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ABSTRACT 
We envisage a fine-grained access control solution that allows a user‟s access privilege to 
be linked to the confidence level (hereafter referred to as the assurance level) in 
identifying the user. Such a solution would be particularly attractive to a large-scale 
distributed resource sharing environment, where resources are likely to be more 
diversified and may have varying levels of sensitivity and resource providers may wish to 
adjust security protection levels to adapt to resource sensitivity levels or risk levels in the 
underlying environment. However, existing electronic authentication systems largely 
identify users through the verification of their electronic identity (ID) credentials. They 
take into account neither assurance levels of the credentials, nor any other factors that 
may affect the assurance level of an authentication process, and this binary approach to 
access control may not provide cost-effective protection to resources with varying 
sensitivity levels.  
To realise the vision of assurance level linked access control, there is a need for an 
authentication framework that is able to capture the confidence level in identifying a user, 
expressed as an authentication Level of Assurance (LoA), and link this LoA value to 
authorisation decision-making. This research investigates the feasibility of estimating a 
user‟s LoA at run-time by designing, prototyping and evaluating an authentication model 
that derives an LoA value based upon not only users‟ ID credentials, but also other factors 
such as access location, system environment and authentication protocol used.   
To this aim, the thesis has identified and analysed authentication attributes, processes and 
procedures that may influence the assurance level of an authentication environment. It 
has examined various use-case scenarios of authentication in Grid environments (a well-
known distributed system) and investigated the relationships among the attributes in these 
scenarios. It has then proposed an authentication model, namely a generic e-
authentication LoA derivation model (GEA-LoADM). The GEA-LoADM takes into 
account multiple authentication attributes along with their relationships, abstracts the 
composite effect by the multiple attributes into a generic value called the authentication 
LoA, and provides algorithms for the run-time derivation of LoA values. The algorithms 
are tailored to reflect the relationships among the attributes involved in an authentication 
instance. The model has a number of valuable properties, including flexibility and 
extensibility; it can be applied to different application contexts and supports easy addition 
of new attributes and removal of obsolete ones. 
The prototypes of the algorithms and the model have been developed. The performance 
and security properties of the LoA derivation algorithms and the model are analysed here 
and evaluated based on the prototypes. The performance costs of the GEA-LoADM are 
also investigated and compared against conventional authentication mechanisms, and the 
security of the model is tested against various attack scenarios. A case study has also 
been conducted using a live system, the Multi-Agency Information Sharing (MAIS) 
system. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1 Electronic Authentication (E-Authentication) 
Electronic authentication (e-authentication) is an electronic process by which a claimant 
(i.e. an individual or a software component) can be identified by a verifier (i.e. a party 
that establishes the identity of the claimant). It provides assurance as to whether someone 
or something is who or what they claim to be in a digital environment. Thus, e-
authentication plays a key role in the establishment of trust relationships for electronic 
commerce, electronic government and many other social interactions. It is also an 
essential component of any strategy for protecting resources (services and data), 
information systems and networks and other assets from unauthorised access or identity 
theft. E-authentication is therefore vital for establishing accountability online and for 
securing resource sharing in distributed environments. 
A typical e-authentication procedure consists of three key phases. The first phase is user 
registration/user identity proofing and credential issuance. The second phase is a claimant 
authentication process and the third phase is credential renewal/revocation/destruction. 
For example, if a user wishes to access certain services from a service provider (SP) 
he/she first needs to register with a Registration Authority (RA), which could be the SP 
itself or a third party that provides the credential management service for the SP. 
Depending on the type of service that the SP provides, the RA may also need to 
demonstrate that the identity is a real identity and that the user is the person who is 
entitled to use that identity (i.e. user identity proofing). For example, if a user applies for 
a free e-mail service, identity proofing is usually unnecessary; whereas a strict identity 
proofing process is required if a user applies for an online banking service. After 
successful user registration, the user can subsequently be issued a credential. The 
credential could either be something he/she knows (e.g. a pin or a password), or 
something he/she has (e.g. a smart card or a USB token with a PKI credential stored in it). 
The user (claimant) proves his/her identity to the verifier by demonstrating that he/she 
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processes a valid credential. When the credential reaches its expiration time, it should be 
renewed if the user requires further access to the SP, or destroyed if not. The credential 
can be revoked if it is, or is suspected to be, compromised. 
1.2 Authentication Levels of Assurance (LoA) 
Different types of credentials may provide different authentication levels of assurance. 
LoA is defined as the strength of authentication required for a service provider to be 
assured that resource access is only granted to users whose identities have been verified. 
It reflects the degree of confidence in an authentication process used to establish the 
identity of a claimant to whom the credential was issued and the degree of confidence 
that the claimant using the credential is indeed the entity to whom the credential was 
issued.  
In fact, all the factors in the three phases of the e-authentication procedure influence the 
LoA established. In addition to the type of authentication credential (or authenticator or 
token) used by the claimant, such factors also include the authentication protocol used by 
the underlying authentication service and how the credentials are managed. The latter 
encompasses issues such as the token technology that is used to store the credential, the 
manner in which a claimed identity is bound to an authentication credential, the life-cycle 
management of the credential and whether the credential service provider (CSP) has 
sufficient operating procedures, processes and policy frameworks to establish the 
required level of trust. Furthermore, the extent to which an authentication event is 
coupled to an authorisation event should also be taken into account when the LoA is 
established. These authentication factors, processes and procedures mentioned above can 
collectively be called LoA-effecting attributes. In other words, we now have the following 
definition. 
Definition 1 - LoA-effecting attributes: An LoA-effecting attribute refers to a factor that 
plays a part in the value of an authentication level of assurance associated with an 
authentication instance (an authentication instance is an authentication event that takes 
place in an authentication environment). For example, authentication credential/token 
types, authentication protocol/mechanisms and the processes/procedures in managing 
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users‟ credentials are all examples of LoA-effecting attributes.  
Once the LoA-effecting attributes are identified, their individual contributions towards 
the overall authentication level associated with an authentication instance should be 
quantified or determined.  To this end, we have two further definitions. 
Definition 2 – A component LoA (denoted as LoAx): A component LoA, LoAx, refers to 
the LoA value contributed by LoA-effecting attribute x. For example, LoAAuthNMethod is 
used to denote the LoA contribution made by the authentication method used in an 
authentication instance.  
Definition 3 – An aggregate LoA (denoted as Agg-LoA): The Agg-LoA refers to the 
overall LoA value determined by the combined effects of multiple LoA-effecting 
attributes involved in an authentication instance. For example, if there are n LoA-
effecting attributes 0},,...,,{ 21 naaa n  in an authentication instance, each with a 
component LoA, LoAi where 0],,1[  nni , then the aggregate LoA for this 
authentication instance is determined by the component LoA values of the n 
attributes },...,{ 21 nLoALoALoA . In other words, given component LoA values, the 
aggregate LoA associated with an authentication instance can be determined by the 
following equation: 
Agg-LoA = f(LoA1, LoA2, … , LoAn)                                        (1.1) 
where f is a function capturing the relationship among the n attributes. 
1.3 Research Motivation 
In a typical access control process, once a user has made an access request, the user is 
authenticated then an authorisation process is invoked to make a grant or deny decision 
on the access request. The authorisation decision is usually based on the user‟s identity, 
his/her membership or role and access permission, which is typically expressed as „what 
action on which object‟. In other words, an access control policy is usually expressed 
using the tuple <subject/identity, role/membership, action, object>. If a user is 
authenticated and the access request made by the user conforms to the specified access 
control policy, the authorisation process will make a grant decision and the access will be 
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permitted. Otherwise, it will be denied. This approach to access control is a binary 
approach. A grant or deny authorisation decision is made based merely upon the outcome 
of a credential-based authentication process. It does not quantify the assurance level of 
the process. It is well known that identity authentication cannot always produce a perfect 
and reliable outcome [Gang01]. Different authentication instances in different 
authentication environments, as influenced by the use of different credentials, 
authentication protocols and/or token management procedures, may result in different 
levels of assurance. These different LoAs should be taken into account when an access 
request is being granted. This is because in a large-scale distributed resource sharing 
environment, resources are likely to be more diversified and may have varying levels of 
sensitivity, or resource providers may wish to adjust security protection levels to adapt to 
resource sensitivity levels or the risk levels in the underlying environment. The existing 
approach to access control, disregarding the quality of authentication in authorisation 
decision-making, cannot satisfy the need for an effective and cost-efficient security 
provision in the diversified resource sharing environments. For example, if we opt for a 
simpler or cheaper authentication method that satisfies the authentication requirements of 
less-sensitive resources, then the more-sensitive resources will be put at a higher risk. On 
the other hand, if we choose a more stringent authentication method to satisfy the 
authentication requirements related to more-sensitive resources, access to the less-
sensitive resources will entail unnecessary higher costs in performance and usability as 
more secure credentials and a more stringent authentication procedure usually introduces 
a higher level of performance and usability costs. To address this weakness and to 
optimise performance and usability while at the same time providing an adequate level of 
protection, there is a need for an authentication framework that can capture the 
confidence level in identifying a user, expressed as an authentication LoA, and link this 
LoA value to authorisation decision-making.  
1.4 Research Challenges 
There are a number of challenges that must be overcome when designing such a 
framework. Firstly, there are typically multiple attributes influencing the value of an 
aggregate LoA in an authentication instance. In addition, the number and types of LoA-
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effecting attributes may differ in different authentication contexts/environments. The 
framework designed should be able to accommodate this diversified feature. Also, as 
technology advances, there may be new emerging LoA-effecting attributes that should to 
be taken into account or obsolete ones taken out of the equation when evaluating an 
aggregate LoA value, so the framework should allow for an easy addition/deletion of 
new/obsolete LoA-effecting attributes. Secondly, the impacts (i.e. weightings) of different 
LoA-effecting attributes on the aggregate LoA may vary and those of the same LoA-
effecting attribute may change over time or in different authentication 
contexts/environments. In real life, it should be the access control policy makers who 
decide the relative weightings of multiple LoA-effecting attributes in their authentication 
process. Such decisions are dependent on a number of factors, including their access 
control policy, how authentication services are provided, the trustworthiness of the 
authentication service, etc. Basically, the more reliable and trust-worthy an LoA-effecting 
attribute, the higher the impact or greater the contribution it should have towards the 
aggregate LoA. Thirdly, the relationship between different attributes may vary. Some 
attributes may jointly reinforce the overall authentication assurance level (i.e. in an 
additive relationship), while others may follow the weakest link principle. Figure 1.1 
outlines the challenging issues for designing the framework as discussed above and 
illustrates the methods used to address these challenging issues.  
 
Figure 1.1 Research methodology and design challenges 
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1.5 Research Aim and Objectives  
We envisage creating a fine-grained access control solution that allows a user‟s access 
privilege to be linked to the assurance level in identifying the user. For example, if a user 
requests access for a resource object with a higher sensitivity level, and/or the risk level 
in the underlying access environment is higher, we could impose a higher LoA value 
which the user has to satisfy before he can be granted access. The use of LoA in access 
control decision making acknowledges the fact that the more LoA-effecting attributes that 
are considered or used in identifying a user, the higher the reliability and the confidence 
level we will have in the authentication outcome, thus the more privileges the system 
could grant to the user. Furthermore, the more the resource is worth and/or the higher the 
risks in the underlying access environment, the more stringent the authentication process 
should be. Such a solution can provide more fine-grained access control than the existing 
binary approach mentioned earlier. It would be particularly attractive to large-scale 
distributed resource sharing environments where resources under protection are more 
likely to be diversified.  
The aim of this research is to set the first step to achieving this vision of LoA-linked 
access control: that is to design, prototype, and evaluate an authentication framework that 
takes into account not only users‟ ID credentials, but also other LoA-effecting attributes, 
such as authentication mechanism, access environment, authentication protocol used, and 
derives the LoA value of a user in a given authentication instance based upon the set of 
LoA-effecting attributes involved in the instance.  
To fulfil this aim, the following objectives have been defined: 
1. To investigate and critically analyse related work in network/distributed system 
authentication and authentication level of assurance. 
2. To identify and study different authentication scenarios and models used in 
distributed systems with the aim of identifying factors or parameters (i.e. LoA-
effecting attributes) that may affect the authentication LoA. 
3. To study the relationships among multiple LoA-effecting attributes in various 
authentication use-case scenarios and models and to devise algorithms to capture the 
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aggregated effects in these scenarios and models. 
4. To design an authentication framework that, for a given set of LoA-effecting 
attributes in an authentication instance, could derive an aggregate LoA value in real-
time based upon individual LoA values of the attributes, their respective impacts and 
their mutual relationships. 
5. To prototype the model designed. 
6. To conduct testing, analyses and case studies to evaluate the security and 
performance of the model using the prototype. 
1.6 Achievements and Novel Contributions 
This research has made the following major advances. The first is the design, prototyping 
and evaluation of aggregate LoA derivation algorithms. The second is the design, 
implementation and evaluation of a generic e-authentication LoA derivation model 
(GEA-LoADM). More details of these novel contributions are given below. 
Aggregate LoA Derivation Algorithms 
The first novel contribution is the identification of two relationships among LoA-
effecting attributes and the design of algorithms that capture these two relationships and 
derive an aggregated authentication LoA value given a set of LoA-effecting attributes in 
each of the relationships. 
One of the two relationships is the weakest link relationship (WLR), and the other is the 
additive relationship (AR). The WLR algorithm captures the relationship among a set of 
LoA-effecting attributes that are included in an authentication instance in the form of n 
operational chain. The aggregate LoA of the attribute set in the WLR is equal to the 
lowest component LoA of individual attributes. The AR algorithm captures the 
relationship among a set of LoA-effecting attributes that are involved in an authentication, 
where their component LoA values reinforce each other. The aggregate LoA of this 
attribute set should not be less than the highest value of the component LoA value of the 
attribute set. 
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LoA-effecting attribute hierarchical structure 
The second major novel contribution is the design of the LoA-effecting attribute 
hierarchical structure (AHS). As discussed in Section 1.4, the number and types of LoA-
effecting attributes involved in an authentication process are application dependent. 
Different authentication models or use-case scenarios may involve the use of a different 
set of LoA-effecting attributes. In addition, the same user being authenticated in two 
different authentication instances may also lead to two different sets of such attributes. 
This is because they are also dependent on access policies that are, in turn, influenced by 
factors such as asset values and the underlying risks in the access environment. In this 
regard, the author has investigated and extended the attributes identified by NIST [Burr06] 
and OASIS [Samlac] and, produced a set of generic LoA-effecting attributes. 
Furthermore, the author has examined the mutual relationships among these attributes 
and created a hierarchical structure that can accommodate these attributes in a systematic 
manner. The significance of this AHS is that it provides a structure for systematic and 
run-time determination of an aggregate LoA value given a set of LoA-effecting attributes. 
Generic e-authentication LoA derivation model 
The third major novel contribution is the design of the GEA-LoADM model that 
incorporates aggregate LoA algorithms and the AHS structure. The model is capable of 
collecting LoA-effecting attributes, retrieving the component LoA value of each attribute 
and deriving an aggregate LoA value for an authentication instance in real time. 
Publications: 
 Li Yao and Ning Zhang, “Quantifying Authentication Levels of Assurance in Grid 
Environments”, the 6th Information Assurance and Security Conference 2010 
(IAS2010), Aug 23-25,  2010, Atlanta, USA, pp 298-303  
  Li Yao and Ning Zhang, “A Generic Authentication LoA Derivation Model”, the 
24th IFIP International Information Security Conference (SEC2009), May 18-20, 
2009, Coral Beach Hotel, Pafos, Cyprus, IFIP series published by Springer, pp. 98-
108 
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 Nenadic, A.; Ning Zhang; Li Yao; Morrow, T. Levels of Authentication Assurance: 
an Investigation Information Assurance and Security, 2007. IAS 2007. Third 
International Symposium on Volume, Issue , 29-31 Aug. 2007 Page(s):155 – 160 
 Chin, J.S.; Zhang, N.; Nenadic, A.; Yao, L.; Brooke, J.M.; Towards Context 
Constrained Authorisation for Pervasive Grid Computing Communication Systems 
Software and Middleware, 2007. COMSWARE 2007. 2nd International Conference 
on 7-12 Jan. 2007 Page(s):1 – 7 
 N. Zhang, L. Yao et al; Achieving Fine-grained Access Control in Virtual 
Organisations, doi: 10.1002/cpe.v19:9 Concurrency and Computation: Practice and 
Experience Volume 19 Issue 9, Pages 1333 – 1352, 2006 
 N. Zhang, L. Yao, J. Chin, A. Nenadic, A. McNab, A. Rector, C. Goble, Q. Shi, 
"Plugging a Scalable Authentication Framework into Shibboleth," wetice, pp.271-
276, 14th IEEE International Workshops on Enabling Technologies: Infrastructure for 
Collaborative Enterprise (WETICE'05), 2005 
1.7 Thesis Outline 
This thesis identifies and analyses the attributes, processes and procedures that may 
influence the assurance level of an authentication instance. It identifies and examines four 
use-case scenarios of authentication in Grid environments and investigates the 
relationships between the attributes in these scenarios. It then proposes an authentication 
model, namely a generic e-authentication LoA derivation model (GEA- LoADM). The 
GEA-LoADM takes account of multiple authentication attributes and their individual 
LoA values along with their relationships to derive an aggregate LA for the authentication 
instance. The model has a number of valuable properties, including flexibility and 
extensibility; it can be applied to different application contexts and supports easy addition 
of new attributes and removal of obsolete ones. The prototypes of the algorithms and the 
model have been developed. The performance and security properties of the LoA 
derivation algorithms and the model are analysed and evaluated against the prototypes. 
The prototypes are tested against both conventional authentication mechanisms to 
investigate the performance cost and various attack scenarios to measure the security 
level. A real-life use case study is presented at the end of the thesis.  
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In detail, Chapter 2 investigates the related works in the topic area of authentication LoA, 
provides an in-depth survey of e-authentication technologies and examines the 
authentication solutions in large-scale distributed system environments. Chapter 3 
identifies and investigates authentication LoA-effecting attributes in these environments. 
It also identifies and analyses the relationships among the attributes and discusses 
methods to determine the weightings of LoA-effecting attributes. Chapter 4 presents the 
design, implementation and evaluation of three aggregate authentication LoA derivation 
algorithms. Chapter 5 describes the design of a generic e-authentication LoA derivation 
model (GEA-LoADM) including its architecture and architectural components. Chapter 6 
prototypes and evaluates the GEA-LoADM model using a real-life case study; the 
performance and security of the GEA-LoADM model are also analysed. Chapter 7 
concludes the thesis and suggests future works. 
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Chapter 2  
Authentication LoA and E-authentication 
Technologies  
2.1 Chapter Introduction 
This chapter provides an insight into main-stream authentication technologies and their 
authentication levels of assurance (LoA). Section 2.2 gives the definition of 
authentication LoA and discusses related works in defining LoA. Section 2.3 examines 
main-stream e-authentication technologies and discusses their authentication LoA. 
Section 2.4 uses the Grid system as an exemplar distributed application to investigate the 
factors that may have impacts on the authentication LoA. Section 2.5 concludes the 
chapter and highlights research approaches for the next step. 
2.2 Authentication LoA 
There have been number of efforts to define and use LoA for transaction or resource 
protection. These efforts, which will be discussed here, include those by the E-
Government/E-Service community [UKloa00, UKloa02, OMB03, Burr06], the 
Grid/Higher Education (HE) Community [InComm, IGTF-1, IGTF-2], and research 
communities [Cree04, Conv04, Nena06, Zhan06].  
2.2.1 The E-Government Initiative 
The first effort to define authentication LoA was made in 2000 by the UK Office of the 
e–Envoy (now Cabinet Office e-Government Unit) in its „E-government authentication 
framework‟ guideline [UKloa00]. In the guideline, four distinctive authentication 
assurance levels, ranging from 0 to 3, were identified in terms of the sensitivity and 
importance of transactions. The document also gives guidance to service providers on 
how to classify transactions into different groups based on potential impact due to 
authentication errors, and how to allocate an applicable assurance level to each group. 
The identified transaction classes and the related authentication assurance levels as 
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defined in the guidance are summarised below.  
 Level 0: Informal transactions. Misappropriation of identity or repudiation of 
transaction would not result in inconvenience to the identity holder, risk to their 
personal safety, financial loss or distress to any party. An authentication service is 
categorised as Level 0 if no trust is put in the identities claimed by clients. 
 Level 1: Personal transactions. Mistaken identity would have a minor impact to one 
or more of the involved parties, as information involved is personal but non-sensitive. 
Misappropriation of identity or repudiation of transaction would not result in major 
inconvenience to the identity holder, risk to their personal safety, financial loss or 
distress to any party. For a Level 1 authentication service, users identify themselves 
by presentation of a credential, which could be a username, and demonstrate the 
knowledge of a related secret, which could be a password. 
 Level 2: Transactions with financial or statutory consequence. Misappropriation of 
identity or repudiation of transaction might result in substantial inconvenience to the 
identity holder (but not risk to their personal safety), significant financial loss or 
distress to any party. It might also assist in commissioning a serious crime, hinder its 
detection or materially damage the reputation of the identity holder. For a Level 2 
authentication service, users identify themselves by presentation of a credential, 
which would preferably be a digital certificate, and demonstrate the right to that 
credential by proving the possession of both the corresponding private key and a 
password or biometrics. The validity of a credential must be time-bound and the 
revocation status of the credential must be checked at the time of transaction. 
 Level 3: Transactions with substantial financial, statutory or safety consequence. 
Misappropriation of identity or repudiation of transaction might result in substantial 
inconvenience to the identity holder, risk to their personal safety, significant financial 
loss or distress to any party. For a Level 3 authentication service, users identify 
themselves by presentation of a digital certificate, which would preferably be stored 
in a secure hard token, and demonstrate the right to that certificate by proving the 
possession of both the corresponding private key and a password or biometrics. Face-
to-face user registration is required at the time of obtaining a credential, and similar to 
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Level 2, the validity of the credential must be time-bound and the revocation status of 
the credential must be checked at the time of transaction. 
In September 2002, the third version of this guideline: „Registration and Authentication 
e-Government Strategy Framework Policy and Guidelines‟ [UKloa02], was published. 
This document builds on the previous Authentication Framework and further specifies 
that the assurance level in identifying a client should be defined in terms of trust acquired 
during both the client‟s registration and authentication processes. Registration is defined 
as a complex process consisting of the following steps: identity registration, identity 
validation, identity verification, credential issuance, logging for audit purposes, and 
credential withdrawal. Authentication is a process of requesting an identity and verifying 
it. This document specifies four levels of registration assurance and four levels of 
authentication assurance, which are appropriate for and can be mapped to the four 
identified transaction classes. In addition, the document also defines four categories of 
identification with their implied registration and authentication levels as follows: 
 Anonymous or pseudo-anonymous: neither real-world nor electronic identity is 
required to complete the transaction (registration level: 0; authentication level: 0). 
 Anonymous or pseudo-anonymous with electronic identity: the real-world identity 
of the client is not required to complete the transaction, but the electronic identity 
enables the service provider to recognise the client in repeated transactions 
(registration level: 0; authentication level: 1, 2, or 3). 
 Anonymous or pseudo-anonymous with electronic identity and traceable: the 
real-world identity of the client is not required to complete the transaction, but the 
electronic identity enables the service provider to recognise the client in repeated 
transactions and could be used to trace the real-world identity via the Registration 
Authority that has registered the client (registration level: 1, 2, or 3; authentication 
level: 1, 2, or 3). 
 Real-world identity established: the real-world identity of the client needs to be 
established to some degree before the transaction can be performed (registration level: 
1, 2, or 3; authentication level: 1, 2, or 3). 
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The UK government‟s efforts have laid the cornerstone for all subsequent efforts to 
define and use LoAs. However, these guidelines have only addressed two aspects of 
LoAs, i.e. registration and authentication. Technical and operational requirements on how 
to achieve a given level of assurance were missing in the guidelines. 
While the UK government guidelines define LoAs in terms of sensitivity levels and 
importance of transactions, the US Government's Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB), in its memorandum, „The E-Authentication Guidance for Federal Agencies‟ 
[OMB03], defines levels of authentication assurance in terms of the consequences of the 
authentication errors and misuse of credentials. This memorandum specifies four 
assurance levels (Levels 1 to 4), to help and direct US federal agencies in reviewing e-
government transactions, determining their authentication needs, and ensuring that the 
authentication process satisfies the minimum LoA given the risk level measured in terms 
of potential impacts of authentication errors and the likelihood of their occurrence.  
The OMB-defined four assurance levels are as follows:  
 Level 1 - Little or no confidence in the asserted identity‟s validity 
 Level 2 - Some confidence in the asserted identity‟s validity 
 Level 3 - High confidence in the asserted identity‟s validity 
 Level 4 - Very high confidence in the asserted identity‟s validity 
To satisfy each of the assurance levels as specified by the OMB Memorandum, 
appropriate authentication technologies should be identified, implemented and regularly 
assessed. The complementary document from the US National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST), „NIST SP 800-63: Electronic Authentication Guideline‟ [Burr06], 
identifies the necessary technologies and provides guidance to implement the OMB‟s 
levels of authentication assurance. The guideline defines specific technical requirements 
for each of the four levels of assurance. The definition takes into account the effects of 
authentication token types, authentication protocols and assertion mechanisms for remote 
communication on the authentication strengths. A short summary of the technical 
requirements for each of the four levels is provided below. 
 Level 1: At this level, the authentication mechanism provides some assurance that the 
same claimant is accessing the protected transaction or data. Successful 
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authentication requires the claimant to prove that he/she has control of a credential 
through a secure authentication protocol. Plaintext passwords or secrets are never 
transmitted across the network. This level does not require the use of cryptographic 
protocols that block off-line attacks. For example, password challenge-response 
protocols are allowed at this level, and an eavesdropper, having intercepted such a 
protocol exchange, can launch an off-line dictionary attack in order to discover the 
password. Therefore, there is no requirement at this level to use FIPS (Federal 
Information Processing Standards) approved cryptographic techniques [Fips01]. All 
the authentication tokens and methods as defined for Level 2, 3, or 4, as well as 
passwords and PIN, are allowed at this level. 
 Level 2: This level provides single-factor remote network authentication (SFA). The 
SFA requires one authentication factor, such as things a user knows (passwords, PINs, 
shared secrets, solicited personal information, etc). Successful authentication requires 
the claimant to prove that he/she controls the authentication credential through a 
secure authentication protocol. The use of cryptographic protocols that can prevent 
off-line, replay and on-line guessing attacks is required. Any of the authentication 
tokens of Level 3, or 4 can be used, as well as passwords and PINs. 
 Level 3: This level provides multi-factor remote network authentication (MFA). The 
MFA requires more than one authentication factors, such as combining things a user 
knows and things a user has to form a stronger authentication mechanism. Successful 
authentication requires the claimant to prove that he/she controls the authentication 
token (i.e. proves possession of a soft/hardware token) through a secure 
authentication protocol. Three kinds of tokens may be used: soft cryptographic tokens, 
hard cryptographic tokens and one-time password device tokens. The use of 
cryptographic protocols that can prevent off-line replay, on-line guessing, verifier 
impersonation and man-in-the-middle attacks is required. All sensitive data 
transferred is cryptographically authenticated and, optionally, encrypted under keys 
derived from the authentication process. Any of the authentication tokens of Level 4 
can be used. 
 Level 4: This level is intended to provide the highest practical remote network 
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authentication assurance. Successful authentication requires the claimant to prove that 
he/she controls the authentication token (i.e. proves possession of a hardware token) 
through a secure authentication protocol. This level is similar to Level 3, except that 
only hard cryptographic tokens are allowed. These tokens are hardware (physical) 
devices that cannot be easily copied and which must be unlocked with a password or 
a piece of biometric, and thus provide two-factor authentication. Either public or 
symmetric key technology may be used. 
Similar efforts have also been made by the European Government [Euegov], Japanese 
Government [Jpegov], the Australian Government [Auegov], and the Canadian 
Government [Caegov] as part of their e-government initiatives. These efforts either use or 
adopt a similar specification to the OMB/NIST guidance mentioned above. However, 
these efforts are made in the context of supporting e-Government initiatives. The NIST 
LoA technical guidance only considers the „user-to-system‟ authentication scenario, i.e. 
covering remote electronic authentication of human users to IT systems via a 
communication network. The „system-to-system‟ and „credential delegation‟ scenarios 
are not covered and discussed (More about these scenarios are discussed in Section 2.4.3). 
In the „user-to-system‟ authentication context, it specifies LoA recommendations versus 
token/credential types and authentication protocols for registration, identity proofing and 
records retention. 
2.2.2 The Higher Education (HE) and Grid Communities 
In addition to the e-Government initiatives mentioned above, a number of HE (Higher 
Education) federations across the world, including the InCommon federation in USA 
[Incomm], the Switch (Switzerland) and the AAF (Australia and New Zealand 
federations [Szegov, Austaf], have defined a number of LoA assurance profiles for the 
purpose of access management in their respective communities. 
The InCommon federation, an access management federation of US HE institutions, uses 
the Shibboleth authentication and authorization system to enable cost-effective, privacy-
preserving and federated identity management among its community of participants. In 
its draft document, „Bronze and Silver Credential Assessment Profiles‟ [Incomm], 
InCommon recommends two classes of authentication services to be used by the 
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federation‟s IdPs and defines two Credential Assessment Profiles (CAPs), namely Bronze 
and Silver. The Profiles contain the assessment criteria for IdPs wanting to be qualified 
for providing the Bronze or Silver services. The InCommon Bronze and Silver Profiles 
only recognise password-based authentication systems that employ Web browsers on the 
client side. The Profiles neither recognise PKI certificate-based authentication systems, 
nor systems that use passwords in conjunction with hard (physical) tokens or other 
specialised hardware or proprietary client software. The reason for this is that campuses 
across US HE support mainly the use of password-based authentication services, and 
currently, they do not have any plan for broad adoption of PKI credentials. This is why 
InCommon have only concentrated on defining profiles compliant with US Gov/NIST 
Levels 1 and 2 (note that certificate-based authentication is a prerequisite for Levels 3 
and 4). 
The Swiss HE Federation, SWITCH, has published an informal proposal for using 
authentication assurance levels on their web site [Szegov]. The Federation funded a pilot 
project to examine the opportunities and limitations of using LoAs and multi-factor 
authentication in the Shibboleth infrastructure. The proposal recommends a four-level 
approach as recognised by the US Government, NIST, E-Authentication and InCommon 
federations. 
Parallel to these activities made in HE sectors, efforts are also being made by the Grid 
community to improve access control. The most notable efforts in this category have 
been made by the IGTF (International Grid Trust Federation) WG. IGTF-WG has 
produced a list of authentication profiles specifying two assurance levels: the Classic 
X.509 and SLCS (Short Lived Credential) profiles. The Classic X.509 profile, maintained 
by the European Policy Management Authority for Grid Authentication (EUGridPMA) 
[IGTF-1], focuses on the operational aspects of CAs (i.e. traditional Certificate); whereas 
the SLCS profile, maintained by The Americas Grid Policy Management Authority 
(TAGPMA) [IGTF-2], focuses on the operational aspects of short-lived credential (e.g. 
proxy certificate) services. The profiles respectively cover traditional and SLCS CAs‟ 
operational aspects of LoA, such as identity vetting, certificate expiration, revocation and 
renewal, the CA‟s key size, hardware requirements, the physical security of the CA‟s site 
and audit and disaster recovery procedures.  However, many LoA-effecting factors 
31 
 
brought up by Grid use-case scenarios, such as credential delegation, n-tier authentication, 
authentication via a third-party and attribute assertion, have not been considered in these 
profiles. 
2.2.3 Other Research Communities 
It is worth emphasising that all the LoA guidelines and efforts discussed above centre on 
the user-to-system authentication use-case scenarios. They do not consider machine-to-
machine or software-to-software authentication scenarios. Nor do they address the 
authentication of a person via a physical authentication mechanism, e.g. location-based or 
sensor-based services. In addition, issues related to how LoA may be fed into the 
authorisation process are also outside the scope of these efforts. Most of the existing 
authentication LoA efforts, such as the one recommended by the OMB/NIST, use an off-
line approach to LoA compliance. With this approach, LoA definitions are given as 
guidelines and the parties concerned are required to comply with these guidelines by 
conducting a risk assessment of the underlying system, mapping identified risks to an 
applicable assurance level, selecting appropriate authentication methods and technologies 
based upon the technical guidelines, and validating the implemented system to make sure 
that it has achieved the required assurance level. This off-line, or static, approach to 
authentication assurance level conformance is adequate in a homogeneous environment 
where resources are also homogeneous; they are well defined, their sensitivity levels are 
similar and known prior to run-time, and they are often provided by a single service 
provider, as is the case in e-Government. This approach is certainly not sufficient for 
large-scale distributed resource sharing environments. 
To overcome these limitations, a recent effort has been made to link LoA to authorisation 
decision-making. The FAME-PERMIS (Flexible Authentication Middleware Extensions 
to the PERMIS) software derives an LoA value based upon a user‟s authentication token 
presented to the authentication service and asserts the value to a role-based access control 
decision engine run at the SP (Service Provider) side, in order to achieve LoA linked fine-
grained access control [Nena06, Zhan06]. However, the software only implements the 
LoA-definition versus token types as defined by the NIST guideline. It does not consider 
the impacts of other LoA-effecting attributes. Nor does it provide any algorithms on 
32 
 
deriving authentication LoA given a set of LoA-effecting attributes.  
Other related recent works include the algorithms proposed by the ubiquitous computing 
community [Cree04, Conv04] on the estimation of the trustworthiness of a user. For 
example, [Cree04] proposes a model to calculate the trustworthiness of a user‟s pervasive 
device, and [Conv04] describes a parameterised authentication model for calculating the 
authentication reliability of authentication sensors in sensor-based networks. These works 
are largely developed for the context of a ubiquitous computing environment and centred 
at a broad level of trust, rather than on using authentication LoA to achieve fine-grained 
access control in large-scale distributed environments such as Data Grids. 
2.3 E-Authentication Technologies 
2.3.1 Username and Password Authentication 
A password is a secret that a claimant memorises and uses to authenticate his/her identity. 
The proof a user‟s of knowledge of a password that matches his/her with the username 
authenticates the user. The username/password-based authentication method is easy to 
implement and use and is familiar to most users. As a result, it is widely used in e-
authentication environments.  
With this username/password-based authentication system, the assurance level in 
identifying a user is mainly dependent on the strength of the chosen password, how it is 
stored and the underlying authentication protocol used. A successful impersonation of an 
identity only requires the impersonator to get hold of, or guess, a valid password. 
Moreover, this method suffers from some password-inherent disadvantages, e.g. difficult-
to-guess passwords are difficult to remember, and easy-to-remember passwords are easy 
to guess. In addition, they are vulnerable to a variety of attacks including guessing, 
network spoofing and dictionary attacks. Due to these facts, username/password-based 
authentication method is regarded as providing a rather low authentication level of 
assurance. NIST e-authentication guideline advises that this method has the 
authentication LoA of Level 2. 
 
33 
 
2.3.2 One Time Password Authentication 
A one-time password (OTP) is a password that is only valid for a single authentication 
session or transaction. OTPs avoid many of the shortcomings that are associated with the 
traditional (static) passwords discussed in the last section. For example, an OTP is 
difficult to guess since it is generated randomly and users are not required to remember 
the password. The most important feature of OTP-based authentication is that, in contrast 
to a static password-based authentication system, it is not vulnerable to replay attacks. 
This means that, if a potential attacker manages to record an OTP that was previously 
used to log into a service, he/she will not be able to abuse it since it will be no longer 
valid. On the downside, an OTP-based authentication system requires the use of 
additional devices/tokens. In an OTP-based authentication system, the assurance level is 
mainly dependent on the token that stores the OTPs, how the token is activated (by PIN 
or biometric) and the underlying authentication protocol used. NIST e-authentication 
guideline advises that OTP-based authentication systems have the authentication LoA of 
Level 3. 
2.3.3 PKI Software Token Authentication 
PKI software token authentication is a multi-factor authentication method, meaning it 
combines two or more factors to achieve authentication. A PKI software token is a 
cryptographic key stored in an encrypted file on a host computer (Factor 1: something 
you have). Typically, the key is encrypted using a secret derived from a pass phase 
known only to the user (Factor 2: something you know), so the knowledge of the pass 
phase is required to activate the token.  Authentication is accomplished by proving the 
possession and control of the key. Examples of software tokens include the default 
Windows Cryptographic Service Provider (CSP) keystore [Marc03] and the 
Mozilla/Firefox Web browser keystore [Marc03].  
Internet Explorer/Windows keystore stores a private key and the certificate of the 
corresponding public key (which are collectively referred to as a cryptographic credential) 
as a binary “blob” in the registry by default. This approach makes the private key and 
certificate as secure as the underlying operating system, and the operating system is 
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responsible for allowing/denying access to the registry. The Mozilla/Firefox Web 
browser keystore stores a cryptographic credential in a subdirectory of the application 
named „.mozilla‟. The private key of the credential is stored in a file named „key3.db‟ and 
the certificate(s) in a file named „cert7.db‟ (Firefox uses „cert8.db‟). Both of these files 
are binary data in Berkeley DB 1.85 format. These files are protected by the file structure 
permission and a password specified by the owner of the credential, so that any 
application capable of reading the Berkeley DB format is still required to provide the 
password to read/modify the plaintext.  
The standard software keystores have the disadvantage of being immobile. Once a private 
key is installed and used on one host, the only way to transport it to another is to export it 
onto a portable hard disk or some other mobile storage medium, and re-import it onto the 
„new‟ host. In addition, after exporting the key, the user must remember to erase it from 
the „old‟ host otherwise the key would be at risk of being stolen. As users become more 
mobile and are expected to use multiple hosts, this immobility hinders its usability. 
However, as this type of keystore is software-based and the processes that use it are 
standardised, the costs incurred in its deployment and management are relatively low. 
The software token authentication is vulnerable to a number of threats. [Marc03] has 
given an in-depth investigation of some of these threats. For example, by hijacking a 
client‟s CryptoAPI library, „crypt32.dll‟, an attacker can steal the user‟s private key and 
use it to forge the client‟s signatures. For example, an attacker may implant an executable 
program on the victim‟s machine and when the victim inputs the password to unlock the 
key, the program steals the password and acquires a copy of the private key without 
triggering any extra window that might alert the user. This attack method is particularly 
useful for stealing medium-or high-security private keys from IE (in a client-side SSL 
negotiation, for example). Other identified attack techniques include DLL injection and 
scripts running inside the HTML. Owing to these considerations, the maximum assurance 
level of this method is defined as Level 3 by NIST e-authentication guidelines. 
2.3.4 PKI Hardware Token Authentication 
PKI hardware token authentication is also a multi-factor authentication method. A 
hardware token refers to a cryptographic key that is stored in a hardware device. Access 
35 
 
to the device is typically controlled by a PIN or a user‟s biometric information. 
Authentication is accomplished by proving possession of the device as well as controlling 
the use of the key. Examples of hardware tokens include smart cards and USB tokens. 
Two API standards have been defined for communicating to a hardware token device in a 
client desktop environment: the Cryptographic API (CAPI) [CAPIMS] defined by 
Microsoft for the Windows operating system and the Internet Explorer Web browser, and 
RSA‟s PKCS#11 [Pkcs11] that can be used for all operating systems and the 
Mozilla/Firefox web browser.  
When using a hardware token for PKI-based authentication, the key pair is generated 
inside the card and the public key is exported to a CA for key certification (i.e. the public 
key is digitally signed by the CA). The private key never comes out of the card, which 
eliminates the risk of it being stolen or misused. Once the certificate is generated and 
signed, it is loaded back into the card. Hardware tokens are generally tamper-resistant, 
and in order to impersonate the card‟s owner, an attacker must get hold of his token as 
well as work out the PIN used to lock the card. Hardware tokens are superior to software 
tokens in terms of keeping private keys secure and supporting users‟ mobility. However, 
their deployment can be costly and tedious. Token devices produced by different 
manufacturers use different drivers and client software, and there is a lack of a standard 
to unify them and make them inter-operable. For a specific token device connected to a 
specific operating system, a specific driver and software would have to be installed on 
each host to be used by a user. This deployment hurdle greatly restricts the wide-scale 
adoption of this method.  
Hardware tokens noticeably increase the security level of the underlying authentication 
system. According to the NIST Electronic Authentication Guideline, they provide the 
highest level of assurance (Level 4) among all the known authentication mechanisms. 
Security threats faced by hardware tokens are of two types: Traditional Mathematical 
Attacks (TMA) and physical attacks. The TMA attacks are normally done using 
algorithms that can be modelled and generalised. Examples include the Single-Exponent 
Multiple-Data attack, the Multiple-Exponent Single-Data attack and the Zero-Exponent 
Multiple-Data attack [Mess00]. These traditional attacks require the acquisition and 
manipulation of extremely large amounts of data, and thus may not necessarily be 
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practical. Physical attacks include Simple Power Analysis (SPA) and Differential Power 
Analysis (DPA) [Mess00]. With the SPA attack, an attacker uses power consumption 
patterns to learn the bit values of a secret key. The DPA attack, on the other hand, uses 
statistical techniques to extract tiny differences in power consumption and extract the bit 
values of the secret key.  
2.3.5 Assertion-based Authentication 
Assertions are statements from a verifier or identity provider (IdP) to a service provider 
that contain authentication information about a claimant. The SP uses the information in 
the assertion to identify the claimant and make authorisation decisions about his or her 
access to resources controlled by the SP. An assertion includes identification and 
authentication statements regarding the claimant, and may additionally include further 
attribute statements of the claimant to support the authorisation decision at the SP.  
Assertion-based authentication supports the process of Single-Sign-On for claimants, 
allowing them to authenticate once to a verifier and subsequently obtain services from 
multiple SPs without further authentication. A typical assertion-based authentication 
process can be broken down into two interactions, one between the claimant and verifier, 
and the other between the verifier and the SP. The interaction between claimants and 
verifiers, are similar to the authentication mechanisms described in previous sections, 
while the interaction between verifiers and SPs can be one of the two assertion modes: 
 Push mode – In the push mode, a claimant authenticates to a verifier by using an e-
authentication mechanism. Following successful authentication of the claimant, the 
verifier creates an assertion and sends it back to the claimant, which is then forwarded 
to the SP. The assertion is used by the claimant to authenticate to the SP.  
 Pull mode – In the pull mode, a claimant authenticates to a verifier by using an e-
authentication mechanism. Following successful authentication of the claimant, the 
verifier creates an assertion as well as an assertion reference (which identifies the 
verifier and includes a pointer to the full assertion held by the verifier). The assertion 
reference is sent to the claimant to be forwarded to the SP. In this mode, the assertion 
reference is used by the claimant to authenticate to the SP. The SP then uses the 
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assertion reference to explicitly request (pull) the assertion and, if necessary, the 
attributes of the claimant from the verifier, too.  
There are three types of assertion technologies, HTTP cookies, SAML (Security 
Assertions Markup Language) assertions, and Kerberos. 
2.3.5.1 HTTP Cookies 
HTTP cookies are one of the most widely used assertion technologies. A HTTP cookie is 
a small piece of text file used by a browser to store information provided by a particular 
web site. The content of the cookie is sent back to the web site each time the browser 
requests a page from it. The web site uses the content to identify the user and prepare 
customised web pages for that user or to authorise the user for certain transactions.  
There are two types of cookies: session cookies, and persistent cookies. A session cookie 
is erased as soon as the related session is finished, e.g. when a user logs out from an 
account or when a user closes a web browser. A session cookie is stored in the temporary 
memory and is not retained after the browser is closed. A persistent cookie, on the other 
hand, is stored on a user‟s hard drive until it expires (persistent cookies are set with 
expiration dates) or until the user deletes it. 
Cookies can be used by the claimant to re-authenticate to a server after the 
communication channel between them has been closed. This may be considered a use of 
assertion technology in pull mode. In this case, the server acts as a verifier when it sets 
the cookie in the claimant‟s browser, and as an SP when it requests the cookie from a 
claimant who wishes to re-authenticate to it. As shown in Table 2.2, NIST advises an 
LoA value of 1 to 3 for this technology, depending on the assertion expiration time and 
assertion integrity protection mechanism used.  
2.3.5.2 SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) 
SAML is an XML-based framework for creating and exchanging authentication and 
attribute-related information between trusted entities over the Internet [Samlv2]. One of 
the most important design objectives of SAML is to solve the SSO (Single-Sign-On) 
problem. The building blocks of SAML include the Assertion XML schema, which 
defines the structure of the assertion; the SAML protocols, which are used to request 
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assertions and „artifacts‟ (that is, the assertion reference mentioned in Section 2.3.5); and 
the bindings that define the underlying communication protocols (such as HTTP or 
SOAP), which can be used to transport the SAML assertions. SAML supports both the 
„pull‟ and „push‟ modes of assertion. Similar to the Cookie assertion, depending on the 
assertion expiration time and the assertion integrity protection mechanism used, NIST 
advises an LoA value of 1 to 3 for this technology. Table 2.1 details the range values. 
Cookie/SAML Assertion 
LoA value 
Assertion Integrity 
Protection 
Assertion expiration time 
1 Digitally signed/TLS No requirement 
2 Digitally signed/TLS 12 hours 
3 Digitally signed/TLS 2 hours 
Table 2.1 Cookie and SAML Assertion LoA value range 
2.3.5.3 Kerberos 
Kerberos [Toda03, Ietf4120] is a network authentication system for use on physically 
insecure networks. It is based on the symmetric key distribution model proposed by 
Needham and Schroeder [Need78]. It allows entities communicating over networks to 
prove their identity to each other while preventing eavesdropping or replay attacks. It also 
provides for data integrity (detection of modification) and confidentiality (preventing 
unauthorised reading) using symmetric crypto systems such as DES.  
The authentication process proceeds as follows: a claimant sends a request to the verifier 
(i.e. to an authentication server (AS)) requesting a „credential‟ for a given SP. The AS 
responds with the credential encrypted, using the claimant‟s master key. The credential 
consists of 1) a „ticket‟ for the SP, and 2) a temporary encryption key (often called a 
“session key”). The claimant forwards (pushes) the ticket (which contains the client‟s 
identity and a copy of the session key, all encrypted in the SP‟s master key by the AS) to 
the SP. The session key (now shared by the claimant and the SP) is used to authenticate 
the claimant to the SP, and may optionally be used to authenticate the SP to the claimant. 
It may also be used to encrypt further communications between the two parties or to 
exchange a separate sub-session key to be used to encrypt further communication. 
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Depending on the assertion expiration time and the Kerberos ticket generation method, 
NIST advises assurance values of Level 1 to Level 3, with maximum authentication LoA 
3 for this technology. Table 2.2 details the LoA value range. 
Kerberos Ticket 
LoA value 
Assertion Integrity 
Protection 
Ticket generation 
method 
Assertion expiration 
time 
1 Digitally signed/TLS derived from user 
generated passwords 
No requirement 
2 Digitally signed/TLS derived from 
cryptographic key 
12 hours 
3 Digitally signed/TLS derived from 
cryptographic key 
2 hours 
Table 2.2 Kerberos Ticket LoA value range 
2.3.6 Location-based Authentication 
Location-based authentication is an e-authentication technology that proves an 
individual‟s identity and authenticity by detecting his/her presence at a distinct location.  
It can be used to determine whether a person is attempting to log in from an approved 
location, e.g. a user‟s office building or home. If any unauthorised activity is detected, it 
will facilitate finding the individual responsible for that activity.  
Compared to conventional authentication technologies, location-based authentication has 
the benefits of being non-intrusive, i.e. during a location-based authentication process a 
user is typically not required to explicitly present a credential to a verifier. There are a 
number of location-based authentication technologies available [Azum93, Hart94, 
Want92]; however, most of them are designed for ubiquitous computing environments 
thus providing only local authentication. For example, Active Badge [Want92, Hart94] is 
a well-known location-based authentication technology. With this technology, an Active 
Badge is worn on a user and transmits a unique identifier approximately every 10 seconds 
using an infra-red transmission. Sensors placed at fixed positions within a building 
receive these infra-red signals and authenticate the user through software. This type of 
location-based authentication does not provide e-authentication to remote parties unless 
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there is a way to transmit authentication information from a local sensor to the remote 
verifier (such as assertion). By doing so, it falls into the category of assertion-based 
authentication.  
2.3.6.1 IP-based Authentication 
In IP-based authentication, a verifier identifies a claimant by checking if the IP address of 
the claimant is on the allowed list defined as part of the verifier‟s security policy. IP-
based authentication requires the confirmation of fixed IP addresses. The method 
provides a rather low authentication assurance level. It suffers from IP spoofing, and it 
relies on the user environment to provide user vetting and identification. It is usually used 
in circumstances that involve many users but where the sensitivity level of the resource 
does not require individual user identification. An exemplar use of the authentication 
method is the university online library service, which grants access based upon users‟ 
access PC IP addresses within the campus. Therefore, in an authentication environment 
that requires individual user identification and verification, IP-based authentication can 
only be used as an auxiliary authentication method in combination with conventional 
authentication methods to achieve a higher authentication assurance level. The NIST 
recommendation does not recognise this authentication method, and thus does not 
recommend any values of authentication LoA. 
2.4 Grid Computing Authentication Solutions 
In addition to the authentication methods discussed above, there are other factors or 
attributes that may also have impacts on authentication LoA. This section uses Grid 
computing, a well known large-scale distributed system, as a platform to identify and 
investigate the additional LoA-effecting factors and attributes. 
2.4.1 Username/Password Authentication Service 
Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) [Welc05], the de facto security solution for Grid, uses 
the username/password authentication service in conjunction with a Web Service security 
(WS-Security) framework [Wssv1.1]. WS-Security defines a number of approved token 
types including Username Token Profile, X.509 Certificate Token Profile, SAML Token 
Profile and Kerberos Token Profile. Username/password authentication uses the 
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„Username Token‟ profile. This profile defines how a Web service client can supply a 
username token as a way of identifying the requester from a username and, optionally, by 
supplying a password. The following XML snippet shows a sample WS-Security 
UsernameToken profile: 
<wsse:UsernameToken wsu:Id="Example"> 
  <wsse:Username> ... </wsse:Username>  
  <wsse:Password Type="..."> ... </wsse:Password>  
  <wsse:Nonce EncodingType="..."> ... </wsse:Nonce>  
  <wsu:Created> ... </wsu:Created> 
</wsse:UsernameToken> 
Table 2.3 Code snippet of WS-Security UsernameToken 
Within the <wsse:UsernameToken> element, a <wsse:Password> element is specified.  
Two types of passwords are supported: „PasswordText‟ and „PasswordDigest‟. 
„PasswordText‟ refers to a plain password, whereas „PasswordDigest‟ is the hash of a 
password. The „PasswordDigest‟ type can only be used if the Plaintext password is 
available to both the requester and the recipient. Otherwise, the authentication process 
cannot take place. 
When a plain password is used for authentication, the underlying systems must support 
the use of a secure channel to provide confidentiality and integrity. The transport level 
security [Tlsv10], or SSL (secure socket layer), is widely used to protect both the token 
and the entire message body. Message level security [Xmlenc, Xmlsig] may also be used 
to provide these features for selected parts of a message. If a secure channel is available, 
the use of digested passwords does not provide an added level of security over the use of 
plaintext passwords. However, if the underlying transport system does not provide 
enough protection against eavesdropping, the password should be digested and the 
„PasswordDigest‟ element should be used. Even so, the password must be strong enough 
so that simple password guessing attacks will not reveal the secret from a captured 
message. 
When a password is encrypted or hashed, the replay attack threat must be considered. If 
an attacker can impersonate a user by replaying an encrypted or hashed password, then 
learning the actual password is not necessary. In WS-Security, the method of preventing a 
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replay attack is to use a nonce. „<wsse:Nonce>‟ and „<wsu:Created>‟ are two optional 
elements introduced in a „Username Token‟ profile for this purpose. A nonce is a random 
value that the sender creates to be included in each username token that it sends. A SP 
maintains a cache of used nonces and compares them with new ones to detect replay 
attacks. A „<wsu:Created>‟ is a timestamp used to indicate the token‟s creation time. The 
advantage of using a creation timestamp together with a nonce is that it allows the server 
to set an upper-bound time limit to cache the nonce, thus potentially saving the server 
resources. Also, in order for this mechanism to be effective, the nonce and timestamp 
must be digitally signed. 
This authentication method provides a basic authentication service. Although with the 
support of a secure communication channel such as an SSL, it also provides 
confidentiality and message integrity; the password-based authentication method cannot 
support more advanced security features such as user credential delegation and SSO 
(Single-Sign-on). Without the support of these security features, complex Grid tasks are 
difficult to accomplish and/or users may suffer usability problems. For example, a user 
may need to authenticate himself repeatedly during a job session should the job require 
services/resources on multiple sites. 
As advised in the NIST guidelines, the authentication LoA of this method varies with the 
types of password used (i.e. complexity of the password) and the underlying system 
security support. For digest passwords with no secure channel provided, the method has 
authentication LoA 1. For plain text/digest passwords with the secure channel option, it 
has authentication LoA 2. Plaintext passwords without the secure channel option stand 
lower than LoA 1 and are strongly recommended against in real system implementations. 
2.4.2 PKI-based Authentication Service 
PKI certificate-based authentication is the most commonly used authentication method in 
Grids. This is not only because it is a well-tested and realisable technology, but also 
because the trust model of the X.509 ID (identity) credential allows an entity to trust 
another domain‟s/organisation‟s certification authority (CA) without requiring that the 
rest of its domain/organisation do so. With this method, every Grid user/service is 
identified by its Distinguish Name (DN) and is issued with a PKI certificate. The 
43 
 
certificate binds the DN of the user/service to its respective public key. In Globus 
security framework [Welc05], a user may even issue a proxy credential to delegate 
his/her credential to an entity that may act on his/her behalf, and which can be used for 
SSO purposes.  More about Proxy Certificate will be discussed in Section 2.4.3. 
The assurance level of PKI authentication is not only dependent on the strength of the 
credential, but also on factors related to the length, storage and use of the associated 
private key. To counter key guessing and brute force attacks, a key pair with sufficient 
length, and which is created from a true random-number generator, is essential. A viable 
and secure key storage mechanism is also very important. If an attacker can get hold of 
another entity‟s private key, he would then be able to impersonate the legitimate entity 
and access the resource to which the entity is entitled. Two measures are usually taken to 
limit the damage caused by private key compromise. The first is to limit the lifetime of a 
PKI credential (a key pair plus the corresponding certificate). The lifetime of a credential 
is usually determined by the policy of the CA that issued the certificate. There is 
obviously a trade-off between security and user convenience in choosing the length of a 
lifetime for a credential; the longer the lifetime, the higher the risk of a key being 
compromised, but the less often that the user would have to request a new credential. 
Typically, the lifetime of a X.509 ID credential is one year, whereas a proxy credential is 
24 hours. The second measure focuses on protecting an entity‟s private key. Apart from 
software and hardware keystores, an online credential repository (OCR) is another key 
storage method to achieve key security and user convenience [Novo01]. Depending on 
the types of the keystore, NIST advises an LoA value of 3 and 4 for this authentication.  
2.4.3 Credential Delegation and Single Sign-On (SSO) Solution 
Credential delegation and SSO are additional features that are commonly seen in large-
scale distributed systems, such as Grid. The following example presents a Grid scenario 
[Rfc3820] with credential delegation and SSO features and illustrates what a proxy 
credential is used for in such an authentication process. In a company‟s Intranet-based 
Grid, a user, Bob, wants to use a reliable file-transfer service to move a number of large 
files between various hosts. From his workstation, he submits the transfer requests to a 
Grid transfer service A. The transfers are expected to take place without Bob‟s 
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involvement after the initial request is made. Service A controls the schedule of the 
transfers. For each transfer, service A will connect to each of the sources and destination 
hosts and instruct them to initiate a file-transfer connection. A job agent is assumed to be 
running on Bob‟s workstation, periodically checking the progress of the transfers by 
contacting service A. All the transfers and job executions should be performed in a secure 
manner and Bob uses software token-based PKI credential for authentication in his job 
execution. 
 
Figure 2.1 A Grid file transfer scenario 
As shown in the figure above, this job execution requires authentication in a number of 
steps. First of all, Bob needs to mutually authenticate with the file-transfer service A to 
submit the transfer request (step 1). Secondly, service A, with the delegated rights from 
Bob, should mutually authenticate with the storage hosts A, B, C and D (step 2). Thirdly, 
the source and destination hosts of a particular transfer must be able to mutually 
authenticate with each other to ensure the file is being transferred to and from the proper 
parties (step 3). Finally, the agent running on Bob‟s workstation must mutually 
authenticate with the file transfer service in order to check the result of the transfers (step 
4). 
This scenario sets out two related problems. One is credential delegation and the other is 
SSO. In this scenario, various remote processes need to perform file-transfer operations 
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on Bob‟s behalf, and to ensure these operations are performed in a legitimate manner Bob 
must delegate the necessary rights to these processes. For example, service A needs to be 
able to authenticate on Bob‟s behalf with the source and destination hosts, and Bob must 
delegate his rights to service A so that it can authenticate with the hosts. It is also 
convenient for Bob to enter his password once and then run a program that will submit all 
the file-transfer requests to the transfer service. Bob can then periodically check on the 
status of the transfers. This program (i.e. the job agent) needs to be given the rights to be 
able to perform all of these operations securely, without requiring repeated access to the 
software token or Bob‟s PIN. 
GSI addresses these problems with proxy credentials. A proxy credential consists of a 
short-term (proxy) private key and a proxy certificate (PC) [Rfc3820]. The PC certifies 
the corresponding proxy public key. A PC is similar to a X.509 ID certificate, except that 
the PC is not signed by a CA. Rather, it is signed by its owner with his/her long-term 
private key corresponding to the public key certified in the ID certificate. A proxy 
credential is a short-term credential delegated to another entity by its owner and is used in 
places where the use of the owner‟s long-term credential is necessary.  
By using the proxying technique, Bob‟s long-term private key stored in the token only 
needs to be accessed once in order to create a proxy credential. The proxy credential 
allows the client/agent program to be authorised as Bob when submitting the requests to 
the transfer service. Access to the long-term credential is not required after the proxy 
credential creation and within the life time of the proxy credential. The client program on 
the workstation can delegate to service A the right to act on Bob‟s behalf. This allows 
service A to authenticate to the storage hosts on behalf of Bob and to inherit Bob‟s 
privileges in order to start the file transfers. Then service A can delegate to the hosts the 
right to act on Bob‟s behalf so that each pair of hosts involved in a file-transfer can 
mutually authenticate to each other in order to perform the file transfer operation in a 
secure manner. When the agent on the workstation reconnects to service A to check on 
the status of the transfer operations, it can perform mutual authentication on behalf of 
Bob. 
The Grid community has developed the following versions of PCs with the latest one 
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fully compliant to the RFC 3820 specification: 
 The old version: Legacy proxy certificates used prior to the drafting of RFC 3820. 
They are deprecated and should only be used when it is necessary to interact with 
legacy Globus installations. It is recognisable if the „CommonName‟ attribute has a 
value of “proxy” and “limited proxy”. 
 GT4 Default version: These proxies follow the format defined in RFC 3820, except 
that they use a proprietary Object ID (1.3.6.1.4.1.3536.1.222) for the „ProxyCertInfo‟ 
extension. It will be replaced with the fully RFC 3820 compliant in a future version of 
the Globus Toolkit. 
 Fully RFC 3820 compliant version: These proxies are fully compliant with RFC 3820. 
They are expected to be the default in the future. 
Compared to a X.509 ID certificate, a proxy certificate has a newly-defined critical X.509 
extension, the „Proxy Certificate Information‟ (PCI) extension. The purpose of this 
extension is to allow the PC issuer to express his/her desire to delegate rights to the PC 
and also to limit further PCs that can be issued by that PC holder. 
There are two fields in the PCI extension. One is the „PCPathLenConstraint‟ field, which 
specifies the maximum depth of the path of PCs that can be signed with this proxy 
credential. A zero value of the „PCPathLenConstraint‟ field means that this credential 
cannot be used to issue other PCs. If the field is not present, then there is no restriction 
and the maximum proxy path length is unlimited.  
Another field is „proxyPolicy‟ which specifies policies on the use of this credential for the 
purpose of authorisation. There are three modes to delegate issuer‟s policies through PCs.  
 Full delegation mode - If an issuer wants to indicate that this is an unrestricted PC 
that inherits all rights from the issuing credential, he/she can use the „id-ppl-
inheritAll‟ value. This mode is in fact an impersonation of its issuer‟s ID credential. 
This approach can easily be integrated with a role-based authorisation system since 
the PC can be treated in the same way as its issuer‟s certificate. However, from a 
security point of view, this delegation mode has the highest risk of the credential 
privileges being misused should the proxy credential be compromised.  
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 Restricted delegation mode - A PC with a restricted usage policy allows an attacker to 
use it subject to the policy specified in the PCI extension, thus providing more 
security assurances. However, the implementation of this mode is more complex than 
the concept. As mentioned before, restricted PCs do not define any particular 
delegation language. Instead, they provide a structure for issuers to choose a policy 
language to express their delegation policy. This design increases the flexibility of a 
PC but causes complications in implementation. The primary issue is that the service 
provider accepting the restricted PC must understand the delegation language used 
and be able to enforce the policies that it imposes. Since it is the issuer who chooses 
the policy language and these policies often contain application-specific restrictions, 
it is difficult to predict and ensure that all the potential delegating SPs understand the 
delegation language. According to the Internet X.509 PKI Certificate and Certificate 
Revocation List (CRL) Profile [Rfc3280], if a critical extension in a certificate cannot 
be recognised by the SP, then the certificate must be rejected. Therefore SPs that do 
not understand the delegation language will not be able to accept a restricted PC, even 
for identity proofing. There have been some attempts to solve the problem. The GSI 
team tried to extend the API between applications and the security libraries, so that 
each of them could have the ability to handle and process given restriction delegation 
policies. For example, the initial implementation of community authorisation service 
(CAS) [Fost03] uses a restricted PC to delegate the policies. However, this method is 
difficult in practice because there is no generalised model and it has to be done on a 
per-application basis. For this reason, the restricted PC has not been widely adopted 
and implemented.  
 None-Delegation mode - If an issuer wants to indicate that this is an independent PC 
that inherits no rights from the issuing certificate, he/she can use the „id-ppl-
independent‟ value. In this case, the PC is used solely for the purpose of confirming 
identity. In this mode, the proxy credential cannot be misused because it does not 
inherit any rights from its issuer. Thus the security risk is considered low. 
A PC issuer can limit what a new PC can be used for by turning off bits in the „Key 
Usage‟ and „Extended Key Usage‟ extensions. Once a key usage or extended key usage is 
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removed, the path validation algorithm ensures that it cannot be added back in a 
subsequent PC. In other words, key usage can only be decreased in a PC chain. The 
„PCPathLenConstraint‟ field of the „proxyCertInfo‟ extension can be used to limit 
subsequent delegation of the PC.  A service may choose only to authorise a request if it 
satisfies certain conditions, such as forbidding delegation. 
In summary, a proxy credential is generally less secure than an identity X.509 credential. 
This is because proxy credentials are usually stored in an unencrypted form on a local file 
system, protected only by the operating system‟s (OS) file system permissions. A user or 
a process can access a proxy credential as long as the user logs in to the OS using the 
account with the access privilege. Therefore, proxy credentials are more vulnerable to 
theft and abuse. To limit any damage caused by credential compromise or abuse, proxy 
credentials are typically given much shorter lifetimes than the user‟s long-term ID 
credentials (usually in the order of hours or days for proxy credentials versus months or 
up to a year for ID credentials). Other ways of limiting the damage are to set more 
restricted policies, limit the key usage and restrict the delegation depth. To sum up, the 
attributes affecting authentication LoA in proxy credentials are the following: 
1) Proxy credential storage 
There are basically two methods to store proxy credential file system permission and 
an online credential repository. File system permission obviously represents a low 
level of assurance and an online credential repository provides a higher assurance 
level.  
2) Policy mode 
As discussed above, there are three policy modes and each policy mode has different 
privilege and security levels.  
3) Key usage and delegation depth 
The PC delegation depth is one important attribute to limit the use of the PC. It 
basically has three conditions; the first is no delegation, the second is one level 
delegation and the third one is n (n>1) level delegation.  
NIST does not identify proxy credential, thus does not advise an authentication LoA for 
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proxy credential-based authentication.  
2.5 The Best Way Forward 
Authentication LoA is an important measure of the strength of an e-authentication 
instance. It can be seen from the discussion above that authentication LoA is dependent 
on many factors associated with an authentication instance. In order to design a 
framework that can be used to estimate an aggregate LoA for a given set of LoA-effecting 
attributes in an authentication instance and to use the estimated LoA to govern access 
control, we need to 1) investigate all the authentication models and examine their LoA-
effecting attributes, 2) study and quantify their respective LoA contributions (called 
component LoA) to the overall strength of an authentication instance, 3) analyse the 
attributes‟ inter-relationships and composite effect on the overall strength (i.e. aggregate 
LoA or Agg-LoA), and 4) design algorithms to derive the Agg-LoA for the inter-
relationship. In this case, if we could classify resources into groups based upon their 
sensitivity levels and the levels of risks experienced in the underlying access environment; 
and assign each resource group with a minimum LoA requirement, LoAR, then we can 
achieve a more fine-grained access control by linking the Agg-LoA to the LoAR via run-
time authentication method selection and authorisation decision-making. For example, an 
access request for a particular resource group with the minimum LoA requirement of 
LoAR can only be granted if the Agg-LoA derived from an authentication instance is not 
lower than the minimum LoA value as required by the resource group, i.e. the condition 
(Agg-LoA   LoAR) must hold. In order to satisfy this condition, the requester would 
have to choose a stronger form of authentication method that could lead to a sufficient 
assurance level in identifying the requester. This LoA-linked access control method 
actually achieves LoA-linked, or in a broad sense, risk-aware access control mapping 
resource sensitivity levels and/or risk levels in the underlying access environment to the 
run-time authentication requirement.  
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Chapter 3  
Authentication LoA-Effecting Attributes: 
Identification and Analysis 
3.1 Chapter Introduction 
As discussed in Section 2.5, to design the framework that can be used to estimate an 
aggregate LoA (Agg-LoA) for an authentication instance in an authentication 
environment and to use the Agg-LoA for fine-grained access control, the following issues 
should be addressed:  
1) Identify all the factors, processes and procedures that may influence the assurance (i.e. 
confidence) level of the authentication environment; some of these factors will be 
taken into account as LoA-effecting attributes for LoA derivation in an authentication 
instance.  
2) Quantify or determine a component LoA for each of the LoA-effecting attributes 
identified in 1). 
3) Investigate, identify, and systematically express the inter-relationships among LoA-
effecting attributes. 
4) Devise algorithms to capture these relationships, and use these algorithms to calculate 
an Agg-LoA based upon the component LoAs of all the contributing LoA-effecting 
attributes associated with an authentication process.  
This chapter discusses issues 1, 2 and 3. Issue 4 will be addressed in Chapter 4, Section 
3.2 presents, in detail, a comprehensive list of LoA-effecting attributes identified by the 
author, as well as different working groups. Section 3.3 discusses how to quantify 
component LoA values of individual attributes. Section 3.4 investigates four use-case 
scenarios in a Grid environment. Based upon these scenarios, two types of relationships 
among LoA-effecting attributes have been identified; namely the weakest link 
relationship and the additive relationship. It further investigates potential methods that 
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can be used to quantify the impact (weighting) of additive attributes on an aggregate LoA.  
3.2 Identification of LoA-effecting Attributes 
Identification of LoA-effecting attributes has, to some extent, been addressed by existing 
works, most notably those produced by NIST [Burr06], OASIS (Organisation for the 
Advancement of Structured Information Standards) [Samlv2], and W3C-WSCWG (W3C 
web security context working group) [W3cscw].  
NIST, in its e-authentication guidance published in 2006 [Burr06], has identified the 
following LoA-effecting attributes: 
 the identity proofing process by which an entity is made known to a registration 
authority (RA) or a credential service provider (CSP) prior to the issuance and 
delivery of a credential to the entity; 
 the type (and the strength) of the authentication credential used by a remote entity for 
proving his/her identity, e.g. a PKI credential or a username/password pair;  
 the authentication protocol/method used by the underlying authentication service to 
establish that a remote entity is whom it claims to be;  
 the credential management process, which encompasses issues such as the token 
technology used to store a credential, the manner in which a claimed identity is bound 
to the credential, the life cycle management of the credentials, and whether the 
identity provider (IdP) has sufficient operating procedures, processes and policy 
frameworks to establish the required level of trust;  
 whether and how assertion mechanisms are used to convey the outcome of an 
authentication instance to other parties (e.g. SPs or authorisation engines).  
To date, the NIST LoA specification remains the most comprehensive set of guidelines 
for identity providers implementing systems achieving a pre-defined authentication 
confidence level. However, the NIST LoA recommendation only covers the user-to-
system authentication scenario. It does not address credential delegation scenarios, so it 
only covers a subset of the LoA-effecting attributes. In addition, with regard to LoA 
implementation, the NIST work provides guidelines on authentication technologies 
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versus LoA values which stipulate that the technologies for a given LoA are chosen, 
implemented and evaluated prior to system run. It has not considered a system that gives 
users and service providers the run-time choice of using a particular authentication 
technology, derives an LoA based upon the authentication technology used and the user‟s 
authentication environment, and feeds the LoA into the authorisation decision-making 
process. 
The authentication context (AC) specification [Samlac] defined in the SAML v2.0 
standard specification set by OASIS has also identified a large number of LoA-effecting 
attributes (in the OASIS term, they are called Authentication Contexts, or ACs for short), 
as shown in Table 3.1. The specification has classified the ACs into five categories; 
identification, technical protection, operational protection, authentication method and 
governing agreement. In addition, this specification has also defined an XML-based 
syntax for constructing ACs. It further uses the syntax to define a number of 
authentication context classes. Each class contains a subset of the ACs. Classes have been 
chosen as representative of the current practices and technologies for common 
authentication, scenarios, such as IP-based authentication, username/password-based 
authentication etc. The SAML authentication context definition and classification readily 
allows identity providers and relying parties to negotiate and agree on a mutually 
acceptable AC. 
Category ACs Sub-ACs 
Identification: User 
identification 
 Physical Verification  
 Written consent 
 Governing Agreements 
Technical 
Protection 
Key store  Not defined 
Key activation  Activation PIN 
Key Sharing 
(Private key 
protection 
only) 
 Boolean (yes/no) 
Authentication Principal  Password 
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Method Authentication 
Mechanisms 
 Restricted Password 
 Token 
 Smartcard 
 Activation Pin 
Authenticator  Previous Session 
 Resume Session 
 DigSig 
 Password 
 Restricted Password 
 Zero Knowledge 
 Shared Secret Challenge Response 
 Shared Secret Dynamic Plaintext 
 IP Address 
 Asymmetric Decryption 
 Asymmetric Key Agreement 
 Subscriber Line Number 
 User Suffix 
 Complex Authenticator 
Authenticator 
Transport 
Protocol  
 HTTP 
 SSL 
 Mobile Network No Encryption 
 Mobile Network Radio Encryption 
 Mobile Network EndToEnd 
Encryption 
 WTLS 
 IPSec 
 PSTN 
 ISDN 
 ADSL 
Operational 
Protection 
Operational 
Protection 
 Security Audit 
 Deactivation Call Centre 
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Governing 
Agreements 
 
Table 3.1 List of SAML LoA-effecting attributes (ACs) [Samlac] 
The topic of LoA-effecting attributes has been also discussed by the W3C web security 
context working group (W3C-WSCWG) [W3cscw].  The group‟s mission is to build 
consensus around what information people need from browsers in order to understand 
their security context, to find innovative ways to present this information and raise 
awareness, and to suggest ways to make browsers less susceptible to spoofing of the user 
interfaces used to convey critical security information to end users. The W3C-SCWG has 
specified a baseline set of security context information that should be accessible to web 
users and defined practices for the secure and usable presentation of this information, 
thus enabling users to come to a better understanding of the context within which they are 
operating when making trust decisions on the Web. The work focuses more on educating 
Web users and on regulating the Web browser to enable a secure and usable interface so 
that Web users can make safe trust decisions on the Web. The security contexts specified 
by the group reflects this focus; they are Web-oriented and include Web interactions, user 
agents, entity identification, third-party recommendation and historical browsing 
information areas. The limitation of this work is that all the identified security contexts 
are Web-related. Non-web interaction security contexts are excluded and some important 
security contexts such as protocols and the user‟s security environment are not discussed.  
Table 3.2 lists a comprehensive set of LoA-effecting attributes by merging and extending 
the attributes identified in NIST, OASIS and W3C-SCWG‟s specifications discussed 
above. Three new attributes have been identified by the author. These newly added 
attributes (X.509 proxy credential, online credential repository and IP address) are shown 
in the table in order to differentiate them from work by other people. They are derived 
from the Grid authentication scenarios to be discussed in Chapter 2. 
The attributes listed in Table 3.2 can be classified into two groups: one that cannot be 
opted by users or SPs at run-time (called Offline LoA-effecting attributes), and the other 
that can be opted by users or SPs at run-time (called Run-time LoA-effecting attributes). 
The offline LoA-effecting attributes are typically managed or enforced through 
governance, rather than run-time choices by the user. An exemplar factor in this group is 
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user registration procedures, which are usually governed through operational processes 
and procedures. The run-time LoA-effecting attributes may change dynamically at run-
time depending on the authentication or access environment contexts, e.g. the 
authentication mechanism used and/or the access location of the requester. The values of 
this group of attributes can be used for deriving the aggregate LoA in a run-time 
authentication process. N.B. The attributes without asterisks are identified by NIST and 
SAML, where those with asterisks are identified by the author. 
Category Attributes Sub-attributes 
 
 
Offline LoA-
effecting 
attributes 
User identification  Physical 
 Written content 
 Online, or close the loop by mail, 
phone or (possibly) e-mail 
 Self assertion, minimal records 
Credential Lifetime, Status or 
Revocation 
 
Operational Protection  Security Audit 
 Deactivation Call Centre 
 
 
 
Run-time 
LoA-effecting 
attributes 
Authentication Credentials  Password & PIN 
 One Time Password 
 X.509 ID Credential 
 *X.509 Proxy Credential* 
Authenticator Transport 
Protocols 
 Private key Proof of Possession 
(PoP) 
 Symmetric key PoP 
 Zero knowledge or Tunnelled 
Password 
 Challenge-response password 
Key store  Soft crypto token device 
 Hard crypto token device 
 *Online credential repository* 
Assertion  Digitally signed SAML assertion 
with 2 hours expiration time 
 Digitally signed SAML assertion 
with 12 hours expiration time 
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 Digitally signed SAML assertion 
 Cookie 
 Kerberos Ticket 
Location*  * IP-based authentication* 
Table 3.2 A comprehensive list of LoA-effecting attributes 
Each LoA-effecting attribute has an assurance level, or LoA value. We use the term 
„component LoA value‟ to denote the LoA value of an LoA-effecting attribute. In contrast, 
we use the term „aggregate LoA value‟, to denote an overall LoA value contributed by a 
set of LoA-effecting attributes. In other words, an aggregate LoA value can be derived 
from a set of the component LoA values of the attributes involved. The next section 
focuses on the determination of component LoA values. Issues in relation to the 
derivation of an aggregate LoA value are to be addressed in subsequent sections. 
3.3 Determining Component LoA Values  
NIST has defined component LoA values for the attributes it has identified. However, 
OASIS specification does not define any component LoA for the ACs, nor does it address 
the impact of the attributes on the aggregate authentication LoA. As a result, we only 
have a subset of the LoA-effecting attributes that have their component LoA values 
specified. It is obvious that the task of defining component LoA values should not rest on 
the author. It should be the responsibility of international communities and 
standardisation bodies, as it requires the involvement of and consensus between 
international communities. Based upon this consideration, and the reality that not all of 
the attributes have their component LoA values defined, we have made an assumption 
here for our work to proceed without any loss of generality. We assume that all of the 
attributes that influence an authentication assurance level use the same LoA regime, 
which could be the NIST LoA regime with LoA values scoped within four levels, Level 1 
through to Level 4, or another LoA regime that may emerge in the near future. Working 
on this assumption, we now focus our efforts on 1) identifying authentication use-case 
scenarios commonly seen in Grid or other distributed resource sharing environments; 2) 
analysing the relationships between multiple LoA-effecting attributes in these use-case 
scenarios; 3) their composite effect on the overall authentication confidence level for a 
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given authentication instance; and 4) on deriving algorithms that could scientifically and 
automatically estimate this composite effect (i.e. aggregate LoA) for a given set of LoA-
effecting attributes along with their component LoA values.  
Table 3.3 shows LoA-effecting attributes versus their exemplar component LoA values. 
The offline attributes have been omitted since they are not used in run-time aggregate 
LoA derivation. The values without asterisks are defined by NIST, where those with 
asterisks have not been defined by international communities but are assigned by the 
author for illustration purposes.  
Category Attributes Sub-attributes Maximum 
Component 
LoA value 
 
 
 
Run-time 
LoA-
effecting 
attributes 
Authentication 
Credentials 
 Password & PIN 2 
 One Time Password 3 
 X.509 ID Credential 4 
 *X.509 Proxy Credential* *2* 
Authentication 
Transport Protocol 
 Private key Proof of Procession 
(PoP) 
4 
 Symmetric key PoP 4 
 Zero knowledge or Tunnelled 
Password 
2 
 Challenge-response password 1 
Key store  Soft crypto token device 3 
 Hard crypto token device 4 
 *Online credential repository* *3* 
Assertion  Digitally signed SAML assertion 
with 2 hours expiration time 
3 
 Digitally signed SAML assertion 
with 12 hours expiration time 
2 
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 Digitally signed SAML assertion 1 
 Cookie 1 
 Kerberos Ticket *3* 
Location*  IP-based authentication *2* 
Table 3.3 LoA-effecting attributes versus their component LoA values 
3.4 Identification of Relationships among Multiple LoA-
effecting Attributes 
To derive an aggregate LoA value from the component LoA values of a set of LoA-
effecting attributes (i.e. to analyse and quantify the composite effect of the set of multiple 
LoA-effecting attributes on the overall confidence level of an authentication instance), we 
need to be clear about the mutual relationships among the multiple attributes. For this 
purpose, we have identified and analysed four use-case scenarios of authentication in 
Grid environments. Figures 3.1 – 3.4 illustrate these use-case scenarios. 
 Use case 1: user-to-service direct authentication using ID credentials  
In the first use-case scenario, a user authenticates directly to an SP using his/her ID 
credential. It is also the most generic form of e–authentication in most authentication 
environments.  
 
Figure 3.1 Use case 1: user-to-service direct authentication using ID credentials. 
 Use case 2: user-to-service authentication using proxy credentials stored locally  
In the second use-case scenario, a user identifies her/himself to a local authentication 
service and upon successful authentication, the user‟s proxy credential is activated. The 
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user‟s proxy credential is then used by the user‟s client for remote service access. In fact, 
in this authentication scenario, a single authentication instance consists of two sequential 
authentication events. The first one is undertaken between the user and the local 
authentication service. This authentication is typically done through the use of the user‟s 
ID credential. The outcome of the authentication is the activation, or issuance, of the 
user‟s proxy credential. The second authentication event is between the user‟s software 
client to the remote service provider; this is carried out through the use of the proxy 
credential just activated/issued.   
 
Figure 3.2 Use case 2: user-to-service authentication using proxy credentials stored locally. 
 Use case 3: user-to-service authentication using proxy credentials stored remotely  
Use-case scenario 3 is similar to use case 2 except that the users‟ proxy credentials are 
stored in a remote online central repository (OCR). So, upon successful authentication 
with the OCR, the user fetches a proxy credential from the repository and then uses it to 
access remote services; this resembles use case 2. Alternatively, the proxy credential may 
be dispatched directly from the OCR to the service provider.  
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Figure 3.3 Use case 3: user-to-service authentication using proxy credentials stored remotely. 
 
 Use case 4: user-to-IdP authentication and IdP asserts the user’s identity to remote 
services (Assertion-based Authentication) 
In the fourth use-case scenario, a user authenticates to a local authentication service (i.e. 
an identity provider, or IdP) and upon successful authentication, the IdP will assert the 
user‟s identity to the remote service provider. Again, a single authentication instance 
consists of two sequential authentication events. The difference between this use case and 
use case 2 is that in the second authentication event, instead of using a user‟s credential to 
authenticate to the remote service provider, the IdP sends an assertion statement asserting 
the user‟s ID or his/her other attributes. 
 
Figure 3.4 Use case 4: user-to-IdP authentication and IdP asserts the user‟s identity to remote services. 
 The Weakest-Link Relationship 
From these four authentication use-case scenarios, we can make an observation: for some 
cases, one authentication instance involves a chain of authentication events. If there is 
one LoA value associated to each of the events, then the overall confidence level (i.e. 
aggregate LoA) for the entire instance should be equal to the LoA value of the event with 
the lowest assurance level. In other words, the „weakest-link principle‟ applies here, or as 
the section heading names it „the weakest-link relationship‟. Another exemplar case 
where the weakest-link principle applies is the relationship between an authentication 
token attribute and an authentication protocol attribute. A token-based authentication is 
performed using an authentication protocol; so if a strong token is used in conjunction 
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with a weak authentication protocol, the aggregate LoA for the authentication instance 
should not be higher than that of the authentication protocol.  
 The Additive Relationship 
In addition to the weakest-link relationship, the author has identified another important 
type of relationship among the identified LoA-effecting attributes: the additive 
relationship. The additive relationship refers to attributes that are independent of, but 
reinforce, each other so that the aggregate LoA is expected to be at least as strong as the 
highest component LoA values in the set. For example, if a username and password 
authentication method is used in conjunction with a location-based authentication method 
to identify the same user, then the assurance level of this two-factor authentication 
approach should be higher than the assurance level when either of the services is used 
alone.  
In order to illustrate the different relationships of the attributes accurately to help to 
design aggregate LoA derivation algorithms, the author has developed a hierarchical 
structure, namely the LoA-effecting attributes hierarchical structure (LoA-AHS). As 
shown in Figure 3.5, this structure can accommodate existing-as well as future emerging- 
LoA-effecting attributes and groups them into different levels and categories. A more 
detailed discussion is given in Section 5.4.1.1.  
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When a set of LoA-effecting attributes involved in an authentication instance are in the 
weakest-link relationship, estimating the aggregate LoA value of the instance is relatively 
straightforward, the aggregate LoA value is the minimum component LoA value in the set. 
However, when the set of LoA-effecting attributes are in the additive relationship, the 
estimation of the aggregate LoA based upon component LoA values of multiple attributes 
is not that simple. The first hurdle to overcome is how to determine the weightings of the 
multiple attributes. The next section discusses weighting determination methods. 
3.4.1 Determining the Weightings of Additive LoA-effecting 
attributes 
Depending on authentication contexts, environments and access control policies, different 
additive LoA-effecting attributes may have different levels of impact (i.e. weightings) on 
the aggregate LoA of an authentication instance. For example, consider the case where a 
smartcard authentication method attribute with a component LoA value 3 and an IP 
authentication attribute with a component LoA value 1 are both used in an authentication 
event. The calculated aggregate LoA values will be significantly different when the ratio 
of their authentication impact/weighting is (1:1), or when the ratio is (3:1). Therefore, 
there is a need for a method to calculate the weightings of the attributes. In real life, the 
quantification and determination of the weightings can be a difficult and subjective 
process. For instance, for an authentication model using a combined password-based and 
location-based authentication service, how are the respective impact levels of the 
password and location attributes determined? The decision may depend on many factors, 
including the trust levels of the respective authentication services and the underlying 
access policies defined by the organisation. As the weightings can significantly influence 
the aggregate LoA of an authentication instance, an interesting research investigation is to 
search for a method that can scientifically determine the weightings of multiple LoA-
effecting attributes for a given authentication process and make the method adaptable to 
the variations in the LoA-effecting attribute types used. We survey the multi-criteria 
decision making (MCDM) techniques and explore the use of a MCDM technique-the 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP)-to address this research issue.  
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3.4.1.1 Three Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) Approaches 
MCDM (also referred to as Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis) is defined by the 
International Society on Multiple Criteria Decision Making [Ismcdm] as the study of 
methods and procedures by which concerns about multiple criteria (attributes) in different 
aspects can be formally and systemically incorporated into a decision-making process. 
The weighting determination of additive LoA-effecting attributes can, in a sense, be seen 
as a multi-criteria (i.e. multiple LoA-effecting attributes) decision-making problem (i.e. 
weight determination). An MCDM method uses a decision matrix of criteria and 
performance scores to provide a systematic analytical approach for integrating risk levels, 
uncertainty criteria/attributes, and valuation to enable the evaluation and ranking of many 
alternatives (i.e. the possible decisions that are required to select). Almost all of the 
MCDM methods share a similar approach to criteria organisation and decision matrix 
construction, but differ in that they synthesise information differently [Yoec02]. They use 
different types of value information and different optimisation algorithms. For example, 
some methods rank options, some identify a single optimal alternative and some provide 
an incomplete ranking, while others differentiate among acceptable and unacceptable 
alternatives.  
The different MCDM methods [Royb05] can generally be classified into three approaches: 
the multi-attribute preference theory approach, the analytic hierarchy process (AHP), and 
the outranking approach, though the AHP approach can be viewed as a special case or an 
approximation of a multi-attribute preference model [Royb05 chapter 7, Chae04]. 
The multi-attribute preference theory approach [Keen93] consists of several multi-
attribute models. These models are based on alternate sets of axioms that have 
implications for their assessment and use. Keeney and Raiffain [Keen93] differentiate 
between these models based on the notions of (a) ordinal comparisons and (b) strength of 
preference versus theories for risky choices. The term „multi-attribute value function‟ is 
used to refer to the former (i.e. case a), and multi-attribute utility function (MAUT) is 
used to refer to the latter (case b). The goal of MAUT is to find a simple expression of the 
net benefits of a decision. Through the use of a utility or value function, MAUT 
transforms diverse criteria into one common scale of utility or value. MAUT relies on the 
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assumptions that the decision-maker is rational (e.g. preferring more utilities to fewer 
utilities), has perfect knowledge and is consistent in his judgments [Kike05]. The goal of 
the decision-maker in this process is to maximise the utility or value. Because poor scores 
on certain criteria can be compensated for by high scores on other criteria, MAUT is part 
of a group of MCDA techniques known as „compensatory‟ methods.  
Similar to MAUT, AHP [Saat90] aggregates various facets of the decision problem using 
a single optimisation function known as an objective function. The goal of AHP is to 
select an alternative that results in the greatest value of the objective function. AHP uses a 
quantitative comparison method that is based on pair-wise comparisons of decision 
criteria/attributes. All individual criteria/attributes must be paired against all others and 
the results compiled in a matrix. The user uses a numerical scale (1 to 9) to compare the 
criteria/attributes and AHP moves systematically through all of the pair-wise comparisons 
of criteria/attributes and alternatives. AHP thus relies on the supposition that humans are 
more capable of making relative judgments than absolute judgments [Royb05 Chapter 9].  
Another approach, the outranking approach, is based on the principle that one alternative 
may have a degree of dominance over another [Kang01]. Dominance occurs when one 
alternative performs better than another on at least one criterion, and no worse than the 
other on all criteria [Odpm04]. However, an outranking technique does not presume that 
a single best alternative can be identified. It compares the performance of two (or more) 
alternatives at a time, initially in terms of each criterion, to identify the extent to which a 
preference for one over the other can be declared. It then aggregates the preference 
information across all relevant criteria and attempts to establish the strength of the 
evidence to favour the selection of one alternative over the others. For example, an 
outranking technique may be in favour of an alternative that performs the best on the 
greatest number of criteria. Thus, outranking techniques allow inferior performance on 
some criteria to be compensated for by superior performance on others.  
3.4.1.2 Choosing the Most Suitable Approach 
Table 3.4 summaries the strengths and weaknesses of the three MCDM approaches 
discussed above. 
The characteristic of the outranking approach requires the comparisons of alternatives 
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against criteria. However our problem is not to select alternatives based on multiple 
criteria, but rather to systematically compute the weightings of a set of contributing LoA-
effecting criteria/attributes. There are no alternatives in our problem, so the outranking 
approach is not suitable for the weighting calculation.  
In MAUT, criteria weightings are often obtained by directly surveying stakeholders, as 
shown in table 3.4. Rigorous stakeholder preference solicitations are expensive, and less 
rigorous stakeholders‟ surveys may not accurately reflect stakeholders‟ true preferences. 
This stakeholder-based approach to criteria weightings does not address our problem 
effectively as this weighing assignment process is entirely subjective, leading to a lack of 
commonality, and is problematic for the implementation of interoperability. For this 
reason, the MAUT approach is ruled out.  
AHP, on the other hand, uses a pair-wise comparison to calculate the criteria weightings. 
This weighting calculation method is systematic, flexible and relatively inexpensive in 
comparison to the stakeholder-based approach. It has been proven to be useful by both 
theoretical and practical applications in the business arena [Korp04, Gass05, Saat90]. 
Most importantly, because it uses a hierarchical structure in its solution that matches the 
LoA-effecting attributes structure detailed in Section 3.4, it reflects how the LoA-
effecting attribute weightings should be calculated. Therefore, the next part of this section 
will focus on the discussion of AHP procedures and their suitability for solving our 
problem. 
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Method Important elements Strengths Weaknesses 
MAUT  Expression of overall performance of an 
alternative in a single, non-monetary 
number representing the utility of that 
alternative 
 Criteria weights often obtained by 
directly surveying stakeholders 
 Easier to compare alternatives whose 
overall scores are expressed as single 
numbers 
 Choice of an alternative can be transparent 
if highest scoring alternative is chosen 
 Maximisation of utility may not be 
important to decision makers 
 Criteria weights obtained through less 
rigorous stakeholder surveys may not 
accurately reflect stakeholders‟ true 
preferences 
 Rigorous stakeholder preference 
elicitations are expensive 
AHP  Criteria weights and scores are based on 
pair-wise comparisons of criteria and 
alternatives, respectively 
 Theoretically sound–based on utilitarian 
philosophy 
 Many people prefer to express net utility in 
non-monetary terms  
 Surveying pair-wise comparisons is easy to 
implement 
 The weights obtained from pair-wise 
comparison are criticised for not 
reflecting people‟s true references 
 Mathematical procedures can yield 
illogical results. For example, 
rankings developed through AHP are 
sometimes not transitive 
Outranking  One option outranks another if: (1) it 
outperforms the other on enough criteria 
of sufficient importance (as reflected by 
the sum of criteria weights), and (2) it is 
not outperformed by the others, in the 
sense of recording a significantly 
inferior performance on any one 
criterion. Does not require the reduction 
of all criteria to a single unit Does not 
always take into account whether over-
performance on one criterion can make 
up for underperformance on another 
 Allows options to be classified as 
“incomparable” 
 Does not require the reduction of all criteria 
to a single unit 
 Explicit consideration of possibility that 
very poor performance on a single criterion 
may eliminate an alternative from 
consideration, even if that criterion‟s 
performance is compensated for by very 
good performance on other criteria 
 Does not always take into account 
whether over- performance on one 
criterion can make up for 
underperformance on another 
 The algorithms used in outranking are 
often relatively complex and not well 
understood by decision-makers 
Table 3.4 Comparison of critical elements, strengths and weaknesses of three advanced MCDA methods: MAUT, AHP, and Outranking [Kike05]
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3.1.4.3 Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
AHP structures multiple attributes into a hierarchy, assesses the relative importance 
of these attributes, compares alternatives (possible decisions) for each attribute, and 
finally, determines an overall ranking of the alternatives [Saat90]. We use this AHP 
method to assess the relative importance of multiple attributes to determine the 
weightings of the additive LoA-effecting attributes used in an authentication 
environment. 
According to [Saat90], five steps are involved when using AHP method to solve a 
multi-attribute decision problem, and the following four steps are used for 
calculating the weightings of a set of additive LoA-effecting attributes. 
 Step 1. Structure an AHP structure from the decision problem 
AHP decomposes a decision problem (which is not structured at this stage) into 
decision elements and organises them into a hierarchical structure. Navigating 
through the hierarchy from top to bottom, the AHP hierarchical structure comprises 
a goal, one or more criteria (evaluation parameters, i.e. attributes) and a set of 
alternatives (possible decisions). Building this hierarchy requires a thorough 
analysis of the problem. This involves, firstly, the identification of the attributes that 
either directly or potentially affects the problem and, secondly, the identification of 
possible alternatives associated with the problem. Figure 3.6 shows an exemplar 
LoA-AHS structure. It fits the AHP requirement perfectly. 
The benefits for arranging the goal, attributes and alternatives into a hierarchical 
structure are twofold. Firstly, it provides an overall view of the complex 
relationships among the attributes. Secondly, it helps decision-makers to assess 
whether issues at each level are of the same order of magnitude and to compare any 
homogeneous elements more accurately. 
Decision-makers take full control of the hierarchy. They may insert or eliminate 
levels and/or attributes as necessary to clarify priorities or to sharpen the focus on 
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one or more aspects of the problem. Attributes that have a global character can be 
represented at a higher level of the hierarchy while others, which specifically 
characterise the problem, can be represented at a lower level.  
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Figure 3.6 An exemplar LoA-AHS structure 
 Step 2. Create the input values by pair-wise comparisons of decision 
elements 
In order to quantitatively measure the impact of each attribute on the goal, AHP 
derives relative scales using judgments or data from a standard scale and performs 
an arithmetic operation on the scales. The judgments are given in the form of pair-
wise comparisons [Saat77, Saat80], and the standard scale is developed as the 
fundamental scale [Saat82]. 
One of the benefits of this hierarchical approach is that it allows us to focus on each 
of the multiple properties essential for making a sound decision separately and 
respectively. We can, in turn, take a pair of elements and compare them on a single 
property without worrying about other properties or other elements. This is why 
combining pair-wise comparisons with the hierarchical structure approach is a 
useful methodology in decision-making [Saat90]. 
The fundamental scale, shown in Table 3.5 and developed by Prof. Saaty [Saat77], 
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is used to represent the intensity of importance among the attributes in question. The 
effectiveness and theoretical justification of the fundamental scale have been 
validated by [Royb05 Chapter 9]. The scale has nine levels, from 1 through 9. Five 
of them (1, 3, 5, 7, 9) represent equal, moderately important, strongly important, 
very strongly important, and extremely important, respectively. The other four (2, 4, 
6, 8) refine the scales by taking the median values of 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9, respectively. 
Intensity of importance Definition Explanation 
1  Equal importance Two activities contribute 
equally to the object 
2  Weak Between Equal and Moderate 
3  Moderate importance Experience and judgment 
slightly favour one activity 
over another 
4 Moderate plus  Between Moderate and 
Strong 
5 Strong importance  Experience and judgment 
strongly favour one activity 
over another 
6 Strong plus  Between Strong and Very 
Strong 
7 Very strong or demonstrated 
importance  
 
An activity is favoured very 
strongly over another; its 
dominance is demonstrated 
in practice 
8 Very, very strong  Between Very Strong and 
Extreme 
9 Extreme importance  The evidence favouring one 
activity over another is 
compelling 
Table 3.5 The Fundamental Scale for AHP [Royb05] 
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The pair-wise comparison can be expressed using a matrix. Assume that we have a 
problem with n attributes, {a1, a2, … , an}. Element aij is used to denote the intensity 
of importance (Table 3.5) difference between two attributes, ai and aj (i.e. ai/aj). 
Thus, we have the comparison matrix,  
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where nia
a
aa ij
ji
ijii ,...,2,1,0,
1
,1  . 
From matrix A, it can be seen that with n*n elements in a matrix, one needs 
2/)( 2 nn   comparisons. This is because there are n 1‟s on the diagonal for 
comparing elements with themselves, and of the remaining judgments, half are 
reciprocals. 
 Step 3. Estimate the relative weightings of the attributes 
Once the comparison matrix is constructed, the weightings of elements (attributes) 
niai ,...,2,1,  can be determined. Assume iw  is the weight of attribute ia  and 
],...,,[ 321 nwwwwW  denotes the set of weightings for n attributes 
{ niai ,...,2,1,  }, respectively, then nnmwwa nmmn ,...,2,1,,/  . Using the 
AHP method, W  can be calculated from matrix A by recovering the vector 
],...,,[ 321 nwwwwW   as follows, 
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The equation multiplies A on the right by the vector of weightings, 
],...,,[ 321 nwwwwW  . The result of this multiplication is nW . [Saat90, Royb05 
Chapter 9] have proved that n is an eigenvalue of A, and W is the corresponding 
eigenvector of n. The solution of AW = nW , called the principal right eigenvector 
of A.   
 Step 4. Check for result consistency 
According to [Saat90], once the weightings of the matrix are determined, the 
consistency of the matrix should be checked before the weightings can be trusted. 
[Saat90] also proved that a comparison matrix A is said to be consistent if and only 
if ikjkij aaa   for all i, j and k.  
It has been proved in [Saat90] that for consistent reciprocal matrices (equation 3.1), 
the largest eigenvalue max  is equal to the number of comparisons, i.e. nmax . 
Based on this, a measurement of consistency is given, which is called the 
Consistency Index (CI) and is defined as the deviation or degree of consistency 
using the following equation: 
1
max



n
n
CI

                                                            (3.3) 
In order to find out what the CI might mean, a simulation solution has been 
developed by [Royb05, chapter9 pp374-375]. In the simulation, choosing the entries 
of A above the main diagonal at random from the 17 values {1/9, 1/8, … , 1, 2, … , 
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8, 9}. Then fill in the entries of A below the diagonal by taking reciprocals. Put ones 
down the main diagonal and compute the consistency index. Do this many 
thousands of times and take the average, which they call it the random consistency 
index (RI) as shown in Table 3.6. The CI is then divided by the RI to calculate the 
consistency ratio (CR), i.e.  
CR = CI/RI                                                      (3.4) 
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
RI 0 0 0.52 0.89 1.11 1.25 1.35 1.40 1.45 1.49 
Table 3.6 Random Consistency Index values 
The following rules are used to judge whether or not matrix A is consistent, please 
note that the 0.1 ratio threshold is carefully specified by the [Saat90]:  
o If CR = 0, then matrix A is consistent; 
o If CR 0.10, then matrix A is considered as acceptably consistent; 
o If CR > 0.10, then matrix A is not consistent and the subjective judgements 
need to be revised. I.e. repeat Step 2 to Step 4 until the matrix A is at least 
acceptably consistent. 
Our required algorithm needs to be able to derive an aggregate authentication LoA 
value based on the component LoAs of contributing LoA-effecting attributes 
associated to an authentication process, along with the impacts of these attributes. 
The AHP method is used here to analyse and quantify the respective impacts (i.e. 
weights) of the LoA-effecting attributes and to derive an aggregate LoA value, 
taking into account the impacts and component LoA values of these multiple 
attributes. The application of this AHP method to the determination of the 
weightings of multiple additive LoA-effecting attributes is illustrated in Section 
4.4.1. 
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 3.5 Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have investigated and analysed component LoA values 
associated with a comprehensive set of LoA-effecting attributes. We then identified 
two types of relationships among those attributes. In addition, we surveyed and 
chose an MCDM method to quantify the weightings of the additive attributes. These 
are all essential steps prior to the design of aggregate LoA derivation algorithms. In 
the next chapter, we will present the design of the algorithms by integrating the 
LoA-effecting attributes identified in this chapter with their component LoA values 
and by taking into consideration the relationships and weightings of the attributes. 
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Chapter 4 
Authentication LoA Derivation Algorithms: 
Design, Implementation and Evaluation 
4.1 Chapter Introduction 
As discussed in Section 3.4, for any given authentication instance there will be a set 
of multiple LoA-effecting attributes, which can be organised into an LoA-AHS 
structure. Using the structure, we can estimate the composite effect on the assurance 
level in identifying a user (i.e. aggregate LoA) of these attributes. This is done in a 
bottom-up manner, assuming that there are m levels (levels 1, ..., m) in the structure. 
From the bottom level m, based on the relationship (the weakest link, or the additive) 
of the group of attributes at the level, an aggregate LoA derivation algorithm 
(corresponding to the relationship) is used to calculate an aggregate LoA for the 
attribute group at this level. This aggregate LoA value is then used as the component 
LoA of the connected attribute of the level immediately above, i.e. Level (m-1). 
This process continues until the top level, i.e. Level 1, of the structure is reached and 
the aggregate LoA value at Level 1 is the overall confidence level, i.e. the aggregate 
LoA, for the entire authentication instance.  
Obviously, for different relationships among multiple attributes, different LoA 
derivation algorithms should be used. This chapter presents the design and 
evaluation of the algorithms. Section 4.2 specifies the design requirements for the 
algorithms. Section 4.3 and 4.4 describe the weakest-link relationship Agg-LoA 
derivation (ALoAWL) algorithm and additive relationship Agg-LoA derivation 
(ALoAAD) algorithm, respectively. Section 4.5 presents a performance evaluation 
and an algorithm result evaluation. Section 4.6 summaries the chapter. 
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4.2 Design Requirements 
This section specifies three requirements (R1, R2, R3) for the design of the 
algorithms. 
R1 – Derivation of aggregate LoA: 
Given a set of LoA-effecting attributes, their component LoA values, their 
respective weightings and their mutual relationship, there is an algorithm that should 
be able to derive an aggregate LoA value for this set of attributes. 
R2 – Algorithm efficiency: 
Computational and communication overheads introduced as a result of using the 
algorithms should be kept as low as possible. 
R3 – Support the use of policy-driven attribute LoAs:  
Each of the LoA-effecting attributes will have a component LoA associated with it. 
The values of these component LoAs are usually dependent on the LoA regime used, 
which should be defined by relevant international communities. To support the use 
of any-either existing (such as the NIST definition [Burr06]) or emerging-LoA 
regimes, the algorithms will use a policy-driven component to handle component 
LoA values.   
Each set imposes an aggregate LoA value on an attribute at the level immediately 
above this level. If multiple attributes in a set are in the weakest-link relationship, 
then the ALoAWL algorithm should be used to calculate the aggregate LoA for this 
set. This aggregate LoA value is then taken as the component LoA value for the 
attribute at the level above this set. Similarly, if a set‟s attributes are in an additive 
relationship then the aggregate LoA for this set should be derived using the ALoAAD 
algorithm. 
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4.3 Aggregate LoA Derivation for Attributes in the 
Weakest Link Relationship –the ALoAWL Algorithm 
Assume that at level k there are multiple sets of attributes {SETA, SETB, …, SETN}. 
Also assume that the attributes {a1, a2, … , an} in SETA are in the weakest-link 
relationship, and their respective component LoA values are {LoAa1, LoAa2, …, 
LoAan}. Then the composite effect of these attributes in SETA on the authentication 
assurance level of the attribute at the level immediately above should be the lowest 
component LoA value in the set. Mathematically, this can be expressed as:  
Agg_LoA(WL, SET_N, level_k) = min(LoAa1,LoAa2, …, LoAan)                           (4.1) 
where min is the minimum function, and Agg_LoA(WL, SET_N, level_k) is the aggregate 
LoA value for set N at level k.  
From this discussion, it can be seen that the derivation of an aggregate LoA value 
for a group of attributes that are in the weakest-link relationship only requires the 
attributes‟ component LoA values. The pseudo code for the algorithm is given below: 
INPUT: LoA-effecting attributes Set N, N>1 
OUTPUT: Agg-LoA Value Agg-LoA 
Integer Method Weakest_LoA(Object Set N)  
   WHILE Set N STILL HAS ELEMENT 
      READ one attribute LoA value in N; 
         SAVE into Integer ARRAY LoA[];  
   ENDWHILE 
   SORT ARRAY LoA[]; 
   Agg-LoA = the Lowest LoA[x]; 
   RETURN Agg-LoA; 
Table 4.1 The weakest link algorithm pseudo code 
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An implementation of this algorithm is in Appendix A and the evaluation of this 
algorithm is undertaken in Section 4.5. 
4.4 Aggregate LoA Derivation for Attributes in the 
Additive Relationship –the ALoAAD Algorithms 
An ALoAAD algorithm is required for estimating an aggregate LoA value given a set 
of attributes that are in an additive relationship.  Three tasks are required to devise 
the algorithm. The first is to determine the attributes‟ weightings. This can be done 
by using the AHP technique, as discussed in Section 3.4.1.3. The second task is to 
find a way to integrate the weightings into the algorithm. The third task is to find a 
method to quantify the reinforcement effect collectively contributed by the additive 
attributes. Section 4.4.1 describes a method for the integration of the weightings of 
each attribute into their corresponding component LoA values. Section 4.4.2 and 
4.4.3 present two ALoAAD algorithms that could be used to derive an aggregate LoA 
value given component LoA values of a set of additive LoA-effecting attributes.  
4.4.1 Attribute Weightings and Their Integration with 
Component LoA Values 
In Section 3.4.1, the author pointed out that when a set of attributes are in an 
additive relationship, the quantification of their composite effect on the assurance 
level of an authentication instance requires the consideration of their respective 
weightings. Also in that section, the author proposed to use the AHP technique to 
calculate the weightings for a set of additive LoA-effecting attributes. Here in this 
section, we demonstrate how attributes‟ weightings are determined and how these 
weightings are integrated into the aggregate LoA derivation process.  
Figure 4.1 shows an exemplar LoA-AHS structure in an authentication environment. 
Level-2 in Figure 4.1 shows a set of three additive attributes, Set A = {„ID 
Credential-based Authentication‟, „Location-based Authentication‟, „Assertion-
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based Authentication‟}. Using the AHP method described in Section 3.4.1, the 
weightings of these three attributes are determined as follows. 
LoA-effecting 
Attributes
 
Assertion-based 
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ID Credential 
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password
Location based 
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Figure 4.1 An exemplar LoA-AHS structure in an authentication environment 
1) Based on the fundamental scale as shown in Table 3.5, a decision-maker (e.g. an 
administrator managing the authentication environment) uses his/her subjective 
opinion and inputs pair-wise comparison values (as shown in Table 4.2) and 
constructs matrix 
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Location-based 
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Assertion-based 
Authentication  
1/3 4 1 
Table 4.2 Pair-wise comparison matrix for the attribute set 
2) Compute matrix A‟s principle eigenvalue 054.3max   and the corresponding 
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eigenvector ]384.0,121.0,915.0[W  using the equation (3.2). 
3) Check for consistency by calculating the consistency ratio (CR), and if the CR is 
equal to 0 or less than 0.1, the matrix is consistent. In this case, by using the 
equation (3.3) we can calculate CI=0.027, and because the size of matrix A is 3, 
thus RI=0.52, thus CR=CI/RI=0.052<0.1, which indicates that matrix A is 
consistent.  
4) If matrix A is consistent or acceptably consistent, the normalised eigenvector 
]271.0,085.0,644.0['W  is derived from W, and W‟ is the normalised weight 
(i.e. weights summing to one) for the attribute set {„ID Credential-based 
Authentication‟, „Location-based Authentication‟, „Assertion-based 
Authentication‟}. 
5) Repeat steps (1)-(4) above for every additive attribute group in the LoA-AHS 
hierarchy. These steps are done offline prior to the running of the authentication 
service. 
At this point, the weightings are determined for the entire additive attributes groups 
in the authentication environment. However in an authentication instance, there are 
cases in which only some of the additive attributes are used. For example, a user 
uses „ID Credential-based Authentication‟ and „Location-based Authentication‟ in 
an authentication instance. In this case, the weightings ]271.0,085.0,644.0['W  for 
Set A = {„ID Credential-based Authentication‟, „Location-based Authentication‟, 
„Assertion-based Authentication‟} need to be modified to reflect the weightings for 
Set B = {„ID Credential-based Authentication‟, „Location-based Authentication‟}. 
Again, this is done by taking the weightings [0.644, 0.085] for „ID Credential-based 
Authentication‟ and „Location-based Authentication‟ in Set A and normalising it to 
weightings ]117.0,883.0['' W for Set B. This process is dynamic and does not 
involve the judgement of the decision-maker therefore it is a real-time process to 
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suit different authentication instances. 
Once the weightings of the attributes are determined, they should be integrated into 
the derivation algorithm. We do this by integrating the weighting of an attribute into 
its component LoA. The method is described in the following.  
Assume that wi is attribute i‟s weighting, LoAi is its original component LoA value, 
and LoAai is i‟s adjusted LoA value. The adjusted LoA value is the one that has 
taken into account the effect of wi on LoAi. In other words, the effect of attribute i‟s 
weighting on the final aggregate LoA is embedded into its adjusted component LoA 
value, LoAai. So },,...,,{ 21 nwwwW   },,...,,{ 21 nLoALoALoALoA and 
},...,,{ 21 anaaa LoALoALoALoA   now denote the set of weightings, original 
component LoA values, and weighting adjusted component LoA values for n 
additive attributes (n>1), respectively.  
It is worth noting that the sum of the weightings of all of the attributes in an additive 
group is always 1. Thus, without specifying a weighting for each of the attributes, an 
additive algorithm initially assumes that each of the n attributes in a group has the 
same level of contribution (weighting), i.e. each attribute initially has a weighting 
equal to 1/n. Then the adjusted weighting for attribute i will be the difference 
between the real weighting, wi, and the assumed weighting, 1/n. wi may be greater 
than, less than or equal to 1/n. If wi = 1/n, attribute i is said to contribute the same as 
it initially does, therefore its adjusted component LoA value is the same as its 
original component LoA value. If wi > 1/n, attribute i contributes more to the 
aggregate LoA than it initially does. Reflecting its component LoA value, the 
adjusted component LoA is its original component LoA plus the difference, and vice 
versa if wi < 1/n. Therefore, the adjusted component LoA value for attribute i can be 
estimated using the following equation: 
))
1
(1(*
n
wLoALoA iiai                                                       (4.2) 
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By integrating attributes‟ weightings into their respective component LoA values, 
the adjusted component LoA values can capture the effects of the attributes on the 
overall authentication assurance level of an authentication event in a more accurate 
manner. By taking the adjusted component LoA values of the attributes involved in 
an authentication instance as input, a more precise Agg-LoA value could be derived 
using an aggregate LoA derivation algorithm. The next two subsections describe 
two such algorithms. The first algorithm is built on Subjective Logic, and the second 
one is built on Probability Theory, thus these algorithms are, called the Subjective 
Logic-based aggregate LoA derivation algorithm and the Probability Theory-based 
aggregate LoA derivation algorithm respectively. 
4.4.2 Algorithm One: Subjective Logic-based Aggregate 
LoA Derivation Algorithm (ALoAAD-SL) 
4.4.2.1 Subjective Logic for Aggregate LoA Derivation 
In standard logic, propositions that are considered either true or false are binary. 
However, Josang believes that the absolute certainty of a statement cannot be 
determined in the real world. Since the statements are always assessed by 
individuals, they can never be considered as representing complete general and 
objective opinions [Josa00]. Therefore, Joang has defined a framework called 
„subjective logic‟ that consists of a belief model, named an opinion model, and a set 
of operations for combining opinions. Subjective logic is developed to 
mathematically describe and manipulate subjective beliefs; it is an extension of 
standard logic that uses continuous uncertainty and belief parameters instead of only 
using discrete truth values. 
The Opinion Model 
The opinion model defines an opinion about a proposition, which translates into 
degrees of belief or disbelief. In addition to belief and disbelief, it is necessary to 
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take into consideration degrees of ignorance, which can be interpreted as the lack of 
evidence to support either belief or disbelief [Joan00].  
For a single opinion about a proposition, the model has: 
]1,0[},,{,1  idbidb                                                      (4.3) 
where b, d and i designate belief, disbelief and ignorance, respectively.  
Figure 4.2 shows the opinion model triangle, where an opinion can be uniquely 
described as a point {b, d, i} on the triangle. For example, the bottom line between 
belief and disbelief represents situations with zero ignorance and is equivalent to a 
traditional probability model, i.e. the opinion {0.5, 0.5, 0} means there are equally 
strong reasons to believe that the proposition is true as false; whereas the opinion 
{0.4, 0.5, 0.1} indicates there are the reasons 40% to believe, 50% to disbelieve and 
10% uncertain about the proposition.  
 
Figure 4.2 Opinion Triangle 
In this opinion model, various operations for processing multiple opinions are 
defined, including conjunction, disjunction, negation, consensus, recommendation 
and ordering. The following introduces the consensus operation, given that it is the 
most relevant operation for the derivation of an aggregate LoA of additive LoA-
effecting attributes.  
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Consensus between Independent Opinions 
The consensus rule for combining independent opinions consists of combining two 
or more independent opinions about the same proposition into a single opinion. In 
[Joan00], the following definition is proposed: 
Definition 4 – Let },,{
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Then 
BA
p
, is called the Bayesian consensus between Ap  and
B
p , representing an 
imaginary agent [A, B]‟s opinion about p. This operation uses operator  . The 
consensus operation can be expressed as
B
p
A
p
BA
p  
,
. Note that two opinions 
both containing zero ignorance cannot be calculated by a consensus operation. This 
is explained by interpreting ignorance as room for influence, meaning that it is only 
possible to influence an opinion that has not yet been committed to belief or 
disbelief.  
From the above discussion, it can be seen that subjective logic holds that it is 
impossible to determine with absolute certainty whether some propositions are true 
or false. This concept matches the case of authentication LoA, i.e. the authentication 
will not always produce a perfect outcome. By defining an opinion model and 
defining a set of operations (e.g. consensus operation) to process multiple opinions, 
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subjective logic can be used to make a binary proposition into a quantifiable 
statement and provides a way to derive a consensus opinion of two independent 
opinions.  
One of the biggest challenges in the design of an aggregate LoA derivation 
algorithm is determining how to combine the assurance levels of multiple additive 
(i.e. independent) LoA-effecting attributes to form a unified aggregate LoA. By 
applying the opinion model to the algorithm design, the additive LoA-effecting 
attributes can effectively be transformed as „opinions‟ about the same proposition 
(e.g., “The user‟s identity as A can be verified,”). A single aggregated opinion (i.e. 
an aggregate LoA) can then be computed by applying the consensus operation. 
More details on how to transform the component LoA values of multiple LoA-
effecting attributes into subjective logic „opinions‟ and how to use the consensus 
operation to calculate an aggregate LoA value based upon the opinions are presented 
in the next section. 
4.4.2.2 ALoAAD-SL Algorithm Design 
Using the SLO model, each of the additive attributes is transformed into an 
„opinion‟ in the opinion model. For example, an attribute x‟s opinion about the 
aggregated authentication assurance level p can be expressed as:
  
xp b + d + u = 1, {b, d, u}   [0, 1]                                            (4.4) 
Where   is the opinion function, p is the proposition which   has an opinion of (in 
this case, p refers to the aggregate LoA), x is the attribute, and b, d, and u represent 
belief, disbelief and uncertainty, respectively. 
We now need to determine the values for the tuple < b, d, u>. Belief b refers to the 
level of trust in attribute x‟s opinion. It is set to a value in the range [0,1], where 0 
stands for no trust at all and 1 stands for absolute certainty. The level of trust in an 
authentication outcome (i.e. the meaning of b) obviously has a similar meaning to 
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the component LoA (which refers to the level of confidence in an authentication 
outcome). However, as LoA values are scoped between 1 and 4, and b in the 
subjective logic uses a scale from 0 to 1, we need a transformation method to 
transform LoA values from the scale of [1, 4] to values in the scale of [0, 1]. This 
scale transformation is done using the following mapping: b(0.25) = LoAx(1), b(0.5) 
= LoAx(2), b(0.75) = LoAx(3), and b(1) = LoAx(4). 
Disbelief d refers to the level of inaccuracy in attribute x‟s opinion. It is usually 
used to measure the inaccuracy (hardware fault) of some hardware-based attributes, 
such as the case in sensor network and hardware location-based authentication. 
Therefore, an inaccuracy level d needs to be specified for such authentication 
attributes. On the other hand, unlike hardware-based authentication attributes, 
credential-based authentication attributes only have belief and uncertainty values, 
but not accuracy value. This is because, for credential-based authentication, if the 
authentication outcome is successful, then the level of accuracy is taken as 100% 
(i.e. d = 0).  
Based upon these considerations, we can define the opinion for attribute x as 
follows:
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 , in which, m is the inaccuracy parameter, and 
b+d+u = 1. 
Once the opinions of all the attributes involved are defined, we can calculate a 
combined opinion by using the consensus operation defined in Definition 4. For an 
additive attributes set with more than two attributes, a recursion operation is used to 
calculate the final aggregate LoA. The pseudo code for this algorithm is given 
below. 
INPUT: Additive LoA-effecting attributes Set N, N >= 1 
OUTPUT: Agg-LoA Value Agg-LoA 
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Integer Method Additive_LoA(Object Set N)  
      READ attribute LoA values in N; 
         SAVE into Integer ARRAY LoA[];  
      READ attribute weightings in N; 
         SAVE into Integer ARRAY weighting[]; 
   SET LoA_Length to the Length of ARRAY LoA[]; 
   SET Agg-LoA to the aggregate LoA value;     
   /* if Set N contains only one attribute, the component LoA 
value of this attribute is returned */ 
   IF LoA_Length IS equals to 1 THEN 
      RETURN LoA[0]; 
   /* if Set N contains more than one attribute, calculate 
adjusted component LoA value based on the weightings*/ 
   ELSE IF LoA_length is more than 1 THEN 
      REPEAT 
         LoA[x] = LoA[x]*(1 + weighting[x]-(1/LoA_length)); 
         SET X to X+1; 
      UNTIL x equals to LoA_length; 
    /* calculate the agg-LoA based on first two attributes */ 
      CALL Agg-LoA = Add_LoAAD(LoA[0], LoA[1]); 
      SET index to 2; 
      IF index equals to LoA_length THEN 
         RETURN Agg_LoA; 
/* check if LoA_length is more than 2, recursion operation */    
      ELSE 
       REPEAT  
         CALL Agg-LoA = Add_LoAAD(Agg_LoA, LoA[index]); 
         SET index to index+1; 
       UNTIL index equals to LoA_length 
       RETURN Agg_LoA; 
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      ENDIF 
   ENDIF 
/* method to calculate Agg-LoA */ 
Integer Method Add_LoAAD(Object LoAa, Object LoAb) 
      SET beliefa to LoAa; 
      SET uncertaina to 1- belief0; 
      SET beliefb to LoAb; 
      SET uncertainb to 1- belief1; 
      DEFINE  
      },0,{ aa
a
p uncertainbelief  
                
},0,{ bb
b
p uncertainbelief  
                
Compute 
                baba
uncertainuncertainuncertainuncertaink 
 
                
kuncertainbeliefuncertainbeliefbelief abbaba /)*(,   
      RETURN babelief , ; 
Table 4.3 The pseudo code of the ALoAAD-SL algorithm 
An implementation of this algorithm is in Appendix A and the evaluation of this 
algorithm is undertaken in Section 4.5. 
4.4.3 Algorithm Two: Probability Theory-Based Aggregate 
LoA Derivation Algorithm (ALoAAD-PT) 
The derivation of an aggregate LoA value given the component LoA values of a set 
of additive LoA-effecting attributes may also be done based on a Probability Theory 
(PT). The design of such a PT-based aggregate LoA derivation algorithm, i.e. 
ALoAAD-PT algorithm is more straightforward when compared to the ALoAAD-SL 
algorithm. This method employs the inclusion-exclusion principle of probability 
theory to calculate the consensus of multiple additive LoA-effecting attributes. For a 
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set of additive LoA-effecting attributes },...,{ 21 naaaS  , the probability of an 
attribute Sai   is represented as a number ]1,0[)( iaP  . In other words, )( iaP  is 
the probability of the trustworthiness of an attribute ia ,which declares the 
authenticity of someone‟s identity. It is obvious that the meaning of )( iaP  and the 
meaning of the component LoA value LoAai are similar. Since component LoA 
values are scoped between 1 and 4, and )( iaP  in the probability theory uses a scale 
from 0 to 1, similar to the mapping mechanism we used in the ALoAAD-SL design, 
we transform LoA values from the scale of [1, 4] to values in the scale of [0, 1] by 
using the following mapping, P(0.25) = LoAx(1), P(0.5) = LoAx(2), P(0.75) = 
LoAx(3), and P(1) = LoAx(4). 
For independent events (attributes in our case)  },...,{ 21 naaa  in a set S , the 
inclusion-exclusion principle is given in equation (4.5) below when n=2,  
)()()()()( 212121 aPaPaPaPaaP                                  (4.5) 
In equation (4.5), )( 21 aaP   denotes the consensus of trustworthiness of attribute 
a1 and a2 that declares the authenticity of someone‟s identity. When n > 2, it can be 
extended to the general equation of the inclusion-exclusion principle, as expressed 
in (4.6). 
)()1(...)()()()(
1
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i aPaaaPaaPaPaP



        (4.6) 
In order to simplify the equation (4.6), we use the complement rule, i.e. for the 
entire event A in a set S,  )(AP  is the complement of )(AP , where 
)(1)( APAP                                                                                 (4.7) 
When n=2, we combine equations (4.5) and (4.7), i.e. 
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))(1))((1()()()()(1)(1)( 2121212121 aPaPaPaPaPaPaaPaaP 
 Then, we have 
))(1))((1(1)(1)( 212121 aPaPaaPaaP                        (4.8) 
Similarly, when n=3, we have 
))(1))((1))((1(1)( 321321 aPaPaPaaaP                              (4.9) 
Thus, 
  
n
i in
n
i i
aPaPaPaPaP
1211
))(1(1))(1))...((1))((1(1)(     (4.10) 
Therefore, the ALoAAD algorithm is 
  
n
i iKlevelAD
aPALoA
1)_,(
))(1(1                                                            (4.11) 
To illustrate the use of this algorithm, suppose there are two additive LoA-effecting 
attributes at a particular level of LoA-AHS: }2,2{ /  locationpasswordusername aaS  in 
the scale of [1, 4]. We then use the mapping mechanism described above to compute 
the corresponding mapped value  }5.0)(,5.0)({ /  locationpasswordusername aPaP  in the 
scale of [0, 1]. By applying equation (4.11), the calculated aggregate LoA value for 
this set of additive attributes is 0.75, which is assurance Level 3. In other words, the 
aggregated authentication assurance achieves level 3 by combining two Level 2 
authentication methods. The pseudo code of this algorithm is given in Table 4.4. 
INPUT: Additive LoA-effecting attributes Set N, N >= 1 
OUTPUT: Agg-LoA Value Agg-LoA 
 
Integer Method Additive_LoA(Object Set N)  
      READ attribute LoA values in N; 
         SAVE into Integer ARRAY LoA[];  
      READ attribute weightings in N; 
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         SAVE into Integer ARRAY weighting[]; 
   SET LoA_Length to the Length of ARRAY LoA[]; 
   SET Agg-LoA to the aggregate LoA value;     
   /* if Set N contains only one attribute, the component LoA 
value of this attribute is returned */ 
   IF LoA_Length IS equals to 1 THEN 
      RETURN LoA[0]; 
   /* if Set N contains more than one attribute, calculate 
adjusted component LoA value based on the weightings*/ 
   ELSE IF LoA_length is more than 1 THEN 
      REPEAT 
         LoA[x] = LoA[x]*(1 + weighting[x]-(1/LoA_length)); 
         SET X to X+1; 
      UNTIL x is equal to LoA_length; 
/* calculate the agg-LoA */ 
  SET variable index to 0; 
  SET variable temp to 1; 
      REPEAT 
         temp=temp*(1-LoA[index]); 
         SET index to index+1; 
      UNTIL index equals to LoA_length 
      SET Agg_LoA = temp; 
      RETURN Agg_LoA; 
Table 4.4 The pseudo code of the ALoAAD-PT algorithm 
An implementation of this algorithm is in Appendix A, and the evaluation of this 
algorithm is undertaken in Section 4.5. 
4.5 Algorithms Evaluation 
This section evaluates the three aggregate LoA derivation algorithms with regard to 
performance and the satisfactory rates of the derived aggregate LoA values. The 
performance is measured in terms of their computational cost. The satisfactory rate 
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is measured by comparing the derived aggregate LoA values to the algorithms with 
the anticipated values. Two sets of experiments are conducted for the evaluation. 
The first set assesses the computational time consumed by each of the algorithms, 
and the second set calculates the aggregate LoA and compare the values on different 
sets of LoA-effecting attributes with different component LoA values. 
4.5.1 Evaluation Environment 
The experiments are hosted on a Windows 7 OS running on a ThinkPad laptop with 
two 2.53GHz processors and 3072MB of memory. The prototype is implemented as 
a JAVA application with Java SE™ Runtime Environment version 6. The 
performance evaluation tool used is NetBeans IDE v6.8, which provides a wide 
range of profiling instruments for measuring CPU and memory costs. 
4.5.2 Algorithms Performance Evaluation 
The performance evaluation is done by measuring computational times consumed 
by the algorithms. To ensure statistical significance, the number of iterations 
(denoted as n) over which the performance is measured need to be determined. 
Three experiments have been conducted; each sets n to a different value and the 
computational times are measured in milliseconds. Figures 4.3 to 4.5 show the 
results of the experiments for the three algorithms: ALoAWL, ALoAAD-SL and 
ALoAAD-PT, respectively. From the figures we can see that the bigger the value of n, 
the less of an effect arbitrariness has on the algorithm execution time. The linear 
regression line in the figures suggests an n value higher than 2.2k (i.e. 2200 
iterations) is sufficient for ALoAWL algorithm, an n value higher than 2.3k (i.e. 2300 
iterations) is sufficient for ALoAAD-SL algorithm and an n value higher than 2.5k 
(i.e. 2500 iterations) is sufficient for ALoAAD-PT  algorithm. Thus an n value of 
3000 is used in all the experiments. 
Prior to performing the experiments, two main results were anticipated. Firstly, for 
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all three algorithms, the larger the input attribute set size is, the longer it would take 
to calculate the Agg-LoA value. This is because none of the algorithm‟s 
computational complexity is )1(O  (i.e. constant time and not related to the length of 
the input), which means the computational time grows when input size grows. 
Secondly, the computational times of the ALoAAD-SL and ALoAAD-PT algorithms 
would grow at the same rate and the computational time of ALoAWL would grows at 
a faster rate in comparison to the other two. This is because the time complexity of 
the ALoAWL algorithm is ))log(*( nnO  [Javaapi], which is „linearithmic time‟, and 
the time complexity of both the ALoAAD-SL and ALoAAD-PT algorithms is )(nO , 
which is „linear time‟.  For the same increment of input size n, „linearithmic time‟ 
grows faster than „linear time‟.  
 
Figure 4.3 Linear Regression to determine number of iterations in ALoAWL Algorithm 
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Figure 4.4 Linear Regression to determine number of iterations in ALoAAD-SL Algorithm 
 
Figure 4.5 Linear Regression to determine number of iterations in ALoAAD-PT Algorithm  
The algorithm performance evaluation experiments took six sets of LoA-effecting 
attributes as input and measured the computational cost of each set on each of the 
algorithms. Figure 4.6 shows the results of the experiments. It shows three sets of 
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execution times in milliseconds against five inputs. The three sets are from the 
weakest link AloAWL, additive ALoAAD-PT and ALoAAD-SL, respectively. Five 
inputs contain 1, 2, 5, 10 and 20 LoA-effecting attributes respectively. Three 
observations can be made from these results. First, the execution times increase in 
the three algorithms as the input size increases. This observation is in line with our 
expectations. The second observation is that when input size grows, the results for 
the ALoAWL algorithm increase faster than the ALoAAD-SL and ALoAAD-PT 
algorithms. This result is also within our anticipations. The third observation is that 
the results for the ALoAAD-SL algorithm are slightly bigger than that for the 
ALoAAD-PT algorithm. This is due to the fact that the calculation of the ALoAAD-
SL algorithm is slightly more complex than the ALoAAD-PT algorithm, as shown in 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3. Therefore, though the computational complexity of both 
algorithms is in the same magnitude, the execution time of the ALoAAD-SL 
algorithm is longer than that of the ALoAAD-PT algorithm. 
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Figure 4.6 Algorithms performance comparison 
4.5.3 Algorithm Satisfactory Rate Evaluations 
As shown in Table 4.5, evaluations are done given five sets of LoA-effecting 
attributes as input values. The anticipated results are listed next to the input values. 
The calculated results using ALoAWL, ALoAAD-PT and ALoAAD-SL algorithms are 
listed in columns 3, 4 and 5 respectively.  
From the table, it can be seen that the algorithms returned satisfactory results. In 
input set A, only one attribute is considered, thus the anticipated result is the 
attribute‟s component LoA value. In input sets B, C and D, ALoAWL returned the 
aggregate LoA values, which are the lowest values among all the attributes‟ 
component LoA values. This result is satisfactory. The ALoAAD-PT and ALoAAD-
SL algorithms returned aggregate LoA values that are larger than the largest 
individual component LoA values from the input sets, which is also satisfactory. In 
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input set E, both ALoAAD-PT and ALoAAD-SL algorithms give a result of 1. This is 
because set E contains an attribute with a component value of 1, which means 
absolute certainty in the ALoAAD-SL algorithm and 100% trustworthiness in the 
ALoAAD-PT algorithm. Therefore, no matter what the other attributes‟ component 
LoA values are, as long as they are in an additive relationship, the largest aggregate 
LoA value is 1. To sum up, the experiments showed a 100% satisfactory rate of the 
derived aggregate LoA values for all of the algorithms under various input values. 
Input  Anticipated 
results 
ALoAWL ALoAAD-
PT 
ALoAAD-
SL 
Agg-
SR 
A {a1=0.75} ALoAWL=0.75 
ALoAAD-SL=0.75 
ALoAAD-PT=0.75 
0.75 0.75 0.75 100% 
B {b1=0.25, b2= 
0.5} 
ALoAWL=0.25 
ALoAAD-SL>0.5 
ALoAAD-PT>0.5 
0.25 0.625 0.571 100% 
C {c1=0.25, 
c2=0.5, c3=0.75} 
ALoAWL=0.25 
ALoAAD-SL>0.75 
ALoAAD-PT>0.75 
0.25 0.9 0.8125 100% 
D{ d1=0.25, 
d2=0.5, d3=0.75, 
d4=0.25} 
ALoAWL=0.25 
ALoAAD-SL>0.75 
ALoAAD-PT>0.75 
0.25 0.92 0.83 100% 
E { d1=0.25, 
d2=0.5, d3=1} 
ALoAWL=0.25 
ALoAAD-SL=1 
ALoAAD-PT=1 
0.25 1 1 100% 
Table 4.5 Satisfactory rate of LoA derivation algorithms results 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has presented the design of three aggregate LoA derivation algorithms: 
the weakest link ALoAWL algorithm, the subjective logic-based additive ALoAAD-
SL algorithm, and the probability theory-based additive ALoAAD-PT algorithm. For 
the aggregate LoA derivation when attributes are in an additive relationship, we 
have also presented a method by which different weightings of different attributes 
can also be taken into account. The performance and satisfactory rate of these 
algorithms have been evaluated via experiments. In the next chapter, we will present 
the design of the GEA-LoADM Model; the algorithms described in this chapter are 
part of this model. 
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Chapter 5 
A Generic E-Authentication LoA 
Derivation Model  
In the previous chapter, we described three aggregate LoA derivation algorithms. 
This chapter integrates these algorithms to devise our approach to real-time 
aggregate LoA derivation, the Generic E-authentication LoA Derivation Model 
(GEA-LoADM).  
5.1 Design Requirement Specifications 
The design of the GEA-LoADM model is non-trivial, and the following issues 
should be resolved: 1) identify all LoA-effecting attributes and determine their 
component LoA values in an authentication environment; 2) construct an LoA-AHS 
structure based on the identified LoA-effecting attributes and allocate weightings to 
each of the attributes in the additive relationship; 3) reliably acquire dynamic real-
time LoA-effecting attributes (i.e. the contributing LoA-effecting attributes) in an 
authentication instance; and 4) derive an aggregate LoA value based upon the 
contributing LoA-effecting attributes in a systematic manner. The model should be 
flexible enough to accommodate any changes in the attribute set, and the resulting 
weighting changes for the set. We have identified  in detail the following design 
requirements for the GEA-LoADM:  
R1 - Extensibility:  
The model supports the use of an extensible set of LoA-effecting attributes. The 
current set of LoA-effecting attributes (Table 3.2) is decomposed from a range of 
existing works [Burr06, Samlac] and Grid authentication scenarios/models. In the 
future, there may be new or emerging authentication technologies that could bring in 
new LoA-effecting attributes, so, the design of the model should allow new 
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attributes to be easily added in and obsolete ones to be removed from it.  
R2 – Support the use of policy-driven attribute LoA values:  
Each of the LoA-effecting attributes will have a component LoA associated with it. 
These component LoA values are usually dependent on the LoA regime used, which 
is expected to be defined by the relevant international communities. To support the 
use of any, either existing (such as the NIST definition [Burr06]) or emerging, LoA 
regimes, the model will use a policy-driven component to process component LoA 
values.   
R3 – Systematic determination of weightings for LoA-effecting attributes: 
An authentication process may involve a number of LoA-effecting attributes. Some 
of these attributes may be intangible or their impacts difficult to measure and 
quantify. For such attributes, the GEA-LoADM model should use a scientific 
approach to determine their impacts (i.e. weightings) on the aggregated assurance 
level of an entire authentication instance. 
R4 – Derivation of aggregate LoA: 
Given a set of LoA-effecting attributes, their types of relationships and their 
component LoA values and weightings, the model should be able to derive an 
aggregate LoA for an authentication instance.  
R5 – LoA conveyance: 
The model should be able to convey to a relying party the aggregate LoA, the LoA-
effecting attributes‟ names and any other items that the CSP has verified. The 
relying party can then use this information to make access control or authorisation 
decisions. 
R6 – Modular structure: 
The model should employ a modular structure such that any change made to one 
architectural module does not lead to any changes in other modules. Each module 
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(component) of the model is designed to fulfil a specific function and can be easily 
plugged in or taken out. 
R7 – Security: 
The application of the model should not weaken or lower the level of security 
afforded by the original access control service (i.e. before applying the GEA-
LoADM model).  
R8 – Performance: 
Adequate considerations should be given to the design of the model to reduce the 
level of overhead and run-time delay as introduced by the LoA derivation service 
provided by the GEA-LoADM model. 
5.2 Architecture Overview 
Figure 5.1 shows the GEA-LoADM architecture. From the figure, it can be seen that 
it has a number of architectural components. These components can largely be 
classified into the following groups: an off-line component, a real-time component 
and an LoA-effecting attributes policy database. The output of the GEA-LoADM is 
an Agg-LoA value calculated for an authentication instance performed by a 
requester. This value is consumed by a relying party (i.e. a service provider), which 
can be either a shibboleth attribute authority [Shib05] or an authorisation decision 
engine to grant access to the requester. 
The off-line component is an LoA-effecting Attributes Policy Manager (LoA-APM). 
It is responsible for identifying a set of LoA-effecting attributes in an authentication 
environment, structuring them into a hierarchy based on their mutual relationships, 
and calculating the weightings for the additive attributes in the set. The component 
comprises two further functional modules: an LoA-effecting Attributes Hierarchical 
Structure (LoA-AHS) and an LoA-effecting Attributes Weightings Allocation 
Module (LoA-AWAM). The LoA-AHS is responsible for identifying a set of LoA-
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effecting attributes in a given authentication environment, constructing a 
hierarchical LoA-effecting attributes structure (such as the one shown in Figure 5.3), 
and categorising the attributes into different groups and levels based on their mutual 
relationships. These tasks are expected to be undertaken manually by an 
authentication administrator or access policy decision-maker, based on their security 
policies and access control requirements. The LoA-AWAM is responsible for 
calculating the LoA weightings for additive LoA attributes. The weightings, the 
attribute hierarchical structure, the indicators of the relationships among different 
attributes, and the component LoA values are all then stored in an LoA-effecting 
attributes policy database (LoA-APDB). The working mechanisms of, and the 
methodology used in the design of, these functional modules are detailed in Section 
5.3.1. 
 
Figure 5.1. GEA-LoADM architecture 
The real-time component has two functional modules: an LoA-effecting Attributes 
Collection Module (LoA-ACM) and an Authentication LoA Derivation Module 
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(ALoA-DM). The LoA-ACM performs three tasks. It first receives a set of 
contributing LoA-effecting attributes involved in an authentication instance from the 
authentication services in a SAML assertion format. It then parses the assertions and 
retrieves the contributing LoA-effecting attributes‟ names from it. Next, the LoA-
ACM sends the retrieved attributes‟ names to the ALoA-DM. The ALoA-DM 
receives the contributing LoA-effecting attributes‟ names and fetches both their and 
their parent attributes‟ names (the database stores the hierarchical structure), 
component LoA values, relationship indicators and weightings. This information is 
used to form a sub-LoA-AHS for this particular authentication instance. Then the 
ALoA-DM uses the sub-LoA-AHS as input to calculate the aggregate LoA using an 
authentication LoA derivation algorithm corresponding to the settings of the 
authentication environment. The design details of the LoA-ACM and ALoA-DM are 
described in Sections 5.3.3 and 5.3.4, respectively.  
The LoA-APDB (LoA-effecting attributes policy database) is a database storing all 
of the LoA-effecting attributes identified by the LoA-AHS, their relationships, their 
component LoA values and the additive LoA attributes‟ weightings. The technical 
details of this module are described in Section 5.2.  
As depicted by Figure 5.2, the working of the GEA-LoADM model is as follows:  
Offline-Step 1: The authentication environment is analysed and all of the LoA-
effecting attributes of the authentication environment are identified and constructed 
in the LoA-AHS structure. The corresponding component LoA values are estimated, 
too. Section 5.4.1.1 discusses this in detail. 
Offline-Step 2: The LoA-AWAM module (as shown in Section 5.3.1.2) is used to 
estimate the weightings of the additive attributes.  
At this point, all of the LoA-effecting attributes in the authentication environment 
have been structured, their component LoA values estimated and the weightings of 
the additive attributes calculated. All of the information is stored in the LoA-APDB.  
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The off-line steps are executed the first time the model is implemented in an 
authentication environment and should be reviewed or redone when there is a policy 
change (e.g. adjustment of the LoA values of LoA-effecting attributes; change of the 
authentication impact among additive attributes), or when new attributes are added 
or obsolete attributes omitted. 
The following real-time steps are executed per authentication instance: 
Real-time Step 1: Upon the execution of an authentication instance, the LoA-ACM 
receives the SAML assertions of the contributing LoA-effecting attributes from the 
authentication services for this instance.  
Real-time Step 2: The LoA-ACM parses the assertions and retrieves the 
contributing LoA-effecting attributes‟ names and sends them to the ALoA-DM.  
Real-time Step 3: The LoA-DM calls the LoA-APDB to fetch the attributes‟ 
component LoA values, the relationship indicators and the additive attributes 
weightings from the LoA-APDB. The attributes‟ parent attributes (based on the 
LoA-AHS) are also retrieved to form a sub-LoA-AHS for the authentication 
instance. The algorithm in the ALoA-DM (as discussed in Section 4.3 and 4.4) 
derives the aggregate LoA value based on the sub-LoA-AHS structure.  
The decision-maker reviews the authentication events and the derived LoA values 
periodically. If there is a policy change or any abnormal situation such as 
faulty/unsatisfactory results, the decision-maker can revise the hierarchical structure 
and the weighting policies to make the appropriate modifications. 
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Figure 5.2 GEA-LoADM system execution flow 
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5.3 Architectural Components Design 
5.3.1 LoA-effecting Attributes Policy Manager (LoA-APM) 
The LoA-APM is proposed as an off-line component, meaning that its functions are 
performed prior to the execution of authentication procedures. 
5.3.1.1 LoA-effecting Attributes Hierarchical Structure (LoA-AHS) 
The LoA-AHS module is responsible for 
 managing (i.e. adding, deleting and classifying) LoA-effecting attributes; 
 assigning component (or attribute) LoA values to each of the attributes; and 
 constructing the attributes into a hierarchical structure based on their mutual 
relationships. 
The first two tasks are authentication environment-dependent. They are also 
dependent on access policies that are, in turn, influenced by factors such as the 
values of the asset under protection and the risks in the underlying access 
environment. We have examined and extended the attributes identified by NIST and 
OASIS and produced a generic set of LoA-effecting attributes, as described in 
Section 3.2. In addition, we have examined the mutual relationships among these 
attributes and organised them into the hierarchical structure shown in Figure 5.3. 
From the figure, it can be seen that the attributes at the same horizontal level enjoy 
one type of mutual relationship, either additive or weakest link. The aggregate LoA 
value for a group of related attributes (shown as circled with a dashed line) at that 
level is determined by the component LoA values of the attributes in that group, as 
well as their mutual relationship. This aggregate LoA, say level-k aggregate LoA, 
once calculated, is then fed into the level immediately above it, i.e. level (k+1), as 
the component LoA value of the attribute directly connected to the group. For 
example, as shown in the figure, the bottom group of two attributes, {„Token Type‟, 
„KeyStore‟} located at level 5, are connected to the „Authentication Token‟ attribute 
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at level 4. The component LoA value for the „Authentication Token‟, called the 
LoAAuthNToken, is then equal to the aggregate LoA value (named LoA5,1, denoting the 
LoA value for the first group of attributes at level 5) of the two connected attributes 
at the level immediately below it. These two attributes have the weakest link mutual 
relationship; therefore, the aggregate LoA value of the group, LoA5,1, is equal to 
min(LoATokenType, LoAKeyStore). LoA5,1 is then taken as the component LoA value for 
the attribute, the „Authentication Token‟, i.e. LoAAuthNToken = LoA5,1. Applying the 
same method to all of the attribute groups in the structure in a bottom-up manner, 
we will eventually get an LoA value for the root node; this root LoA value is the 
aggregate LoA value for the entire authentication instance.  
This structured approach to LoA-effecting attributes‟ identification, classification, 
and organisation is an essential step towards the determination of their respective 
weightings on, and derivation of, the overall confidence level for an authentication 
instance, in a scientific manner. This structure has a number of additional merits. 
For example, it is flexible and extensible. Any emerging LoA-effecting attributes 
can easily be added into the structure, and any obsolete ones removed from it 
without affecting other levels in the hierarchy. Also, once constructed, an LoA-AHS 
for a given authentication environment will only need to be revised when there is a 
change in the authentication attributes at any level. 
5.3.1.2 LoA-effecting Attributes Weighting Allocation Module (LoA-
AWAM) 
When calculating an aggregate LoA for a set of attributes that are in an additive 
relationship, their respective weightings should be determined first. The LoA-
AWAM module uses the AHP‟s pair-wise comparison technique discussed in 
Section 4.4.1 to calculate the relative weightings of the attributes. 
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Figure 5.3 A generic LoA-AHS structure
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5.3.2 LoA-effecting Attributes Policy Database (LoA-APDB) 
The LoA-APDB is a database containing four tables. Table one, called the „AHS‟ 
table, stores the LoA-AHS structure, the „Weightings‟ and the „Relationship Types‟ of 
the LoA-effecting attributes. Table two, called the „attributes‟ table, stores „Attribute 
Names‟ and „Component LoA Values‟ of the LoA-effecting attributes. Table three, 
called the „aggregate LoA‟ table, stores the aggregate LoA value derived by the 
ALoA-DM for each authentication instance. Table four, called the „Contributing 
AHS‟ table, links with the „aggregate LoA‟ table and stores the corresponding 
contributing LoA-effecting attributes in a hierarchal structure for each authentication 
instance. 
attributes
PK attribute_ID INTEGER
 attr_name VARCHAR(200)
 Comp_LoA INTEGER
AHS
 parent_attr_ID INTEGER
 child_attr_ID INTEGER
 left_node INTEGER
 right_node INTEGER
 relationship CHAR(10)
 weighting INTEGER
attributes_AHS_FK1
Aggregate LoA
PK Agg_LoA_ID INTEGER
 Agg_LoA DOUBLE
 Time DATETIME
contributing AHS
PK hie_ID INTEGER
 parent_attr_ID INTEGER
 child_attr_ID INTEGER
FK1 Agg_LoA_ID INTEGER
Aggregate LoA_contributing AHS_FK1
attributes_contributing AHS_FK1
 
Figure 5.4 LoA-APDB ER Model 
5.3.3 LoA-effecting Attributes Collection Module (LoA-
ACM) 
The LoA-ACM module performs three tasks. Firstly, it interacts with all of the 
authentication services involved in an authentication instance to receive the SAML 
assertions that contain the contributing LoA-effecting attributes. Secondly, it parses 
the assertions to retrieve the contributing LoA-effecting attributes‟ names. Thirdly, it 
sends the retrieved data to the ALoA-DM. Figure 5.5 shows the sequences involved 
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when a user authenticates to a GEA-LoADM model-aware authentication service. 
One issue we have observed during the design of the LoA-ACM module is that while 
conveying the LoA-effecting attributes between different parties (e.g. between 
different modules in the GEA-LoADM model, or between an authentication service 
provider and relying party), a unified attributes namespace is required so that both 
parties can refer to the same attributes without confusion. One way to address this 
issue is to use SAML authentication context (AC) specification [Samlac]. As we have 
discussed in Section 3.2, SAML AC specification has defined an XML-based syntax 
for constructing ACs. Most of the LoA-effecting attributes we have identified are 
defined in the AC specification (i.e. they have a unified identifier), and for attributes 
that are not defined in the AC specification, we can extend the definition to 
accommodate them.  
queries
User Authentication Services LoA_ACM LoA_APDB LoA_DM
authenticates: 
responses
redirect user to resources
After successful 
authentication, 
the AS sends 
contributing LoA-
effecting 
attributes to LoA-
ACM
Stores Agg-
LoA value and 
contributing 
attributes
sends attributes data: 
calculate 
Agg-LoA 
value
Parse 
assertion to 
retrieve 
contributing 
attributes’ 
names
Figure 5.5 GEA-LoADM real-time authentication sequence diagram 
5.3.4 Authentication LoA Derivation Module (ALoA-DM) 
The ALoA-DM obtains the contributing LoA-effecting attributes names from the 
LoA-ACM. It then queries the LoA-APDB to fetch the attributes‟ component LoA 
values, relationship indicators and weightings and form a sub-LoA-AHS. It then uses 
the sub-LoA-AHS to derive an aggregated authentication LoA value for the 
authentication instance. The derivation is done by using the algorithms detailed in 
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Chapter 4. Once the aggregate LoA value is calculated, the sub-LoA-AHS is stored in 
the „Contributing AHS‟ table, and the aggregate LoA value, along with a time stamp, 
is stored in the „Aggregate LoA‟ table in the LoA-APDB for auditing purposes and 
future reference. Optionally, these data may be stored in a third-party attribute 
directory managed by an attribute authority for consumption by other relying parties. 
For example, the data may be sent to the attribute authority in the Shibboleth system 
for attribute assertion [Shib05, Zhan06], or to the attribute authority for creating and 
assigning an attribute certificate. 
5.4 Model Analysis against Design Requirements 
In this section, we analyse the GEA-LoADM model against the design requirements 
specified in Section 5.1. 
R1 - Extensibility:  
The model has designed and developed an LoA-AHS structure. By using such a 
structure, the model can easily support removal of any obsolete attributes, 
modification of any existing attributes and addition of any new attributes. So if a new 
authentication service is introduced to the authentication environment, there is no 
need to alter other attributes in the hierarchy. This feature is particularly important in 
an area where the technology advances at a rapid pace. 
R2 – Support the use of policy-driven attribute LoA values:  
The model uses a mapping mechanism to transform existing LoA values to a value 
between 0 and 1. If another LoA regime is used the only modification is to replace the 
LoA value mapping mechanism. Other modules in the architecture remain unchanged. 
In other words, the LoA derivation model will still be applicable regardless of the 
LoA regime. 
R3 – Systematic determination of weightings for LoA-effecting attributes:  
Determining the weightings of a set of LoA-effecting attributes in an additive 
relationship is a challenging issue. The model employs a multi-criteria decision 
making technique, the analytic hierarchy process (AHP), to establish the weightings 
of such attributes.  By using the pair-wise comparison method, the decision-maker 
can make subjective decision based on the importance of the services and use AHP to 
systematically measures the relative weightings between attributes, deriving overall 
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weightings for all of the attributes. 
R4 – Derivation of aggregate LoA:  
In an authentication instance, an aggregate LoA can be derived from a set of LoA-
effecting attributes based upon their component LoA values. The model has identified 
a comprehensive set of LoA-effecting attributes, identified two types of relationships 
for the LoA-effecting attributes and developed three aggregate LoA derivation 
algorithms. By combining the algorithms and taking the LoA-effecting attributes‟ 
component LoA value as input (for attributes that are in an additive relationship, their 
respective weightings are also required), the model can derive an aggregate LoA for 
the entire authentication instance. 
R5 – LoA conveyance:  
The model uses the SAML authentication context specification to convey LoA and 
LoA-effecting attributes. In this way, all of the attributes and the aggregate LoA are 
transmitted in a standard, unified and secure manner, thus providing security and 
convenience for sending and receiving parties. 
R6 – Modular structure: 
The design of the model uses a modular approach, as described in Section 5.3. Each 
module of the model is designed to fulfil a specific function and can easily be plugged 
in or taken out. For example, we can change the aggregate LoA derivation algorithm 
without modifying/interfering with other components of the model. The LoA-
effecting attributes can be added/modified/removed without affecting the attribute 
collection and aggregate LoA derivation. 
R7 – Security and R8 – Performance: The security and performance evaluations 
will be conducted in Chapter 6. 
5.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has given the design details of the GEA-LoADM model, by which the 
aggregate LoA, as influenced by multiple LoA-effecting attributes, can be 
systematically estimated. There are two novel contributions in this model design. The 
first is the LoA-AHS structure, by which a large number of LoA-effecting attributes 
can be organised into a hierarchical structure with distinctive mutual relationships. 
The second major contribution is the design of three aggregated LoA derivation 
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algorithms. They capture the two identified relationships. With the use of these 
algorithms, supported by the LoA-AHS structure and additional architectural 
components, the model is able to systematically and automatically derive a composite 
LoA value given a set of LoA-effecting attributes in an authentication instance. The 
major advantage of this model is its ability to accommodate a complex set of 
attributes and to provide a quantitative measure for authentication assurance levels in 
the face of complex authentication tasks. In the next chapter, we will prototype and 
evaluate the GEA-LoADM model using a real-life case study. The performance and 
security of the GEA-LoADM model will also be analysed. 
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Chapter 6 
GEA-LoADM Real System Evaluation 
6.1 Chapter Introduction 
Chapters 4 and 5 presented the design of three aggregate LoA derivation algorithms 
and the design of the GEA-LoADM model. This chapter presents a prototype of the 
GEA-LoADM model. Based on the prototype, the performance of the model is 
evaluated to further assess the costs introduced as a result of using this approach. A 
security evaluation is also conducted to assess the resistance level of the model 
against various security attacks. Section 6.2 reports an implementation of the GEA-
LoADM model in detail. The implementation is done in a real-time system, the MAIS 
(Multi-Agency Electronic Information Sharing) system. Section 6.3 gives a 
performance evaluation of the GEA-LoADM, and the security evaluation is presented 
in Section 6.4. Finally, Section 6.5 concludes the chapter. 
6.2 GEA-LoADM Model Prototype 
6.2.1 Multi-Agency Electronic Information Sharing (MAIS) 
System 
The Pilot Electronic (Web-based) Multi-Agency Information Sharing (MAIS) System 
for Mentally Disordered Offenders is a project awarded by the NHS Service Delivery 
and Organisation R&D Programme to the School of Computer Science, in 
collaboration with the Psychiatry Research Group in the School of Community-Based 
Medicine, at The University of Manchester. The aim of the project is to establish a 
multi-agency information sharing IT network that will provide a mechanism through 
which information about a recently released prisoner, who has severe and enduring 
mental health problems, can be shared promptly, securely and reliably between the 
community health (police custody nurses, forensic medical examiners and the 
criminal justice mental health team) and criminal justice agencies (i.e. police custody 
sergeants). The MAIS system is a web-based networked system involving the 
establishment of a secure web-based e-Workbench service to provide browser-based 
fine-grain controlled access to the health records of mentally ill prisoners upon their 
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release from the MAIS network prisons.  
Figure 6.1 shows the architecture of the MAIS system. From the figure, it can be seen 
that the e-Workbench is equipped with the following components: a database that 
contains a selection of the prisoner‟s personal, criminal and health information; a 
number of authentication services; a role-based access control service to ensure users 
from different agencies are only able to access the data they are entitled to; a data 
access service that facilitates the database access and delivers the required 
information to the user; and an audit service that records all activities related to the 
data access in the MAIS system.   
 
Figure 6.1 MAIS system architecture 
At the current stage, the access control service of the MAIS system works as follows. 
It employs three authentication services: the first one is a username/password-based 
authentication service, the second one is a PKI certificate-based software/hardware 
based authentication service and the third one is an IP-based authentication service. 
An access control process begins with user authentication, in which a user can choose 
to use either the username/password-based authentication service or the PKI 
certificate-based authentication service. The IP-based authentication is a compulsory 
service. More discussions about the compulsory use of IP-based authentication 
service are given in the next paragraph. In the case of successful authentication, the 
role-based authorisation service assigns one of two roles (one is „police‟ and the other 
is „clinician‟) to the user. This role assignment is done based on the user‟s ID. Each of 
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the roles is assigned with a set of access privileges. For example, as shown in the use-
case diagram in Figure 6.2, the „clinician‟ role has „write‟ access to the prisoner data, 
whereas the „police‟ role can only view the data. Another example is that the 
„clinician‟ role can access a prisoner‟s „prescription detail‟ data, but the „police‟ role 
cannot. These access policies are used by the authorisation service to make an access 
control decision. The decision is executed by the data access service to deliver the 
appropriate prisoners‟ data to the user making the request. During the access control 
process, the audit service records the user ID, user access time, user‟s access IP 
address and user‟s activities, including what data information for which prisoner is 
viewed/modified by whom at what time. The auditing service ensures accountability 
in data access and usage. 
Police
Login
MAIS System
Clinician
<<uses>>
<<extends>>
search prisoner
view data section B
write to databaseview/modify personal info
view data section A
<<uses>>
<<extends>>
<<extends>>
Login
<<extends>>
<<extends>>
<<extends>>
<<extends>>
<<extends>>
 
Figure 6.2 MAIS system use case diagram 
Owing to the requirement for the project, IP-based authentication is a compulsory 
authentication service. This means that users can only access data stored in the MAIS 
system from a few pre-defined IP subnets, such as a police custody suite or a 
clinician‟s office. This security policy was requested by the project stakeholders. It is 
enforced to provide enhanced protection of the highly sensitive personal information 
and health data of the prisoners. However, this policy greatly reduced the accessibility 
of the MAIS system. For example, if a clinician from an agency is called out for an 
emergency regarding a prisoner‟s mental health problems, the clinician would want to 
check the mental health history and prescription details of the prisoner from his/her 
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Internet-enabled mobile phone or an Internet-connected computer in the visiting 
location. However he/she cannot do this because the system is IP-restricted and he/she 
can only access the MAIS service from his/her office computer.  
By integrating the GEA-LoADM model into the MAIS system and linking the 
authentication LoA to access control decisions in the MAIS authorisation process, we 
can achieve a more fine-grained access control without sacrificing the usability of the 
system. For example, there is no need to make compulsory use of the IP-based 
authentication as the whole point of this security policy is to improve the strength of 
authentication, thus enhancing the protection of prisoners‟ data. If a user does not opt 
for the IP-based authentication, then the user will be assigned with a lower 
authentication LoA. A lower authentication LoA means less access privilege should 
be granted to the user. For example, if a user accesses MAIS data using his/her office 
computer and opts for IP-based authentication, then the user could be granted with 
„read‟, „write‟ and „append‟ access to the data. However, if the same user accesses the 
data from somewhere else, and/or does not opt for IP-based authentication, then 
he/she would only be granted with „read‟ and „append‟ access. In this way, the 
restricted user privileges limit the risk of data being compromised and also provide 
enhanced protection of prisoners‟ data. The next section presents the implementation 
and integration of the GEA-LoADM model with the MAIS system. 
6.2.2 Integrating GEA-LoADM into the MAIS System 
Figure 6.3 shows the integration of the GEA-LoADM model into the MAIS system. 
Comparing this figure to Figure 6.1, we can see that in order to integrate the GEA-
LoADM model, the MAIS system needs to have two modifications. The first 
modification is to change the authentication services to make them send LoA-
effecting attributes to the GEA-LoADM model upon successful authentication. A 
more detailed discussion of this is given in Section 6.2.2.4. The second modification 
is to define the LoA requirements of each section of the e-health database and to write 
access control policies so that they use the LoA as one of the attributes for access 
control. For prototyping purposes, the author has assigned LoA values to different 
sections of the e-health database and the authorisation service‟s security policies have 
been amended accordingly. In the next four sub-sections, we follow the steps 
discussed in Section 5.3 to implement the GEA-LoADM model.  
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Figure 6.3 MAIS architecture with GEA-LoADM 
6.2.2.1Constructing an LoA-AHS for the MAIS system 
The first step in building the GEA-LoADM model is to identify the LoA-effecting 
attributes from the MAIS authentication environment and construct the LoA-AHS 
structure. As shown in Table 6.1, we have identified seven LoA-effecting attributes 
based on three authentication services in the MAIS system. The username/password 
authentication service has „password‟ as the authentication credential and „SSL‟ as the 
authentication protocol. The certificate-based authentication service has „X.509 ID 
credential‟ and „X.509 proxy credential‟, and the keystores are „software token device‟ 
and „hardware token device‟. The authentication protocol used is „SSL‟. The IP-based 
authentication service has no further attributes. In addition, the component LoA 
values of the attributes are estimated. Some of these values are taken from the NIST 
e-authentication guideline [Burr06] and some of them (i.e. those not defined by NIST) 
are assigned by the author for prototyping purposes. The attributes whose LoA values 
have been given by the author are annotated with an asterisk. 
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Category Attributes Sub-attributes Component 
LoA value 
 
 
 
MAIS LoA-
effecting 
attributes 
Authentication 
Credentials 
 Password 2 
 X.509 ID Credential 4 
 *X.509 Proxy Credential* *2* 
Authenticator 
Transport Protocol 
 Private key Proof of Procession 
(PoP), e.g. SSL 
4 
Key store  Software token device 3 
 Hardware token device 4 
Location*  IP-based authentication *2* 
Table 6.1 MAIS system LoA-effecting attributes list 
Based on the LoA-effecting attributes we have identified, we can construct the LoA-
AHS structure for the MAIS authentication environment as shown in Figure 6.4. 
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Figure 6.4 MAIS authentication environment LoA-AHS structure 
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6.2.2.2 Estimating weightings of additive attributes  
After structuring all of the LoA-effecting attributes and identifying the relationships 
for each group of attributes, the weightings of the additive attribute groups need to be 
determined. We follow the steps described in Section 4.4.1 to determine the 
weightings of the additive attributes in the MAIS LoA-AHS structure. For 
prototyping purposes, the author has chosen pair-wise comparison values for the 
additive attributes groups, as shown in Table 6.2 and 6.3. A Java web application is 
developed to calculate the weightings for each of the additives attributes. Figure 6.5 
shows the GUI of the application. In Table 6.2 and 6.3, the pair-wise comparison 
matrix, the calculated eigenvector and the corresponding normalised weightings of 
each additive attributes groups are presented.  
 
Figure 6.5 Weighting determination GUI 
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 ID credential-
based 
Authentication 
Location-based 
Authentication 
Eigenvector Normalised 
weightings 
ID credential-
based 
Authentication 
1 4/1 4 0.8 
Location-based 
Authentication  
1/4 1 1 0.2 
Table 6.2 Pair-wise comparison matrix for level 2 additive attributes group 
 Username/passwor
d Authentication 
Certificate-
based 
authenticatio
n 
Eigenvecto
r 
Normalise
d 
weightings 
Username/passwor
d Authentication 
1 1/3 0.315 0.249 
Certificate-based 
Authentication  
3 1 0.949 0.751 
Table 6.3 Pair-wise comparison matrix for level 3 additive attributes group 
At this point, all of the LoA-effecting attributes in the MAIS authentication 
environment have been structured, their component LoA values estimated and the 
weightings of additive attributes calculated. The next step is to implement and 
populate the LoA-APDB database and store the information into the database for the 
real-time component of the GEA-LoADM to use. 
6.2.2.3 Implementation of the LoA-APDB  
The LoA-APDB database is implemented using Mysql technology. As mentioned in 
Section 5.4.2, four tables have been created in the LoA-APDB database. Appendix B 
contains the database schema. 
6.2.2.4 Implementation of the LoA-ACM module 
The LoA-ACM module is developed as a Java servlet that does the following tasks: 
1). Receiving SAML assertions that contain the contributing LoA-effecting attributes‟ 
names from authentication services during the authentication process in an 
authentication instance. 
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2). Parsing the assertions and retrieving the LoA-effecting attributes‟ names from 
them. 
3). Sending the retrieved information to the ALoA-DM. 
Here we use an example to illustrate the process of the LoA-ACM module. Assume a 
user, Bob, chooses to authenticate to the MAIS system using both username/password 
and IP-based authentication services. After successful authentication, the LoA-ACM 
module receives one SAML assertion from each of the authentication services, as 
shown in Tables 6.4 and 6.5. The LoA-ACM parses the SAML assertions and 
retrieves the corresponding LoA-effecting attributes‟ names. Table 6.6 shows the 
retrieved LoA-effecting attributes‟ names from the assertions. This information is then 
sent to the ALoA-DM module via an SSL channel to ensure the integrity and the 
confidentiality of the message. 
<Assertion xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:assertion" 
xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:assertion" 
xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:protocol" 
AssertionID="db3c2838db744f704c5363059bb7a0eb" IssueInstant="2010-05-
17T14:58:34.763Z" Issuer="EGA-LoADM" MajorVersion="1" 
MinorVersion="1"> 
 <Conditions> 
  <DoNotCacheCondition></DoNotCacheCondition> 
 </Conditions> 
 <AttributeStatement> 
  <Subject> 
   <NameIdentifier 
Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:unspecified" 
NameQualifier="EGA-LoADM:AS">password authentication</NameIdentifier> 
   <SubjectConfirmation> 
   
 <ConfirmationMethod>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:cm:sender-
vouches</ConfirmationMethod> 
   </SubjectConfirmation> 
  </Subject> 
  <Attribute AttributeName="password authentication token" 
AttributeNamespace="urn:bea:security:saml:AC"> 
   <AttributeValue>password</AttributeValue> 
  </Attribute> 
  <Attribute AttributeName="password authentication 
protocol" AttributeNamespace="urn:bea:security:saml:AC"> 
   <AttributeValue>ssl</AttributeValue> 
  </Attribute> 
 </AttributeStatement> 
</Assertion> 
Table 6.4 Username/password authentication service SAML assertion 
<Assertion xmlns="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:assertion" 
xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:assertion" 
xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:protocol" 
AssertionID="db3c2838db744f704c5363059bb7a0eb" IssueInstant="2010-05-
17T14:58:34.763Z" Issuer="EGA-LoADM" MajorVersion="1" 
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MinorVersion="1"> 
 <Conditions> 
  <DoNotCacheCondition></DoNotCacheCondition> 
 </Conditions> 
 <AttributeStatement> 
  <Subject> 
   <NameIdentifier 
Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:unspecified" 
NameQualifier="EGA-LoADM:AS">IP authentication</NameIdentifier> 
   <SubjectConfirmation> 
   
 <ConfirmationMethod>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.0:cm:sender-
vouches</ConfirmationMethod> 
   </SubjectConfirmation> 
  </Subject> 
</Assertion> 
Table 6.5 IP-based authentication service SAML assertion 
Level 3 attributes Level 4 attributes Attributes values 
Password authentication Password authentication token password 
Password authentication protocol SSL 
IP authentication   
Table 6.6 Retrieved LoA-effecting attributes names from SAML assertions 
6.2.2.5 Implementation of the ALoA-DM module 
The ALoA-DM module receives the contributing LoA-effecting attributes‟ names 
from the LoA-ACM and queries to the LoA-APDB to retrieve both the contributing 
attributes‟ and their parent attributes‟ names (the database stores the hierarchical 
structure), component LoA values, weightings and relationship indicators. These 
attributes form a sub-LoA-AHS, as illustrated in Figure 6.5.  
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Figure 6.6 The sub-LoA-AHS for an authentication instance 
The ALoA-DM uses the structure as input to calculate the final aggregate LoA value. 
Using the algorithms described in Chapter 4, the results are the following: 
Aggregate LoA value for 
this authentication instance 
Use ALoAAD-SL 
algorithm 
Use ALoAAD-PT 
algorithm 
0.71 0.77 
NIST LoA definition 3 4 
Table 6.7 Aggregate LoA calculated in two additive algorithms 
The ALoAAD-SL algorithm gives an aggregate LoA value „0.71‟; the ALoAAD-PT 
algorithm gives an aggregate LoA value „0.77‟; and based on the mapping mechanism 
discussed in Section 4.4, the threshold of NIST level 3 and 4 is 0.75, thus the 
aggregate LoA values are transformed to 3 and 4 in the NIST definition respectively. 
It can been seen that the small changes in the numerical values of the LoA can lead to 
the same procedure being placed in two different NIST LoA levels. An observation 
can be made from this result. I.e. the numerical LoA values represent the 
authentication assurance in a more precise way than NIST LoA levels. More 
refinement for NIST LoA levels is needed.  
After the derivation of the aggregated LoA, the corresponding LoA-effecting 
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attributes and the LoA value for this authentication instance are stored in the LoA-
APDB for authorisation services to use. 
6.3 GEA-LoADM Performance Evaluation 
This section aims to investigate the level of the additional overheads the GEA-
LoADM introduces into an authentication process. In the following experiments, the 
Authentication Execution Times (AETs) in both the GEA-LoADM-enabled MAIS 
system and the MAIS system without the GEA-LoADM are measured and compared. 
An AET is defined as the time difference between when an authentication service 
receives an authentication request and when the authentication service makes an 
authentication decision for the request. The unit of the AET is a millisecond. 
Two sets of experiments (Set A and Set B) have been conducted for the evaluation. 
Set A is performed in the GEA-LoADM enabled MAIS system and Set B is 
performed in the MAIS system without the GEA-LoADM. Each set contains four 
identical experiments. Experiment one uses a username/password authentication 
service. Experiment two uses a certificated-based authentication service. Experiment 
three uses username/password and IP-based authentication services, and experiment 
four uses certificate-based and IP-based authentication services. 
Prior to performing the experiments, two main results were anticipated. Firstly, that 
all the AETs in Set A experiments would be longer than the AETs in Set B 
experiments. The reason is apparent as the GEA-LoADM would add additional 
overheads to the MAIS system. Secondly, the AETs in both sets would be longer 
when multiple authentication services are used (i.e. experiments 3 and 4) than the 
AETs when a single authentication service is used (experiments 1 and 2). This is 
because more computational time will be consumed when the sizes of attributes‟ input 
for the algorithms are larger, as we have evaluated in Section 4.5.2. 
6.3.1 Evaluation Environment 
The experiments are hosted on a Windows 7 OS running on a ThinkPad laptop with 
two 2.53GHz processors and 3072MB of memory. The prototype is implemented as a 
JAVA web application with Java EE™ Runtime Environment version 5. The 
performance evaluation tool used is NetBeans IDE v6.8. 
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6.3.2 Experiment Results 
Figure 6.7 shows the results of the experiments. As can be seen in the figure, one set 
is from the MAIS system with the GEA-LoADM and the other set from the MAIS 
system without the GEA-LoADM. The four experiments are „username/password 
authentication service‟, „certificated-based authentication service‟, 
„username/password and IP-based authentication services‟ and „certificate-based and 
IP-based authentication services‟, respectively. Two observations can be made from 
these results. The first one is that the AETs in Set A are significantly bigger than the 
AETs in Set B. This observation is in line with our expectations. The average 
difference is around 4 times longer. For example, in these experiments, the average 
AET in Set A is 2.3 seconds, but the average value in Set B is 0.64 seconds. Another 
observation is that in Set A, the AETs in experiments 3 and 4 are much longer than in 
experiments 1 and 2. This result is also expected.   
In order to improve the performance and reduce the AET in the GEA-LoADM model, 
we need to find out which component in the GEA-LoADM cost the most AET. For 
this purpose, we have done another set of experiments and investigated the execution 
times of each of the components involved in the authentication process. Figure 6.8 
shows the experiment results. It shows three sets of execution times in milliseconds 
against the four experiments. The three sets are from the LoA-ACM module, the 
ALoA-DM module and the authentication service, respectively. The four experiments 
are the same as the previous ones. The results show that the LoA-ACM module 
contributes the most AETs. After further investigating the program, we found that this 
is because the SAML assertions are XML-based messages, and parsing these 
messages (typically involving the construction of a DOM tree) is a very time-
consuming operation. Therefore, it costs a large amount of execution time. There is 
little we can do from the software point of view, but a high-performance computer 
would be able to reduce this execution time. 
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Figure 6.7 GEA-LoADM AET experiments 
 
 Figure 6.8 GEA-LoADM components execution time experiments  
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6.4 Tests against Security Attacks  
This section evaluates the security strength of the GEA-LoADM and discusses 
whether the overall security level of the MAIS system would be weakened by 
applying the GEA-LoADM model.  
From the discussion in Section 6.2.2, we can see that the GEA-LoADM model does 
not interfere with the user-to-system authentication process; therefore, the security of 
this part is unchanged. However, because the authentication services send SAML 
assertions to the GEA-LoADM, the authenticity of the authentication services and the 
integrity and confidentiality of the SAML assertions need to be guaranteed. We do so 
by issuing certificates to each of the authentication services and enabling SSL mutual 
authentication services to verify the authenticity of the authentication services. 
We have attempted some well-known attacks against our prototype and analysed the 
resistance level of the GEA-LoADM against them. Four security attacks have been 
attempted against the system: the first one is a forged assertion attack, the second one 
is a replay attack, the third one is a man-in-the-middle attack and the fourth one is a 
denial of service (DoS) attack. In the forged assertion attack, an attacker forges or 
alters an SAML assertion and sends it to the GEA-LoADM model. Based on the 
countermeasure specified in the SAML specification [Samlv2], the authentication 
service can digitally sign the SAML assertion before sending it to the GEA-LoADM 
model, thus providing both message integrity and authenticity. The replay attack is 
when an attacker intercepts a valid data transmission and retransmits it to the GEA-
LoADM. The countermeasure is to use the SSL transmitting channel between the 
authentication services and the LoA-ACM, thereby preventing the message‟s 
eavesdropping and interception. In addition, we have enabled a timestamp in the 
signature on an assertion (alternatively, a nonce continued by the receiving module 
can be included) to provide an additional assurance. The man-in-the-middle attack is a 
form of active eavesdropping in which the attacker makes independent connections 
with the authentication services and the GEA-LoADM model and relays messages 
between them, making them believe that they are talking directly to each other over a 
private connection, when in fact the entire conversation is controlled by the attacker. 
Again, the countermeasure is to use SSL mutual authentication to verify the 
authenticity of the authentication services thus ensuring the authenticity of the 
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message. In a DoS attack, an attacker attempts to prevent legitimate users from 
accessing services/resources by making them unavailable. The most common form is 
to send enormous valid but useless requests to a service provider thus blocking the 
network and/or crashing the server. Since the operations in the GEA-LoADM model 
are computationally more expensive than conventional authentication services as we 
demonstrated in the last section, the GEA-LoADM model could potentially be 
vulnerable to this type of attack. However, as the GEA-LoADM model takes 
messages sent by authentication services rather than receiving authentication requests 
directly from users, we can thwart this attack by assuring the authenticity between the 
authentication service and the GEA-LoADM using SSL mutual authentication. In this 
way, the GEA-LoADM could filter out invalid messages more efficiently. They will 
have to first successfully pass the authentication services. In other words, only 
authorised users could cause harm by launching such attacks; measures such as 
auditing can be used to identify and deter the attackers. 
In addition, the protection of the LoA-APDB database is also an important issue since 
the aggregate LoA values of each authentication instance (live or completed) are 
stored there. The database should be installed on a separate machine where only the 
server has access to it, and the database machine should not be linked to the Internet 
directly. 
6.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has described a prototype of the GEA-LoADM model based on a real-
life system, the MAIS system. Using the prototype, performance and security 
evaluations have been conducted. Major contributions demonstrated in this chapter 
are threefold. Firstly, the GEA-LoADM model has been implemented in a real-life 
system. Secondly, based on this prototype, the performance of the model has been 
investigated and compared with a conventional authentication process to understand 
the extent of the overheads introduced by the model. Thirdly, by simulating well-
known attacks on the prototype, the security of the model has been validated, which 
has demonstrated that the model is able to resist these attacks. 
The next chapter concludes this thesis and give recommendations for future work.
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion and Future Work 
This chapter summarises the work presented in this thesis, gives the conclusions 
drawn from the research findings, and finally, recommends future work. 
7.1 Thesis Summary 
 7.1.1 Review of the Thesis 
The work presented in this thesis can be arranged into four parts: research background, 
authentication levels of assurance (LoA) derivation algorithms, the generic e-
authentication levels of assurance derivation model (GEA-LoADM), and the 
implementation and evaluation of the model. 
Research Background 
The thesis has explained what authentication LoA is and how to link it to a user‟s 
access privilege to achieve a fine-grained access control. Chapter 2 gave an overview 
of the authentication LoA and investigated its related works. It also provided an in-
depth survey of e-authentication technologies and examined the authentication 
solutions in large-scale distributed system environments. Chapter 3 identified the 
LoA-effecting attributes from different authentication LoA-related works. It further 
identified two types of relationships from them, namely the weakest link relationship 
and the additive relationship. Finally it investigated potential methods that could be 
used to quantify the impact (weighting) of additive relationship attributes on an 
aggregate LoA.  
LoA Derivation Algorithms 
Chapter 4 presented our innovative authentication LoA derivation algorithms. It first 
specified the requirements for designing such algorithms. It then presented the design 
of one LoA derivation algorithm for attributes with the weakest link relationship, and 
the design of two LoA derivation algorithms for attributes with the additive 
relationship. Finally, it evaluated the performance and results of the algorithms. 
GEA-LoADM Model 
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Chapter 5 presented the design of a real-time authentication LoA derivation model, 
the GEA-LoADM, and integrated the LoA derivation algorithms into the model. It 
first detailed the design requirements for designing such a model. It then described the 
architecture and architectural components of the model. Finally, it analysed the model 
against its design requirements. 
Implementation and Evaluation 
The implementation of the GEA-LoADM model was done on a real-life system, the 
MAIS system. Based on the prototype, the performance of the model has been 
evaluated and compared to the system without the GEA-LoADM. This evaluation and 
comparison further assess the costs introduced as a result of using this approach. A 
security evaluation has also been conducted to assess the resistance level of the model 
against well-known security attacks. 
7.1.2 Contributions 
The thesis has made the following contributions and discoveries: 
The LoA-effecting attributes hierarchical structure (LoA-AHS) 
The author has identified and analysed a wide range of LoA-effecting attributes, 
examined the mutual relationships among them and designed a novel LoA-effecting 
attributes hierarchical structure (LoA-AHS). The LoA-AHS is flexible and extensible, 
and can accommodate existing, as well as future emerging, LoA-effecting attributes. 
By grouping multiple attributes into hierarchical levels and different categories based 
on their mutual relationships, this structured approach provides a systematic method 
for determination of an aggregated LoA value for an authentication instance, given 
component LoA values of the attributes involved as well as the weightings of the 
additive attributes. 
Aggregate LoA Derivation Algorithms 
The second major novel contribution is the design, prototype and evaluation of the 
three aggregate LoA derivation algorithms. One of the algorithms is for capturing the 
weakest link relationship among attributes and the other two are for capturing the 
additive relationship among attributes. 
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Generic e-authentication LoA derivation model 
The third major novel contribution is the design of the GEA-LoADM model that 
incorporates the aggregate LoA algorithms and the AHS structure. The model is 
capable of gathering LoA-effecting attributes, retrieving component LoA values of 
these attributes and the weightings of those attributes that are in an additive 
relationship, and deriving an aggregate LoA value for an authentication instance in 
real-time. 
Prototype-based evaluation 
A prototype-based evaluation has been carried out, which demonstrates that our 
solution, the GEA-LoADM, is capable of deriving an aggregate LoA based on a set of 
LoA-effecting attributes in real-time. It also demonstrates that the model is secure. 
The overheads introduced by the GEA-LoADM solution are the price to pay in order 
to achieve a more fine-grained access control. Real-system experiments have shown 
that, on average, the GEA-LoADM increases an authentication delay by 3.6 times in 
comparison to the system when LoA derivation is not enabled. A bigger portion of this 
increase is caused by parsing the XML messages generated as a result of using SAML 
assertions. 
To summarise, the research has explored the use of authentication LoA to facilitate a 
fine-grained access control that allows a user‟s access privilege to be linked to the 
authentication LoA in identifying the user. 
7.2 Future Work 
The following are recommended for future work. 
 The functionality of the GEA-LoADM model can be extended. For example, it 
can be equipped with a negotiation mechanism so that if the authentication LoA of 
a user is not sufficient for certain resources/services access, instead of denying the 
access request, the model can negotiate with the user to allow the user to choose 
an alternative authentication method in order to achieve the desired authentication 
LoA, or to grant the user with a lower level of access privilege.  
 The current prototype uses SAML assertions as the underlying LoA-effecting 
attributes mechanism to encapsulate and transport their component values, and 
other data required by the GEA-LoADM. As shown in our experiments that XML 
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message parsing is a time-consuming task, other transportation methods should be 
investigated to find a more efficient way of conveying data between 
authentication services and the GEA-LoADM model. 
 The evaluation of the GEA-LoADM has only considered the user-to-system 
scenario. More work is required to evaluate the model under other authentication 
scenarios, such as the assertion-based authentication scenario and delegation 
scenario. The GEA-LoADM model has considered the credential delegation, and 
more work is required to prototype the solution in a Grid application context to 
demonstrate the applicability of the model. 
 A ubiquitous computing environment involves the use of more LoA-effecting 
attributes than a conventional Internet environment. It would be interesting to 
investigate the use of the GEA-LoADM in a ubiquitous environment. In addition 
to identifying new attribute types, new authentication LoA derivation algorithms 
may need to be designed if new relationships among the attributes are identified. 
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APPENDIX A 
Authentication LoA Derivation Algorithms 
ALoAWL Algorithm (WL_LoADA.java) 
package loa_algorithms; 
 
import java.util.Arrays; 
 
/** 
 * 
 * @author yaol 
 */ 
public class WL_LoADA { 
 
    public WL_LoADA() { 
    } 
    double Agg_LoA;//[addAttrGroup.length]; 
    //double Agg_LoAS; 
    //int index; 
 
    public double wl_LoA(double addAttrGroup[]) { 
        int length = addAttrGroup.length; 
        //for (int j = 0; j < length; j++) { 
            //for (int i = 0; i < addAttrGroup[j].length; i++) { 
            if (length > 1) { 
                Arrays.sort(addAttrGroup); 
                return addAttrGroup[0]; 
 
            } else if (length == 1) { 
                Agg_LoA = addAttrGroup[0]; 
            } else { 
                Agg_LoA = -1; 
            } 
            //} 
        //} 
        return Agg_LoA; 
 
    } 
} 
ALoAAD-SL Algorithm (SL_LoADA.java) 
package loa_algorithms; 
 
/** 
 * 
 * @author yaol 
 */ 
public class SL_LoADA { 
 
    public SL_LoADA() { 
    } 
 
    double Agg_LoA; 
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    public double add_LoA(double addAttrGroup[]) { 
        //int index; 
 
        int length = addAttrGroup.length; 
 
        if (length > 2) { 
 
            Agg_LoA = add_LoASL(addAttrGroup[0], addAttrGroup[1]); 
 
            for (int index = 1; index < addAttrGroup.length - 1; 
index++) { 
                Agg_LoA = add_LoASL(Agg_LoA, addAttrGroup[index + 
1]); 
            } 
 
        } else if (length == 2) { 
            //add weightings to component LoA value 
            Agg_LoA = add_LoASL(addAttrGroup[0], addAttrGroup[1]); 
 
        } else if (length == 1) { 
            Agg_LoA = addAttrGroup[0]; 
        } else { 
            Agg_LoA = -1; 
        } 
        return Agg_LoA; 
    } 
 
    protected double add_LoASL(double loa1, double loa2) { 
     double uncert1 = 1 - loa1; 
     double uncert2 = 1 - loa2; 
     double k = uncert1 + uncert2 - uncert1 * uncert2; 
     if (k == 0) { 
      Agg_LoAS = 1; 
     } else { 
      Agg_LoAS = (loa1 * uncert2 + loa2 * uncert1) / k; 
     } 
     return Agg_LoAS; 
    } 
} 
ALoAAD-PT Algorithm (PT_LoADA.java) 
package loa_algorithms; 
 
/** 
 * 
 * @author yaol 
 */ 
public class PT_LoADA { 
    double Agg_LoA; 
    public PT_LoADA() { 
    } 
 
    public double add_LoA(double addAttrGroup[]) { 
        double temp = 1; 
        int length = addAttrGroup.length; 
        if (length > 1) { 
            for (int i = 0; i < length; i++) { 
                temp = temp * (1 - addAttrGroup[i]); 
            } 
            Agg_LoA = 1 - temp; 
        } else if (length == 1) { 
            Agg_LoA = addAttrGroup[0]; 
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        } else { 
            Agg_LoA = -1; 
        } 
        return Agg_LoA; 
    } 
} 
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APPENDIX B 
LoA-APDB Database Schema 
/* 
MySQL Data Transfer 
Source Host: localhost 
Source Database: loa_apdb 
Target Host: localhost 
Target Database: loa_apdb 
Date: 29/05/2010 23:21:27 
*/ 
 
SET FOREIGN_KEY_CHECKS=0; 
-- ---------------------------- 
-- Table structure for aggregate loa 
-- ---------------------------- 
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS `aggregate loa`; 
CREATE TABLE `aggregate loa` ( 
  `agg_loa_id` int(11) NOT NULL, 
  `agg_loa` double NOT NULL, 
  `time` datetime NOT NULL, 
  PRIMARY KEY (`agg_loa_id`) 
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=latin1; 
 
-- ---------------------------- 
-- Table structure for ahs 
-- ---------------------------- 
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS `ahs`; 
CREATE TABLE `ahs` ( 
  `parent_attr_id` int(5) DEFAULT NULL, 
  `child_attr_id` int(5) DEFAULT NULL, 
  `left_node` int(5) DEFAULT NULL, 
  `right_node` int(5) DEFAULT NULL, 
  `relationship` varchar(100) DEFAULT NULL, 
  `weighting` double DEFAULT NULL 
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=latin1; 
 
-- ---------------------------- 
-- Table structure for attributes 
-- ---------------------------- 
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS `attributes`; 
CREATE TABLE `attributes` ( 
  `attr_ID` int(5) NOT NULL, 
  `attr_name` varchar(200) NOT NULL, 
  `comp_loa` int(2) DEFAULT NULL, 
  PRIMARY KEY (`attr_ID`) 
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=latin1; 
 
-- ---------------------------- 
-- Table structure for contributing ahs 
-- ---------------------------- 
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS `contributing ahs`; 
CREATE TABLE `contributing ahs` ( 
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  `hie_id` int(11) NOT NULL, 
  `parent_attr_id` int(11) DEFAULT NULL, 
  `child_attr_id` int(11) NOT NULL, 
  `agg_loa_id` int(11) NOT NULL, 
  PRIMARY KEY (`hie_id`) 
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=latin1; 
 
-- ---------------------------- 
-- Records  
-- ---------------------------- 
INSERT INTO `aggregate loa` VALUES ('1', '0.71', '2010-05-20 
23:15:14'); 
INSERT INTO `ahs` VALUES (null, '1', '1', '24', 'additive', null); 
INSERT INTO `ahs` VALUES ('1', '2', '2', '19', 'additive', '0.8'); 
INSERT INTO `ahs` VALUES ('1', '3', '20', '23', 'additive', '0.2'); 
INSERT INTO `ahs` VALUES ('2', '4', '3', '8', 'weakest', '0.33'); 
INSERT INTO `ahs` VALUES ('2', '5', '9', '18', 'weakest', '0.67'); 
INSERT INTO `ahs` VALUES ('4', '6', '4', '5', null, null); 
INSERT INTO `ahs` VALUES ('4', '7', '6', '7', null, null); 
INSERT INTO `ahs` VALUES ('5', '8', '10', '15', 'weakest', null); 
INSERT INTO `ahs` VALUES ('5', '9', '16', '17', null, null); 
INSERT INTO `ahs` VALUES ('8', '10', '11', '12', null, null); 
INSERT INTO `ahs` VALUES ('8', '11', '13', '14', null, null); 
INSERT INTO `ahs` VALUES ('3', '19', '21', '22', null, null); 
INSERT INTO `attributes` VALUES ('1', 'agg_loa', null); 
INSERT INTO `attributes` VALUES ('2', 'id_authN', null); 
INSERT INTO `attributes` VALUES ('3', 'location_authN', null); 
INSERT INTO `attributes` VALUES ('4', 'password_authN', null); 
INSERT INTO `attributes` VALUES ('5', 'certificate_authN', null); 
INSERT INTO `attributes` VALUES ('6', 'passwd_authN_token', null); 
INSERT INTO `attributes` VALUES ('7', 'passwd_protocol', null); 
INSERT INTO `attributes` VALUES ('8', 'cert_authN_token', null); 
INSERT INTO `attributes` VALUES ('9', 'cert_protocol', null); 
INSERT INTO `attributes` VALUES ('10', 'cert_token_type', null); 
INSERT INTO `attributes` VALUES ('11', 'cert_keystore', null); 
INSERT INTO `attributes` VALUES ('12', 'passwd', '2'); 
INSERT INTO `attributes` VALUES ('13', 'ssl', '4'); 
INSERT INTO `attributes` VALUES ('14', 'id_certificate', '4'); 
INSERT INTO `attributes` VALUES ('15', 'proxy_certificate', '2'); 
INSERT INTO `attributes` VALUES ('16', 'cert_soft', '3'); 
INSERT INTO `attributes` VALUES ('17', 'cert_hard', '4'); 
INSERT INTO `attributes` VALUES ('19', 'ip', '2'); 
INSERT INTO `contributing ahs` VALUES ('1', null, '1', '1'); 
INSERT INTO `contributing ahs` VALUES ('2', '1', '2', '1'); 
INSERT INTO `contributing ahs` VALUES ('3', '1', '3', '1'); 
INSERT INTO `contributing ahs` VALUES ('4', '2', '4', '1'); 
INSERT INTO `contributing ahs` VALUES ('5', '3', '19', '1'); 
INSERT INTO `contributing ahs` VALUES ('6', '4', '6', '1'); 
INSERT INTO `contributing ahs` VALUES ('7', '4', '7', '1'); 
INSERT INTO `contributing ahs` VALUES ('8', '6', '12', '1'); 
INSERT INTO `contributing ahs` VALUES ('9', '7', '13', '1'); 
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APPENDIX C 
SAML Assertion Creation method  
private SAMLAssertion saml() { 
        String strIssuer = "EGA-LoADM"; 
        String strNameID = "password_authN"; 
        String strNameQualifier = "EGA-LoADM:AS"; 
        String strNamespace = "urn:bea:security:saml:AC"; 
        String strAttrName1 = "passwd_authN_token"; 
        String strAttrName2 = "passwd_protocol"; 
        SAMLAssertion assertion = null; 
        try { 
            // Crate the assertion 
            assertion = new SAMLAssertion(strIssuer, null, null, 
null, null, null); 
            // Create the subject 
            SAMLSubject subject = new SAMLSubject(new 
SAMLNameIdentifier(strNameID, strNameQualifier, 
SAMLNameIdentifier.FORMAT_UNSPECIFIED), null, null, null); 
 
            
subject.addConfirmationMethod(SAMLSubject.CONF_SENDER_VOUCHES); 
 
            // Create the authentication statement 
            //Date date = new Date(); 
            //SAMLAuthenticationStatement authStatement = new 
SAMLAuthenticationStatement(subject, LoAAttr, date, null, null, 
null); 
 
            //assertion.addStatement(authStatement); 
 
            // Create the attribute statement 
            SAMLAttribute attr = new SAMLAttribute(strAttrName1, 
strNamespace, null, 0, null); 
            SAMLAttribute attr1 = new SAMLAttribute(strAttrName2, 
strNamespace, null, 0, null); 
            // Here some hardcoded values for the groups attributes 
            attr.addValue("passwd"); 
            attr1.addValue("ssl"); 
 
            HashSet set = new HashSet(); 
            set.add(attr); 
            set.add(attr1); 
            SAMLSubject subject2 = (SAMLSubject) subject.clone(); 
            SAMLAttributeStatement attrStatement = new 
SAMLAttributeStatement(subject2, set); 
 
            assertion.addStatement(attrStatement); 
 
            SAMLDoNotCacheCondition condition = new 
SAMLDoNotCacheCondition(); 
            assertion.addCondition(condition); 
             
            //System.out.println("AMUserAssertion 1:\n" + 
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assertion.toString()); 
            //SAMLAttributeStatement attr3 = (SAMLAttributeStatement) 
assertion.getStatements().next(); 
            
//System.out.println(attr3.getAttributes().next().toString()); 
        } catch (Exception e) { 
            e.printStackTrace(); 
        } 
        return assertion; 
    } 
Weighting Determination code (weightingDet.java) 
public strictfp class weightingDet 
{ 
  public static void eigen(Complex A[][], Complex lambda[], 
                           Complex vec[][], boolean fail[]) 
  { 
    System.out.println("Eigene.eigen(A, lambda, vec, fail)"); 
    // driver for computing eigenvalues and eigenvectors 
    if(A==null || lambda==null || vec==null) 
    { 
      System.out.println("Error in Eigen2.eigen,"+ 
                         " null or inconsistent array sizes."); 
      return; 
    } 
    int n = A.length; 
    if(A[0].length!=n || vec.length!=n || vec[0].length!=n || 
lambda.length!=n) 
    { 
      System.out.println("Error in Eigen.eigen,"+ 
                         " inconsistent array sizes."); 
      return; 
    } 
    fail[0] = false; 
 
    // special cases 
    if(n<1) {System.out.println("zero size matrix"); return;} 
    int rowcol[] = new int[n]; 
    Complex B[][] = new Complex[n][n]; 
    ComplexMatrix.copy(A, B); 
 
    if(n==1) 
    { 
      lambda[0] = B[0][0]; 
      vec[0][0] = new Complex(1.0, 0.0); 
      return; 
    } 
    if(n==2) 
    { 
      twobytwo(B, lambda, vec); 
      return; 
    } 
    System.out.println("calling cxhess"); 
    cxhess(B, rowcol); 
    for(int i=0; i<n; i++) lambda[i] = new Complex(-999.0, -999.0); 
    System.out.println("calling cxeig2c"); 
    cxeig2c(B, lambda, vec, rowcol, fail); 
  } // end eigen 
 
  private static void twobytwo(Complex A[][], Complex lambda[], 
                               Complex vec[][]) 
  { 
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    Complex b, c, rad, l1, l2; 
    Complex Z[] = new Complex[2]; 
    double t; 
 
    b = A[0][0].add(A[1][1]); // negative 
    c = A[0][0].multiply(A[1][1]); 
    c = c.subtract(A[0][1].multiply(A[1][0])); 
    rad = (b.multiply(b)).subtract(c.multiply(4.0)); // a==1 
    rad = rad.sqrt(); 
    l1 = (b.add(rad)).divide(2.0); 
    l2 = (b.subtract(rad)).divide(2.0); 
    lambda[0] = l1; 
    lambda[1] = l2; 
    // eigenvectors in columns 
    Z[0] = A[0][1].negate(); 
    Z[1] = A[0][0].subtract(l1); 
    t = ComplexMatrix.norm2(Z); 
    vec[0][0] = Z[0].divide(t); 
    vec[1][0] = Z[1].divide(t); 
    Z[0] = A[1][1].subtract(l2); 
    Z[1] = A[1][0].negate(); 
    t = ComplexMatrix.norm2(Z); 
    vec[0][1] = Z[0].divide(t); 
    vec[1][1] = Z[1].divide(t); 
  } 
 
  private static double sumabs(Complex Z) 
  { 
    return Math.abs(Z.real())+Math.abs(Z.imaginary()); 
  } // end sumabs 
 
  private static void cxhess(Complex A[][], int rowcol[]) 
  { 
    int i, k, t; 
    Complex x; 
    Complex y; 
 
    System.out.println("cxhess(A, rowcol)"); 
    int n = A.length; // checked before call 
 
    for(int j=0; j<n; j++) rowcol[j] = j; 
    k = 0; 
    for(int m=k+1; m<n-1; m++) // main reduction loop 
    { 
      i= m; 
      x = new Complex(0.0, 0.0); 
      for(int j=m; j<n; j++) 
      { 
 if(sumabs(A[j][m-1]) > sumabs(x)) 
        { 
          x = A[j][m-1]; 
          i = j; 
        } 
      } 
      if(i != m) 
      { 
        //  rowcol row column interchange of H 
 t = rowcol[m]; 
        rowcol[m] = rowcol[i]; 
        rowcol[i] = t; 
 for(int j=m-1; j<n; j++) 
147 
 
        { 
          y = A[i][j]; 
          A[i][j] = A[m][j]; 
          A[m][j] = y; 
        } 
        for(int j=0; j<n; j++) //for J in 1..N loop 
        { 
          y = A[j][i]; 
          A[j][i] = A[j][m]; 
          A[j][m] = y; 
        } 
      } 
      if(sumabs(x) != 0.0) 
      { 
 for(int ii=m+1; ii<n; ii++) 
        { 
          y = A[ii][m-1]; 
          if(sumabs(y) > 0.0) 
   { 
            y = y.divide(x); 
            A[ii][m-1] = y; 
            for(int j=m; j<n; j++) 
            { 
              A[ii][j] = A[ii][j].subtract(y.multiply(A[m][j])); 
     } 
            for(int j=0; j<n; j++) 
            { 
              A[j][m] = A[j][m].add(y.multiply(A[j][ii])); 
            } 
          } // end if 
          A[ii][m-1] = new Complex(0.0, 0.0); // just cleanup 
        } 
      } // end if 
    } // end main reduction loop 
    System.out.println("result of cxhess="); 
    ComplexMatrix.print(A); 
    System.out.println("based on rowcol interchanges="); 
    Matrix.print(rowcol); 
    System.out.println(" "); 
  } // end cxhess 
 
  private static void cxeig2c(Complex A[][], Complex lambda[], 
                              Complex vec[][], 
                              int rowcol[], boolean fail[]) 
  { 
    int j, k, m, mm, low, its, itn, ien; 
    double anorm = 0.0; 
    double ahr, aahr, acc, xr, xi, yr, yi, zr; 
    Complex accnorm; 
    Complex x, y, z, yy, T, S; 
    int n = A.length; // checked in driver 
 
    low = 0; 
    acc = Math.pow(2.0, -23); 
    System.out.println("acc="+acc+" = 2^-23"); 
    T = new Complex(0.0, 0.0); 
    itn = 30 * n; // heuristic on maximum iterations 
    ComplexMatrix.identity(vec); // initialize to identity Matrix 
 
    // starting from Hessenberg reduction 
    for(int ii=n-2; ii>0; ii--) //for i in reverse A'FIRST+1..A'LAST-
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1 loop 
    { 
      j = rowcol[ii]; 
      for(k=ii+1; k<n; k++) //for K in i+1..A'LAST loop 
      { 
        vec[k][ii] = A[k][ii-1]; 
      } 
      if(ii != j) 
      { 
 for(k=ii; k<n; k++) //for k in i..A'LAST loop 
        { 
          vec[ii][k] = vec[j][k]; 
          vec[j][k] = new Complex(0.0, 0.0); 
        } 
        vec[j][ii] = new Complex(1.0, 0.0); 
      } 
    } 
    ien = n-1; // used as subscript, loop test <=ien 
  
    // ien is decremented 
    while(low <= ien) // 260 
    { 
      System.out.println("260 low="+low+", ien="+ien); 
      its = 0; 
      // look for small single subdiagonal element 
      L280: while(true)  //  280 
      {  
        System.out.println("in 280"); 
        k = low; 
        // for kk in reverse low+1..ien loop  // 300 
        for(int kk=ien; kk>low; kk--) // 300 
 { 
          System.out.println("300 kk="+kk); 
 
          ahr = sumabs(A[kk][kk-1]); 
          aahr = acc * (sumabs(A[kk-1][kk-1]) + sumabs(A[kk][kk])); 
          if(ahr <= aahr) 
   { 
            k = kk; 
            break; 
          } 
        }  //  300  
        System.out.println("exiting 300 with k="+k); 
        if(k == ien) break L280;  //exit L280 when k = ien;  // 780 
        if(itn <= 0) 
 { 
          fail[0] = true; 
          return; 
        } 
 
        // compute shift 
        if(its == 10 || its == 20) 
 { 
          S = new Complex(Math.abs(A[ien][ien-1].real()) + 
                          Math.abs(A[ien-1][ien-2].real()) , 
                          Math.abs(A[ien][ien-1].imaginary()) + 
                          Math.abs(A[ien-1][ien-2].imaginary())); 
 } 
        else 
 { 
          S = A[ien][ien]; 
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          x = A[ien-1][ien].multiply(A[ien][ien-1]); 
          if(sumabs(x) > 0.0) 
   { 
            y = (A[ien-1][ien-1].subtract(S)).divide(new Complex(2.0, 
0.0)); 
            z = ((y.multiply(y)).add(x)).sqrt(); 
            if(y.real() * z.real() + y.imaginary() * z.imaginary() < 
0.0) 
     { 
              z = z.negate(); 
            } 
            yy = y.add(z); 
            S = S.subtract(x.divide(yy)); 
          } // end if; 
        } // end if;  //  400  
        for(int i=low; i<=ien; i++) // for i in low..ien loop  // 420 
 { 
          A[i][i] = A[i][i].subtract(S); 
        } // end loop;  //  420  
        T = T.add(S); 
        its = its + 1; 
        itn = itn - 1; 
        j = k + 1; 
 
        // look for two consecutive small sub-diagonal elements 
        xr = sumabs(A[ien-1][ien-1]); 
        yr = sumabs(A[ien][ien-1]); 
        zr = sumabs(A[ien][ien]); 
        m = k; 
        for(mm=ien-1; mm>=j; mm--) // for mm in reverse j..ien-1 loop  
// 460 
        { 
   System.out.println("460 mm="+mm+", m="+m+", j="+j); 
          yi = yr; 
          yr = sumabs(A[mm][mm-1]); 
          xi = zr; 
          zr = xr; 
          xr = sumabs(A[mm-1][mm-1]); 
          if(yr <= (acc * zr/yi *( zr + xr + xi ))) 
   { 
            m = mm; 
            break; 
          } 
        } //end loop;  //  460  
 
        // triangular decomposition  A = L*R 
        for(int i=m+1; i<=ien; i++) //for i in m+1..ien loop  // 620 
        { 
   System.out.println("620 mm="+mm+", m="+m+", i="+i); 
          x = A[i-1][i-1]; 
          y = A[i][i-1]; 
          if(sumabs(x) >= sumabs(y)) 
   { 
            z = y.divide(x); 
            lambda[i] = new Complex(-1.0, 0.0 ); 
          } 
          else 
   { 
            // interchange rows of A 
     for(int jj=i-1; jj<n; jj++) // for j in i-1..n loop  // 540 
            { 
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              z = A[i-1][jj]; 
              A[i-1][jj] = A[i][jj]; 
              A[i][jj] = z; 
            } // end loop;  //  540 
            z = x.divide(y); 
            lambda[i] = new Complex(1.0, 0.0); 
          } // end if; 
          A[i][i-1] = z; 
          for(int jj=i; jj<n; jj++) // for j in i .. N loop  // 600 
          { 
            A[i][jj] = A[i][jj].subtract(z.multiply(A[i-1][jj])); 
          } // end loop;  //  600 
        } // end loop;  //  620  
 
        // composition R*L = H 
        for(int jj=m+1; jj<=ien; jj++) // for j in m+1..ien loop  // 
760 
        { 
          x = A[jj][jj-1]; 
          A[jj][jj-1] = new Complex(0.0, 0.0); 
 
          // interchange columns of A and vec if necessary 
          if(lambda[jj].real() > 0.0) 
          { 
            for(int i=low; i<=jj; i++) // for i in low .. j loop  // 
660 
            { 
              z = A[i][jj-1]; 
              A[i][jj-1] = A[i][jj]; 
              A[i][jj] = z; 
            } // end loop;  //  660 
            for(int i=low; i<n; i++) // for i in low .. N loop  // 
680 
            { 
              z = vec[i][jj-1]; 
              vec[i][jj-1] = vec[i][jj]; 
              vec[i][jj] = z; 
            } // end loop;  //  680 
          } // end if 
 
          // end interchange columns 
          for(int i=low; i<=jj; i++) // for i in low..j loop  // 720 
          { 
            A[i][jj-1] = A[i][jj-1].add(x.multiply(A[i][jj])); 
          }  //  720 
          for(int i=low; i<n; i++) // for i in low..N loop  // 740 
          { 
            vec[i][jj-1] = vec[i][jj-1].add(x.multiply(vec[i][jj])); 
          }  //  740 
 
          // end accumulate transformations 
        }  //  760  
      }  // 280 
  
      // a root found 
      lambda[ien] = A[ien][ien].add(T); 
      ien = ien - 1; 
    } // end loop;  // 260 while 
 
    // all roots found 
    for(int i=0; i<n; i++) // for i in A'RANGE loop 
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    { 
      anorm = anorm + sumabs(lambda[i]); 
      for(int jj=i+1; jj<n; jj++) // for j in i + 1 .. A'LAST loop 
      { 
        anorm = anorm + sumabs(A[i][jj]); 
      } 
    } 
    accnorm = new Complex(anorm * Math.pow(2.0,-23), 0.0); 
    if(anorm == 0.0 || n < 2) 
    { 
      return;  // done 
    } 
 
    // back substitute to set up vec of upper triangular form 
    for(ien=n-1; ien>low; ien--) // for ien in reverse low+1..N loop 
    { 
      x = lambda[ien]; 
      for(int i=ien-1; i>=low; i--) // for i in reverse low .. ien - 
1 loop 
      { 
        z = A[i][ien]; 
        for(int jj=i+1; jj<ien; jj++) // for j in i+1..ien-1 loop 
        { 
          z = z.add(A[i][jj].multiply(A[jj][ien])); 
        } 
        y = x.subtract(lambda[i]); 
        if(sumabs(y) == 0.0) 
        { 
          y = accnorm; 
        } 
        A[i][ien] = z.divide(y); 
      } 
    } 
 
    // multiply by transformation Matrix to give vec of original full 
Matrix 
    for(int jj=n-1; jj>=0; jj--) // for j in reverse A'RANGE loop 
    { 
      for(int i=0; i<n; i++) // for i in A'RANGE loop 
      { 
        z = vec[i][jj]; 
        for(k=0; k<jj; k++) // for k in A'first..j-1 loop 
 { 
          z = z.add(vec[i][k].multiply(A[k][jj])); 
        } 
        vec[i][jj] = z; 
      } 
    } 
  } // end cxeig2c 
} // end class Eigen2 
 
// Complex.java 
/* 
 * Copyright (c) 2003 Jon S. Squire.  All Rights Reserved. 
 *  
 * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without 
 * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions 
 * are met: 
 *  
 * -Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright 
 *  notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
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 *  
 * -Redistribution in binary form must reproduce the above copyright 
 *  notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in 
 *  the documentation and/or other materials provided with the 
distribution. 
 *  
 * Neither the name of the author or the names of contributors 
 * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this 
software 
 * without specific prior written permission. 
 *  
 * This software is provided "AS IS," without a warranty of any kind. 
ALL 
 * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CONDITIONS, REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES, 
INCLUDING 
 * ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 
PURPOSE 
 * OR NON-INFRINGEMENT, ARE HEREBY EXCLUDED. THE AUTHOR AND 
CONTRIBUTORS 
 * SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES OR LIABILITIES SUFFERED BY 
LICENSEE 
 * AS A RESULT OF OR RELATING TO USE, MODIFICATION OR DISTRIBUTION OF 
THE 
 * SOFTWARE OR ITS DERIVATIVES. IN NO EVENT WILL THE AUTHOR OR 
CONTRIBUTORS 
 * OR SUCCEEDING LICENSORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY LOST REVENUE, PROFIT OR 
DATA, 
 * OR FOR DIRECT, INDIRECT, SPECIAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, INCIDENTAL OR 
PUNITIVE 
 * DAMAGES, HOWEVER CAUSED AND REGARDLESS OF THE THEORY OF LIABILITY, 
 * ARISING OUT OF THE USE OF OR INABILITY TO USE SOFTWARE, EVEN IF 
THE AUTHOR 
 * OR CONTRIBUTORS HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH 
DAMAGES. 
 *  
 * You acknowledge that this software is not designed, licensed or 
 * intended for use in the design, construction, operation or 
 * maintenance of any human use medical device. 
 */ 
 
 
/** Immutable, complex numbers. A Complex consists of a real 
 *  and imaginary part, called Cartesian coordinates. 
 * 
 *  The Complex class provides methods for arithmetic such as: 
 *  add, subtract, multiply, divide, negate and invert. 
 *  Also provided are complex functions sin, cos, tan, asin, acos, 
atan, 
 *  sqrt, log, exp, pow, sinh, cosh, tanh, atanh. 
 * 
 *  Source code <a href="Complex.java">Complex.java</a> 
 */ 
 
strictfp class Complex extends Object 
{ 
  double x, y; // Cartesian representation of complex 
 
  /** cartesian coordinates real and imaginary are NaN */ 
  public Complex(){x=Double.NaN; y=Double.NaN;} 
 
  /** construct a copy of a Complex object */ 
153 
 
  public Complex(Complex z){x=z.real(); y=z.imaginary();} 
 
  /** real value, imaginary=0.0 */ 
  public Complex(double x){this.x=x; y=0.0;} 
 
  /** cartesian coordinates real and imaginary */ 
  public Complex(double x, double y){this.x=x; this.y=y;} 
 
  /** convert cartesian to polar */ 
  public Complex polar(){double r = StrictMath.sqrt( 
                                    this.x*this.x+this.y*this.y); 
                         double a = StrictMath.atan2(this.y,this.x); 
                         return new Complex(r,a);} 
 
  /** convert polar to cartesian */ 
  public Complex cartesian(){return new 
Complex(this.x*StrictMath.cos(this.y), 
                                               
this.x*StrictMath.sin(this.y));} 
 
  /** extract the real part of the complex number */  
  public double real(){return this.x;} 
 
  /** extract the imaginary part of the complex number */ 
  public double imaginary(){return this.y;} 
 
  /** extract the magnitude of the complex number */  
  public double magnitude(){return 
                            
StrictMath.sqrt(this.x*this.x+this.y*this.y);} 
 
  /** extract the argument of the complex number */ 
  public double argument(){return StrictMath.atan2(this.y,this.x);} 
 
  /** add complex numbers */  
  public Complex add(Complex z){return new Complex 
                                (this.x+z.x, this.y+z.y);} 
 
  /** add a double to a complex number */ 
  public Complex add(double d){return new Complex 
                                (this.x+d, this.y);} 
 
  /** subtract z from the complex number */ 
  public Complex subtract(Complex z){return new Complex 
                                     (this.x-z.x, this.y-z.y);} 
 
  /** subtract the double d from the complex number */ 
  public Complex subtract(double d){return new Complex 
                                     (this.x-d, this.y);} 
 
  /** negate the complex number */ 
  public Complex negate(){return new Complex(-this.x, -this.y);} 
 
  /** multiply complex numbers */  
  public Complex multiply(Complex z){return new Complex 
                          (this.x*z.x-this.y*z.y, 
                           this.x*z.y+this.y*z.x);} 
 
  /** multiply a complex number by a double */ 
  public Complex multiply(double d){return new 
Complex(this.x*d,this.y*d);} 
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  /** divide the complex number by z */ 
  public Complex divide(Complex z){double r=z.x*z.x+z.y*z.y; 
                                   return new Complex 
                                   ((this.x*z.x+this.y*z.y)/r, 
                                    (this.y*z.x-this.x*z.y)/r);} 
 
  /** divide the complex number by the double d */ 
  public Complex divide(double d){return new 
Complex(this.x/d,this.y/d);} 
 
  /** invert the complex number */ 
  public Complex invert(){double r=this.x*this.x+this.y*this.y; 
                          return new Complex(this.x/r, -this.y/r);} 
 
  /** conjugate the complex number */ 
  public Complex conjugate(){return new Complex(this.x, -this.y);} 
 
  /** compute the absolute value of a complex number */ 
  public double abs(){return  
StrictMath.sqrt(this.x*this.x+this.y*this.y);} 
 
  /** compare complex numbers for equality */ 
  public boolean equals(Complex z){return (z.x==this.x) && 
                                          (z.y==this.y);} 
 
  /** convert a complex number to a String.  
   *  Complex z = new Complex(1.0,2.0); 
   *  System.out.println("z="+z); */ 
  public String toString(){return new 
String("("+this.x+","+this.y+")");} 
 
  /** convert text representation to a Complex.   
   *  input format  (real_double,imaginary_double) */ 
  public static Complex parseComplex(String s){ 
      int from = s.indexOf('('); 
      if(from==-1) return null; 
      int to = s.indexOf(',',from); 
      double x = Double.parseDouble(s.substring(from+1,to)); 
      from = to; 
      to = s.indexOf(')',from); 
      double y = Double.parseDouble(s.substring(from+1,to)); 
      return new Complex(x,y); } 
 
  /** compute e to the power of the complex number */ 
  public Complex exp(){double exp_x=StrictMath.exp(this.x); 
                       return new Complex 
                       (exp_x*StrictMath.cos(this.y), 
                        exp_x*StrictMath.sin(this.y));} 
 
  /** compute the natural logarithm of the complex number */ 
  public Complex log(){double rpart=StrictMath.sqrt( 
                       this.x*this.x+this.y*this.y); 
                       double ipart=StrictMath.atan2(this.y,this.x); 
                       if(ipart>StrictMath.PI) ipart=ipart-
2.0*StrictMath.PI; 
                       return new Complex(StrictMath.log(rpart), 
ipart);} 
 
  /** compute the square root of the complex number */ 
  public Complex sqrt(){double 
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r=StrictMath.sqrt(this.x*this.x+this.y*this.y); 
                        double rpart=StrictMath.sqrt(0.5*(r+this.x)); 
                        double ipart=StrictMath.sqrt(0.5*(r-this.x)); 
                        if(this.y<0.0) ipart=-ipart; 
                        return new Complex(rpart,ipart);} 
                        
  /** compute the complex number raised to the power z */ 
  public Complex pow(Complex z){Complex a=z.multiply(this.log()); 
                                return a.exp();} 
                        
  /** compute the complex number raised to the power double d */ 
  public Complex pow(double d){Complex a=(this.log()).multiply(d); 
                                return a.exp();} 
 
  /** compute the sin of the complex number */ 
  public Complex sin(){return new Complex 
                       (StrictMath.sin(this.x)*cosh(this.y), 
                        StrictMath.cos(this.x)*sinh(this.y));} 
 
  /** compute the cosine of the complex number */ 
  public Complex cos(){return new Complex 
                       (StrictMath.cos(this.x)*cosh(this.y), 
                        -StrictMath.sin(this.x)*sinh(this.y));} 
 
  /** compute the tangent of the complex number */ 
  public Complex tan(){return (this.sin()).divide(this.cos());} 
 
  /** compute the arcsine of a complex number */ 
  public Complex asin(){Complex IM = new Complex(0.0,-1.0); 
                 Complex ZP = this.multiply(IM); 
                 Complex ZM = (new Complex(1.0,0.0)).subtract 
                                     
(this.multiply(this)).sqrt().add(ZP); 
                 return ZM.log().multiply(new 
Complex(0.0,1.0));} 
 
  /** compute the arccosine of a complex number */ 
  public Complex acos(){Complex IM = new Complex(0.0,-1.0); 
                 Complex ZM = (new Complex(1.0,0.0)).subtract 
                                     
(this.multiply(this)).sqrt().multiply 
                                     (IM).add(this); 
                 return ZM.log().multiply(new 
Complex(0.0,1.0));} 
 
  /** compute the arctangent of a complex number */ 
  public Complex atan(){Complex IM = new Complex(0.0,-1.0); 
                        Complex ZP = new Complex(this.x,this.y-1.0); 
                        Complex ZM = new Complex(-this.x,-this.y-
1.0); 
                        return 
IM.multiply(ZP.divide(ZM).log()).divide(2.0);} 
 
  /** compute the hyperbolic sin of the complex number */ 
  public Complex sinh(){return new Complex 
                       (sinh(this.x)*StrictMath.cos(this.y), 
                        cosh(this.x)*StrictMath.sin(this.y));} 
 
  /** compute the hyperbolic cosine of the complex number */ 
  public Complex cosh(){return new Complex 
                       (cosh(this.x)*StrictMath.cos(this.y), 
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                        sinh(this.x)*StrictMath.sin(this.y));} 
 
  /** compute the hyperbolic tangent of the complex number */ 
  public Complex tanh(){return (this.sinh()).divide(this.cosh());} 
 
  /** compute the inverse hyperbolic tangent of a complex number */ 
    public Complex atanh(){return (((this.add(1.0)).log()).subtract( 
       ((this.subtract(1.0)).negate()).log()) 
       .divide(2.0));} 
 
   
  // local - should be a good implementation in StrictMath 
  private double sinh(double x){return( 
                                StrictMath.exp(x)-StrictMath.exp(-
x))/2.0;} 
  private double cosh(double x){return( 
                                StrictMath.exp(x)+StrictMath.exp(-
x))/2.0;} 
} 
LoA-ACM module (loa_acm.java) 
package ehealth.security.LoA; 
/* 
 * To change this template, choose Tools | Templates 
 * and open the template in the editor. 
 */ 
 
import java.io.IOException; 
import java.io.PrintWriter; 
import java.util.Hashtable; 
import java.util.Iterator; 
import javax.servlet.ServletException; 
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServlet; 
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest; 
import javax.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse; 
import javax.servlet.http.HttpSession; 
import org.opensaml.SAMLAssertion; 
import org.opensaml.SAMLAttribute; 
import org.opensaml.SAMLAttributeStatement; 
 
/** 
 * 
 * @author yaol 
 */ 
public class loa_acm extends HttpServlet { 
 
    /**  
     * Processes requests for both HTTP <code>GET</code> and 
<code>POST</code> methods. 
     * @param request servlet request 
     * @param response servlet response 
     * @throws ServletException if a servlet-specific error occurs 
     * @throws IOException if an I/O error occurs 
     */ 
    protected void processRequest(HttpServletRequest request, 
HttpServletResponse response) 
            throws ServletException, IOException { 
        response.setContentType("text/html;charset=UTF-8"); 
        PrintWriter out = response.getWriter(); 
        try { 
            HttpSession session = request.getSession(true); 
            SAMLAssertion assertion = (SAMLAssertion) 
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session.getAttribute("saml"); 
 
            SAMLAttributeStatement samlAttrState = 
(SAMLAttributeStatement) assertion.getStatements().next(); 
            Iterator samlAttrs = samlAttrState.getAttributes(); 
 
            Hashtable contributing_attr = new Hashtable(); 
            SAMLAttribute samlAttr = null; 
            while (samlAttrs.hasNext()) { 
                samlAttr = (SAMLAttribute) samlAttrs.next(); 
                contributing_attr.put(samlAttr.getName(), 
samlAttr.getValues().next().toString()); 
            } 
            session.setAttribute("contributing_Attributes", 
contributing_attr); 
            
response.sendRedirect(response.encodeRedirectURL("aloa_dm")); 
        } finally { 
            out.close(); 
        } 
    } 
 
    // <editor-fold defaultstate="collapsed" desc="HttpServlet 
methods. Click on the + sign on the left to edit the code."> 
    /**  
     * Handles the HTTP <code>GET</code> method. 
     * @param request servlet request 
     * @param response servlet response 
     * @throws ServletException if a servlet-specific error occurs 
     * @throws IOException if an I/O error occurs 
     */ 
    @Override 
    protected void doGet(HttpServletRequest request, 
HttpServletResponse response) 
            throws ServletException, IOException { 
        processRequest(request, response); 
    } 
 
    /**  
     * Handles the HTTP <code>POST</code> method. 
     * @param request servlet request 
     * @param response servlet response 
     * @throws ServletException if a servlet-specific error occurs 
     * @throws IOException if an I/O error occurs 
     */ 
    @Override 
    protected void doPost(HttpServletRequest request, 
HttpServletResponse response) 
            throws ServletException, IOException { 
        processRequest(request, response); 
    } 
    /**  
     * Returns a short description of the servlet. 
     * @return a String containing servlet description 
     */ 
    @Override 
    public String getServletInfo() { 
        return "Short description"; 
    }// </editor-fold> 
} 
 
